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ABSTRACT 
TARGETING DRONES: FRAMING, VETTING, AND POWER IN 
TRANSNATIONAL ADVOCACY ISSUE NETWORKS 
SEPTEMBER 2021 
ALEXANDRIA JANE NYLEN 
B.A., UNIVERSITY OF SAN DIEGO
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF SAN DIEGO
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST  
Directed by: Professor Charli Carpenter 
Existing international relations literature shows that coherent messaging by advocacy 
networks is a key component for successful transnational mobilization around human 
security issues. However, traditional models of transnational advocacy do not fully explain 
how activists working against armed drones have mobilized over the past two decades. 
This dissertation explores the case of a transnational advocacy coalition that – despite 
efforts to do so – was unable to coalesce around a central message: the anti-drone issue 
network. I ask two interrelated questions: 1) Why have international anti-drone activists 
not been able to overcome disagreements over framings? and more broadly, 2) How do 
actors with differing levels of geopolitical power navigate a transnational human security 
network? Drawing on an original text and picture dataset of 300 anti-drone advocacy 
documents, 38 in-depth interviews with key informants, and multi-sited fieldwork, I argue 
that distinct exertions of power by specific, geographically disparate actors affected the 
overall issue network’s ability to cohere around a unifying frame. Specifically, partnering 
viii 
decisions at every level of the network were impacted by an original concept that I call 
“inverse vetting” – a process through which less materially and geographically powerful 
network actors legitimize the advocacy framings of more powerful groups by partnering 
with them or not. 
I demonstrate this argument through three empirical chapters that examine different 
levels of the transnational advocacy network against drones. In the first empirical chapter, 
I focus on the most powerful actors in the network: international non-governmental 
organizations that lobby international organizations. I then analyze US-based activists who 
primarily petition their own government over its drone policies. The last empirical chapter 
examines a violence-affected segment of the anti-drone network in Pakistan. Each of these 
chapters explore how power is operative in transnational advocacy networks through the 
mechanism of inverse vetting. I argue that inverse vetting demonstrates how actors who 
are traditionally considered the least enfranchised members of a network can affect the 
overall coherency of an advocacy campaign by making their voices and interests heard. 
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The Transnational Armed Drone Issue 
Puzzle and Research Questions 
“I am feeling a lot of frustration with the drone folk,” Max1 sighed, shaking their 
head. Max works as a media communications expert at an organization focused on 
helping nonprofits amplify their various mission goals in the mainstream media. They 
coordinate communication between advocacy organizations working on armed drones, 
like Human Rights Watch (HRW), Amnesty International (AI), Center for Civilians in 
Conflict (CIVIC), and others. While they are generally surprised at the large amount of 
effort it takes to coordinate joint events with these groups on drones, they reported that 
their largest frustration yet was with the silence from these activists regarding the January 
2020 Baghdad strike that killed the Iranian General Qasem Soleimani.  
While the US government defended the strike as a legitimate “targeted killing” 
within its broader “war against terrorists,”2 the Gen. Soleimani killing represents a 
dramatic evolution in US drone policy. As the head of the Revolutionary Guard’s Quds 
Force, Gen. Soleimani was Iran’s most powerful intelligence and security officer.3 The 
January strike was the first killing by drone of an official whose government the US is 
not at war with. Given Gen. Soleimani’s prominence, the strike ratcheted up tensions to 
1 Name changed as per participant request and gender-neutral pronouns to conceal 
identity: “they/them/their’s” 
2 Gearan and Itkowitz, 2020 





a fever-pitch between the US and Iran. Experts were quick to point out the possible legal 
violations of this strike.4 Notably, the strike apparently occurred without the consent of 
the Iraqi government,5 and without the consent of US Congress.6 Some contend, at the 
very least, that the collateral deaths of nine other individuals caused by the strike were 
almost certainly illegal. But, despite the action’s dubious legality, international anti-drone 
activists did not release a timely joint statement acknowledging the strike.7 
 The absence of a public response from the anti-drone activists is not the result of 
a lack of effort on the part of specific actors within that community. For example, Max 
attempted to coordinate a simple and decisive joint statement on the Soleimani killing the 
moment after they heard about the strike. However, according to them, back-and-forth 
quibbling between key actors over framing resulted in a failure to produce such a 
statement for more than a month after the strike. This is despite the shared and 
expressed goal of activist community to make coordinated public comments on drone-
related current events. 
The disagreements reportedly centered around language. Some organizations 
wanted to take as strong of a stance as possible and call the January 2020 strike “illegal” 
and use it as a way to demonstrate the insidiousness of drone warfare. However, HRW 
and AI were approaching the situation with an abundance of caution and were both 
hesitant to label the strike as “illegal.” In light of this resistance from the two human 
rights gatekeepers, other actors suggested that rather than producing a novel joint 
statement, the anti-drone community should compile and re-release its past statements 
on drones. However, HRW and AI were, at the time of writing, unwilling to accept this 
compromise.  
 
4 Carpenter, 2020 
5 Johnson, 2020 
6 Zraick, 2020 





 The Soleimani strike seems to be just the type of lightening-rod external event 
that can activate and reinvigorate transnational human security campaigns. This vignette 
offers a particularly powerful and contemporary example of the transnational anti-drone 
activists’ inability to come together in a key moment. This is not an isolated incident, nor 
a recent trend, within this specific advocacy community. On the contrary, this story 
exemplifies the centrality of internal discord over framing decisions in transnational 
actors’ attempts to organize joint advocacy activities, after they have already deemed the 
issue as a legitimate topic for advocacy.  
 Disagreements and internal squabbles are common and normal for activists 
attempting to work together in nascent human security campaigns.8 However, activists 
working on issues that enjoy a robust and sustained civil society interest – such as 
landmines and killer robots – typically overcome these arguments through compromise 
or elite consolidation around a “vanilla” umbrella frame.9 Alternatively, if no compromise 
around framing can be found or if powerful advocacy organizations do not want to work 
on the subject, the issue may fade away and/or die.10 In addition to these factors, 
international relations literature shows that issues regarding bodily harm to vulnerable 
populations are particularly salient for garnering civil society’s attention, and that 
advocacy topics that easily graft onto preexisting transnational issues are more likely to 
form robust campaigns through processes of conceptual interlinkage, norm cascades and 
band-wagoning.11 The anti-drone advocacy issue is theoretically interesting from these 
standpoints, as activists have not found an overarching frame compromise, yet they have 
persisted in focusing on the issue topic of armed drones for well over a decade. 
 
8 Bahçecik 2019; Carpenter 2007 
9 Mekata 2000; Stroup and Wong, 2017; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Breen 2019 
10 Carpenter, 2014 





In light of this, my project asks two interrelated questions: 1) Why have 
international anti-drone activists not been able to overcome disagreements over 
framings? and more broadly, 2) How do actors with differing levels of geopolitical power 
navigate a transnational human security network? 
Possible Explanations 
 There are a couple alternative explanations for the lack of an overarching 
campaign message, one external and one internal. First, explanations for this lack of 
cohesive transnational advocacy might point beyond the tactics and strategies of the 
activists themselves and to a hostile political opportunity structure regarding the 
regulation of armed drone issue. Political opportunity structures are the objective, 
external institutional environment in which contentious politics takes place – they define 
“the nature of resources and constraints external to the challenging group.”12 States are 
generally theorized as being largely unresponsive to civil society attempts to reign in their 
power on issues central to national security.13 However, the presence of challenging 
political opportunity structures does not fully explain the case of fragmented drone 
advocacy from both empirical and theoretical levels. 
On an empirical level, there is actually a widening of state interest in addressing or 
at least engaging with specific aspects regarding the regulation of drones: proliferation 
and assassination. While states may have been reticent to address the use of drones when 
there was only one primary state user (the United States) and a small pool of potential 
targets (al-Qaeda and its affiliates), the increasingly bold and sophisticated instances of 
nonstate usage – such as the 2019 attack on a Saudi oil field14 and the attempted 
 
12 Meyer, 2009: 19; Tilly, 1978; McAdam, 1982; Tarrrow, 1998 
13 Baldwin 1993; Waltz 2001 
14 This attack was claimed by Houthi rebels, but a majority of international actors like the 





assassination on Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro15 by drone in 2018 – firmly 
situates export and proliferation control as a national security issue.16 Additionally, as the 
January 2020 US drone strike on Iranian General Qasem Soleimani shows, prohibition 
norms surrounding the lethal targeting of state officials may be crumbling.17 On a 
theoretical level, substantial transnational mobilization against an expanded state practice 
can still occur even in the presence of long odds.18 Indeed, transnational activists have 
launched successful campaigns aimed at banning weapons states once considered 
important to their military arsenal, such as anti-personnel landmines, cluster munitions 
and nuclear weapons.19   
Second, turning inward to the anti-drone activist community, another potential 
explanation for a lack of cohesive messaging against armed drones is disinterest from 
elite transnational civil society organizations in anti-drone campaigning.20 Theory 
suggests that powerful international organizations like Human Rights watch act as 
“gatekeepers” that can legitimate or ignore various human security issues.21 The effect of 
a gatekeeper’s lack of interest in an issue is that the issue does not become a transnational 
campaign.22 For example, when local activists who wanted to ban male circumcision were 
turned down as partners by large international organizations, their proposed issue was 
kept off the transnational advocacy “agenda” and they were unable to spark a global 
campaign to end the practice.23 However, unlike in many of these cases where elite civil 
 
15 It is still unclear who conducted this attack; a wide array of claims have been leveled, 
from anti-government forces to the potential of a false flag operation to solidify regime 
power (Franke, 2018) 
16 Milan and Bassiri Tabrizi 2020; Chávez and Swed 2021; Senn and Troy, 2017: 210; 
Horowitz, Kreps, and Fuhrmann, 2016 
17 Thomas 2001, 2005; Carpenter, 2020; Banka and Quinn 2018 
18 Bayat, 2013; Goodwin and Jasper, 1999 
19 Garcia, 2015; Rosert 2019 
20 Park, Murdie, and Davis 2019 
21 Bob, 2009 






society actors need to be convinced that a particular issue is worth their time, gatekeeper 
organizations were some of the earliest “adopters” of the armed drone issue. For 
example, AI, HRW and CIVIC all launched highly publicized reports on the US use of 
armed drones for targeted killing as early as 2010.24 
Argument 
 The above factors – an opening political opportunity structure and the pre-
existing engagement of gatekeeper organizations – suggest that the anti-drone advocacy 
issue should be ripe for a robust transnational advocacy campaign in favor of regulating 
or banning armed drones.25 However, anti-drone activists have not been able to 
overcome their fundamental differences in how they frame the “problem of drones.” 
Indeed, the complexity of the armed drone issue lends itself to a variety of human 
security frames and advocacy groups hold differing ideas of the “true” problem.  
This dissertation explores the case of a transnational advocacy coalition that – 
despite efforts to do so – was unable to coalesce around a central message: the anti-
drone issue network. I analyze internal networking processes in order to understand why 
the anti-drone community did not coalesce around a specific framing, despite the drone 
issue’s seeming conduciveness to transnational campaigning. Drawing on an original text 
and picture dataset of 300 anti-drone advocacy documents, 38 in-depth interviews with 
key informants, and multi-sited fieldwork, I argue that distinct exertions of power by 
specific, geologically disparate actors affected the overall issue network’s ability to cohere 
around a unifying frame. Specifically, partnering decisions at every level of the network 
were impacted by an original concept that I call “inverse vetting.” Inverse vetting builds 
on the theoretical concept of “elite vetting,” which shows that the most powerful actors 
 
24 Kenneth Roth 2010; “The Civilian Impact of Drones: Unexamined Costs, Unanswered 
Questions,” 2012; “Will I Be Next?: U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan,” 2013 
25 Park, Murdie, and Davis 2019; Della Porta and Tarrow, 2005; Tarrow, 2005; Meyer 





in an advocacy network oftentimes determine which human security issues emerge as 
campaigns.26 Alternatively, I argue that inverse vetting is a process through which less 
materially and geographically powerful network actors legitimize the advocacy framings 
of more powerful groups by partnering with them or not. As I will develop throughout 
this dissertation, inverse vetting is a relational process between actors with varying levels 
of geopolitical power that can influence the coherence of a human security campaign. In 
this case for example, the most disenfranchised actors - anti-drone grassroots activists in 
Pakistan - exercised power in global politics, as their actions inadvertently impacted how 
the armed drone issue is campaigned around in transnational space. Thus, the anti-drone 
issue network’s inability to cohere can at least partially be explained by the presence of 
both elite and inverse vetting processes. This dissertation contributes to and expands the 
theorizing on transnational advocacy processes focuses on traditionally less-powerful 
actors.27 
What is a Drone? 
 A military drone, or Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), is a remotely piloted 
aircraft. This means that unlike traditional aerial bombers, there is no human inside the 
cockpit. Instead, drone pilots operate the vehicles hundreds, oftentimes thousands, of 
miles away.28 Drones also differ from fully autonomous weapons, since there is still a 
human pilot operating the aircraft and strikes are based on human decision-making 
processes.29 Military drones come in multiple models, such as General Atomics’ MQ-9 
Reaper and MQ-1 Predator. They are also dual use – with models specializing in strike 
 
26 Carpenter, 2014 
27 Arensman, van Wessel, and Hilhorst, 2017; Bownas ,2017; Capie, 2012; de Almagro, 
2018; Hauf, 2017; Hertel, 2006; Irvine, 2013; Pallas, 2017; Pallas and Nguyen, 2018; 
Pallas and Urpelainen, 2013; Schramm and Sändig, 2018; Temper, 2019; Wajner, 2017 
28 For a fascinating and critical take on the history of bombing and its connection to 
imperialism, see Lindqvist, 2001 





capabilities, surveillance capabilities, or both.30 Drones can be used in support of troops 
on the ground but also in independent targeted strike operations. Another key defining 
characteristic of drones are which operational chains of command they fall under— the 
Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency are both capable of running 
reconnaissance and lethal international drone operations.31  
As drone technologies are rapidly proliferating in civilian life, there can be 
confusion amongst non-experts on what the issue actually is.32 Drone technology is 
currently being used in multiple dimensions of everyday life – from the use of small 
drones for photography and videography purposes to their role in Amazon deliveries.33 
There is a massive research and development drive focused entirely on evolving drones 
from their original use in the military to a significant role in commerce and civil 
government applications, such as in farming.34 Goldman Sachs anticipates that this 
domestic civilian “market opportunity” is the “fastest growing” sector – around $30 
billion; while still estimating the military R&D potential at $70 billion.35 The domestic use 
of nonmilitary drones are certainly without controversies of their own – especially when 
it comes to issues of policing and surveillance.36 For example, in Summer 2020, domestic 
drones stoked controversy for their use by police to monitor peaceful demonstrations 
 
30 Drones are increasingly being used for commercial and civilian purposes, such as in 
agriculture, photography and package delivery (Schulzke, 2019). They are also 
increasingly being used in domestic police forces for purposes such as border monitoring 
(Csernatoni, 2018). This dissertation is only concerned with their military use outside of 
the user state’s borders in pursuit of national security objectives. 
31 However, this trend may be changing more in favor of the Pentagon as it draws back 
support for the CIA operations (Barnes and Schmitt 2020) 
32 Suhrke, 2019 
33 “Drones: Reporting for Work,” n.d. 
34 Schulzke, 2019; “Drones: Reporting for Work,” n.d. 
35 Goldman Sachs, n.d. 





associated with the Black Lives Matter movement.37 Again, however, this is beyond the 
purview of this dissertation which is only concerned with military usage of drones.  
Significance in International Security 
 Military drone technology is rapidly proliferating – both state and nonstate actors 
are solidifying patterns of use that are in turn affecting how contemporary wars are 
fought.38 As of 2020, 120 countries have acquired some model of military drone and 11 
have used armed drones in combat.39 As the technological first-mover, since 2001 the US 
has launched over 4,700 confirmed strikes in seven different countries: Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, Syria, Iraq and Libya.40 The Obama Administration massively 
expanded the targeted killing program started by the Bush Administration,41 with an 
increase in drone development, strike numbers, deaths, geographical scope, and 
institutionalization.42 Bolstered by the previous Administration’s bureaucratizing of the 
legal and policy framework, these upward trends continued under the Trump 
Administration.43 Within its first in office, the quantity of strikes doubled in Somalia, 
tripled in Yemen, while also increasing in Pakistan.44 Since 2001, these strikes have 
resulted in between 7,275 - 10,586 total deaths, according to differing nongovernmental 
accounts,45 with 737-1,551 of these estimated as civilian deaths.46 
 
37 Biddle, 2021 
38 Senn and Troy, 2017; Horowitz, Kreps, and Fuhrmann, 2016; Kreps and Zenko, 2014 
39 PAX, 2020 
40 Savage, 2015; The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 2018 
41 McCriken 2011; The first recorded U.S. drone strike occurred on November 2001 in 
Kabul, Afghanistan, killing an estimated seven people. The Bush Administration oversaw 
50 total drone strikes, all concentrated towards the end of his last term, all inside 
Afghanistan. 
42 Jameel, 2016: 6; Within Obama’s first two terms in office, the number of drone strikes 
increased six times over, and deaths quadrupled. 
43 But also see Yousaf 2020 
44 Purkiss, Serle and Fielding-Smith, 2017 
45 Ibid. These numbers do not include the number of drone strikes in the ongoing air war 
in Syria and Iraq, or Israeli drone activity in Gaza. 
46 Civilian casualty counting in regard to drone strikes has been contested, with the U.S. 





While the US continues to remain the primary user of armed drones in the 
international sphere, the drone issue is an inherently transnational one.47 The US drone 
program relies on a well-developed international security architecture for proper 
functioning.48 For example, the Ramstein airbase in Germany houses the satellite relay 
station that grants drone operators in the US the ability to communicate with UAVs 
striking in the Middle East, North Africa and Afghanistan.49 Niger Air Base 201 in 
Agadez further demonstrates the complex and deeply transnational nature of US drone 
operations. While this base is owned by the Nigerien military, it was built, paid for and is 
operated by the US as a launching point for armed UAV operations in the Sahel.50 
In addition to functioning as enabling partners for US operations, EU states and 
the UK also have their own policies on the development and use of armed drones.51 For 
example, the UK has its own small fleet of Reaper drones, with plans to acquire the new 
“SkyGuardian” version of the former Predator drone.52 The British military and 
intelligence services have also pursued targeted killing operations independent from the 
US command and control. Meanwhile, the EU is currently laying the groundwork to 
develop the first multinational armed drone as part of the new European Defense Fund 
(EDF) – the first model being Airbus’s “Eurodrone.” Germany, France, Italy and Spain 
collaborated on its development, and the “Eurodrone” will be strike-capable when it 
reaches flying stage sometime in 2020.53 On this topic, Airbus’s CEO stated that the 
distribution of strike-capable models will depend on the “political sensitivities” within 
 
government’s numbers and independent reports likely arises from a difference in 
definition of combatant and civilian (Kreps and Kaag, 2014) 
47 Welch, 2021 
48 Cannon, 2020 
49 Scahil, 2015 
50 Rempfer, 2020 
51 Mair, Minor, and Holder 2017 






each EU user nation.54 These varying levels of partner-state complicity in US operations, 
along with the development of independent drone programs by different users, 
complicates the work of transnational activists. The diffused nature of drone warfare 
creates a problem of scale regarding decisions by activists on which governments to 
target. 
Understanding the parameters and idiosyncrasies of the “drone debates” in the 
wider international sphere is a necessary first step before analyzing the more specific case 
of contestation within drone-related transnational advocacy. This is because the 
conceptual ambiguities that arise from these broader debates contribute to the frame 
disputes amongst activists. These effects are most notable in discussions around the 
relationship between the drone technology and the policy of targeted killing.55 Below I will 
detail a few aspects of the debates - and the foreign policy shifts which gave rise to them 
- that are relevant to my dissertation’s subject. 
Which Laws Apply to Drone Strikes? 
 Since the US has been the overwhelming sole-user of armed drones for the 
majority of the past two decades, its patterns of use solidified precedents and set the 
terms of the drone debates. US drone operations fall in line with the US’s overall 
approach to its “war against terrorists:” that the country is engaged in an ongoing and 
shifting global conflict.56 This foreign policy approach began after 9/11 when the Bush 
Administration took the position that the US should treat terrorism as an act of war 
rather than one of crime, and that they should not restrict combat operations to a single 
battleground.57 Under this “war paradigm,” the Bush Administration legalized its war in 
Iraq and its use of renditions and “enhanced interrogations,” and the Obama 
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Administration institutionalized the use of drones for targeted killing both within and 
beyond active warzones.58 
 All post-9/11 US Administrations have taken the unwavering legal position that 
counterterrorism operations abroad fall under the jurisdiction of the Laws of Armed 
Conflict (LOAC) rather than International Human Rights Law (IHRL).59 This position is 
contested within international society, by both state and nonstate actors, given the fact 
that the LOAC are much more permissive than IHRL in terms of civilian causalities and 
lethal targeting in general.60 This has been especially true in the case of US drone usage, 
since lethal strikes have occurred in areas that do not meet the threshold for a state of 
armed conflict, such as in Northern Pakistan.61 As long as its drone strikes adhere to the 
LOAC principles of distinction, proportionality, and military necessity, the US’s legal 
position is that targeted killing via drone is legal.62  
This war paradigm for drone strikes did not go uncontested; many international 
human rights advocates, attorneys, international law experts, nongovernmental 
organizations and state governments disagree with the US’s legal position.63 For example, 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) states that both IHL and IHRL are 
applicable during armed conflict, and that as the “law of peacetime,” IHRL should 
manage conduct outside recognized battlefields.64 Many other international actors argue 
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that IHRL demands a “policing paradigm” for counterterrorism and drone strikes.65 This 
means that targeting killing would only be legal if the suspect was posing an immediate 
threat to others’ lives.66  
Conflating Targeted Killing with Drones 
These legal debates, and the confusion that can sometimes arise from them 
within the public sphere, creates conceptual murkiness. This imprecision is the most 
consequential when it conflates targeted killing – a policy – with drones – a weapons 
technology. 
Targeted killing is a leadership decapitation and deprivation tactic that have been 
a central action in post-9/11 U.S. foreign policy.67 The US military has used targeted 
killing extensively in its global counterterrorism operations to deprive groups like al-
Qaeda and Daesh of their leadership with the ultimate goal of scattering the 
organizations.68 Proponents of targeted killing claim that these strikes have sent terrorist 
groups into a hard-to-reverse decline.69 While armed drones have been the primary 
weapon platform from which these US counterterrorism strikes have occurred, targeted 
killing can be undertaken with a number of weapons.70  Indeed, the most publicized 
example of a targeted killing by the US military was the SEAL Team raid that killed 
Usama bin Laden.  
Drones, on the other hand, are an unmanned aerial weapons platform capable of 
launching air-to-ground laser- or radar-guided missiles, the most common of those being 
Hellfire missiles. While there are a variety of drone models from different manufacturers, 
the key factor that separates drones from traditional military aircraft is the fact that they 
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are remotely piloted and can hover over targets waiting for an opportunity to strike.71 
Armed drones are not autonomous weapons, since they require a human in the loop that 
constantly controls the aircraft and makes the strike decisions. Fully autonomous 
weapons – labeled “killer robots” by some international activists72 – are currently in the 
research and development stage and completely remove human control from direct 
targeting decisions.73 Importantly for the topic of this dissertation, the international 
drone campaigners and the international “killer robot” campaigners are distinct advocacy 
issue networks.74 According to the activists I spoke with, this is because many human 
security activists are frustrated at the complexity of the armed drone issue and activists’ 
inability to settle on a coherent message. They report that activists can much more easily 
frame “killer robots” in a black-and-white way: that they are inherently “bad,” while 
drones fall into a shade of gray. 
 These differences are more than semantics. Focusing myopically on the 
technology of the drone is precisely the legal tactic that the US government has 
unwaveringly adopted since 2001.75 This is because, as stated earlier, the US military 
argues that as long as the strikes are undertaken in a manner consistent with the 
principles of war law – distinction, proportionality and necessity – their use of armed 
drones are legal (again, because the entire globe is a “battle zone” under the war 
paradigm).76 The drone is revered as one of the most precise weapons technologies in the 
US’s arsenal in terms of targeting combatants and limiting civilian casualties,77 and the US 
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military’s logic follows that drones are uniquely capable of compliance with war law, 
especially when compared to bombers of the past.78 Some public intellectuals and 
academics even echo this narrative of drones as uniquely humane weapons.79 This is in 
spite of the fact that the US government has kept casualty numbers caused by drones 
largely secret and opaque as a matter of policy.80  
Conversely, many activists and scholars urge a widened view- one that 
acknowledges the potential precision-strike capability of drones as a technology; but also 
interrogates the US’s jus ad bellum reasoning – or the legal claim that anywhere al-Qaeda 
and its affiliates hide is part of their wider war on terror – on their policy of preemptive 
drone strikes outside active battlefields.81 Critics argue that conflating the technology 
with the policy obfuscates legal questions about when and where the US can undertake 
lethal targeting.82 These debates and the ensuing conceptual murkiness surrounding 
drones and “what matters” about them also impacts how activists advocate on the issue 
of armed drones— particularly in framing decisions and intra-network disagreements. 
Emergence of an International Activist Response 
 While the Bush Administration used armed drones for lethal targeting missions 
inside the active battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan, the international activist community 
began concentrating on armed drones as a significant human security issue largely under 
the Obama Administration. The years 2008-2106 saw a massive uptick in lethal targeting 
operations via armed drones within Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia - these attacks outside 
active battlefields drew the most early activist responses.83 In 2010, the Bureau of 
Investigative Journalism (TBIJ) became one of the first organizations to dedicate 
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significant resources towards elevating armed drones as an important security issue 
through their ongoing casualty recording project.84 In 2012, both human rights and 
humanitarian disarmament groups like CIVIC, AI and HRW issued in-depth reports on 
the dubious legality of drone strikes outside Afghanistan and Iraq, drawing attention to 
the civilian cost of such strikes.85 As will be further explored in the empirical chapters of 
this dissertation, smaller organizations based all over the world also adopted armed 
drones onto their agendas during this decade. The key hubs of anti-drone advocacy were 
based in the US, the UK, the EU and Pakistan. 
 In addition to these individual organizations’ responses, anti-drone advocates also 
began to collaborate with one another under the Obama years. For example, the US-
based Interfaith Network on Armed Drones formed in 2014, while the EU-based 
European Forum on Armed Drones (EFAD) formed in the same year. In the most 
highly published example of partnerships between organizations based in the Global 
North and South, CodePink partnered with the Pakistani organization Foundation for 
Fundamental Rights in its protest march from Islamabad to Waziristan.86 At this same 
time, Open Society Foundation (OSF) became the major funder of anti-drone advocacy 
internationally, a massive project that only just tapered off in early 2021.87 With these 
activities and funding patterns in mind, the bulk of transnational anti-drone work was 
carried out between 2010-2021, with most activists describing issue interest as waning in 
the past several years.  
Key Concepts: Anti-Drone Activism 
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 This dissertation focuses only on activists who are opposed, either in part or in 
whole, to current state use of armed military drones. While there are robust pro-drone 
(mostly corporate) lobbying activities,88 these actors are beyond the purview of this 
dissertation. It is important to make a note of my terminology and definition here, so 
that it is useful in regard to the diversity of actors in this network. “Anti-drone” refers to 
a group or individual’s broad opposition to how armed drones are currently being used 
by state actors, not necessarily that they desire a wholesale weapons ban against the 
technology. For example, Human Rights Watch is only concerned with whether or not 
armed drones are being used legally or illegally in combat; they do not oppose the 
weapon. This is different from a small peace-oriented organization like Drone Wars UK 
that opposes the armed drone entirely, and advocates for the technology to be banned.  
Coherent Networked Advocacy 
 Overall frame coherence is the dependent variable in this project, and this 
terminology needs further elaboration. In order for a transnational advocacy network to 
be effective, they must be able to strategically communicate a coherent message about 
their goals on a particular issue to policymakers and stakeholders.89 This involves 
overcoming the problem of a “frame soup,” in which multiple actors in the network 
have competing, contradictory or just different preferences on how to define the human 
security issue at hand.90 Indeed, fragmented and unfocused advocacy is not only 
ineffective, but it may also deter interest from policymakers due to “attention fatigue.”91 
If activists can overcome this jumble, a coherent advocacy message comes in the form of 
an umbrella frame – the unifying call to action or “demand” on powerholders that can 
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push disparate aspirations into a consolidated campaign. In this way, strategic 
participatory communication in social movements is “at the heart of social change” in 
transnational politics.92 
Assuming other conditions are ripe in transnational politics, it is from this 
consolidated human security campaign that activists might achieve some level of policy 
“success” by altering the state behavior they label as “undesirable.”93 Here, we can think 
of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) as the prototypical example of 
a “successful” and coherent human security campaign, as the ICBL campaign had a 
cogent driving frame and achieved its self-described goals of banning anti-personnel 
landmines through a treaty.94 The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons 
(ICAN) is another example of a human security campaign that consolidated on a simple 
umbrella frame (outlaw nuclear weapons) and ultimately achieved its specific goal of 
creating a new international treaty.95 The more contemporary Campaign to Stop Killer 
Robots, which seeks to outlaw autonomous weapons, is an illustrative example of a 
campaign that faced significant internal arguments between activists over framing 
initially, but eventually cohered into a targeted campaign and is still ongoing.96 Of course, 
the attainment of these advocacy goals does not ensure efficacy – the mere existence of 
international treaties does not mean compliance.97 
My project is not meant to be a diagnostic of the “success” or “failure” of the 
anti-drone campaign, nor is it meant to account for all of the factors necessary for 
“human security campaign emergence.” Instead, as the first academic project on the anti-
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drone advocacy network, this project explores the various frames that constitute the 
UAV “frame soup.” I study the relational processes between actors with drastically 
varying levels of geopolitical power that went into trying to create an umbrella frame for 
a transnational anti-drones campaign. I found that a key relational process – inverse 
vetting – played a significant role in explaining why the anti-drones network was 
ultimately unable to cohere around a unifying frame. 
Inverse Vetting 
 I argue that vetting, which are inherently relational processes, can influence the 
overall coherence of a transnational advocacy campaign’s framing. While elite vetting in 
advocacy networks has been studied extensively, I show that both elite and inverse 
vetting processes were at play in the anti-drone advocacy network. This new coalition-
building dynamic builds on traditional and contemporary literature transnational 
advocacy processes. The conventional boomerang model of transnational advocacy 
shows us that local groups will link up with better endowed international organizations 
when they face challenges.98 This can potentially allow less well-resourced activists to 
circumvent blockages, as these more powerful partners are thought of as bringing 
tangible resources to bear, such as political access, financial resources and technical 
expertise. In the words of Keck and Sikkink (2018): “For the less powerful Third World 
actors, networks provide access, leverage and information (and often money) they could 
not expect to have on their own.” Other studies inverse the traditional boomerang 
model, as well as introduce other “types” of boomerangs that will be discussed in the 
next chapter in more detail.99 The inverse boomerang model specifically suggest that 
sometimes international organizations are the ones to first initiate contact with smaller 
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groups when facing lobbying blockages.100 This is because diverse stakeholder 
participation is thought of as boosting campaign legitimacy, and as we know from 
existing work, legitimacy is the key currency of international NGOs.101  
While the boomerang models are about directionality, agenda setting helps us 
better understand which issues get adopted by transnational civil society. International 
gatekeeper organizations are thought of as carefully “vetting” the advocacy topics they 
undertake, legitimizing only a few human security issues by adding them to their 
agenda.102 I combine the above-described inverse boomerang model with a new vetting 
model, how actors with differing levels of power navigate an issue network. I argue that 
less powerful groups “vet” partnerships and issue framings in much the same way as 
gatekeeper organizations. Inverse vetting reverses the traditional advocacy vetting model, 
meaning that the less powerful grassroots actor chooses whether to legitimize certain 
advocacy framings by transnational groups, rather than only the other way around. When 
this inverse vetting process leads to a rejected partnership this pathway towards a 
unifying frame for a given global campaign becomes more muddled and fragmented. The 
implication of the inverse vetting process is that it may show a mechanism through 
which activists based in the Global South, or less resource-rich groups more broadly, 
impact transnational advocacy. 
Frames and Frame Typology 
Groups advocating against drones vary in terms of professional focus, 
geographical location, and size. This collection of actors includes human rights groups, 
humanitarian disarmament groups, peace groups, religious groups, and individuals like 
journalists and academics who self-identify as anti-drone activists.103 These communities 
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have varying degrees of communication and project synergy with one another, and are 
located within geographically dispersed networks in Washington, DC, New York, the 
UK, the EU and Pakistan. While all of these groups take positions against state use of 
armed drones, the groups vary significantly in their focus, as well as in their prescriptions. 
From the human rights groups’ perspectives, the use of drone strikes outside 
“active” battlefields is illegal and constitutes extrajudicial execution. Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch, alongside smaller human rights organizations, 
tend to focus on the policy of targeted killing, and when it can legally be used by states.104 
Their advocacy efforts center around writing reports on the consequences of specific 
strikes. They also engage in litigation on behalf of victims of US strikes and pursue 
government transparency regarding armed drone policies.105 In contrast, humanitarian 
disarmament groups, having a relatively successful track record on banning certain 
weapons technologies like landmines, have primarily focused their advocacy attention on 
demonstrating that the drone itself may be inherently harmful. More specifically, these 
activists are concerned that drones are uniquely destructive weapons technologies 
because they might lower the threshold for the use of force by making it easier and 
cheaper; that the precision-strike narrative around drones makes policymakers less likely 
to ask about civilian casualties;106 and that the drone’s ability to hover wreaks extreme 
psychological damage to those who live beneath them in targeted territories.107   
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A third set of actors, direct action and peace groups like Code Pink are more 
“hands on” in their approaches to political mobilization. For example, as part of their 
“Ground the Drones” campaign, Code Pink activists have travelled to Pakistan in order 
to join local activists in a solidarity march from Peshawar into what was then called the 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA; now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, or KP), and 
they also host an annual trip to Creech Air Force in Nevada to “shut down” its normal 
operations through embodied protest.108 Religious groups in the US have formed a 
robust domestic interfaith network, which focuses on the critiquing the ethics of drone 
strikes and how they relate to human dignity. Religious groups employ direct action 
tactics like weekly sit-ins at drone bases, while also focusing on community socialization 
through sermons.109 
A fourth group of activists in Pakistan vary in their substantive focuses, with 
some adopting a human rights litigation approach, some working on data gathering, and 
others opting for a more indigenous grassroots response. These groups typically work 
directly with survivors of strikes as part of their advocacy, though the activists vary in 
their willingness to network with European and American organizations. 
In this study, I identify three overarching meta-frames that groups in this 
transnational network utilize when naming the “problem with drones.” I refer to these 
overarching concepts as “meta-frames” in order to differentiate them from the various 
sub-frames that exist under each category within my typology.110 These meta-frames 
include: the “Lawful Usage” Frame, the “Ban Drones” Frame and the “Neocolonialism” 
Frame, and they all represent broad ways in which groups present the drone issue in their 
 
108 Boone, 2012 
109 Linehan, 2019 
110 In this dissertation, I use the terminology of “frames” rather than only refering to 
actor’s understandings of the issue as “problem definitions.” This is because I look at 






advocacy. As will be developed throughout this dissertation, there are important nuances 
under each category and different types of groups tend to favor specific frames within 
these categories. Figure 2 below contains useful information on each meta-frame, such as 
a brief description, examples of specific issues, and the proposed solutions of activists 
who fall into a given category.  
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Table 1.1: Frame Typology 
The “Ban Drones” Frame focuses on the weapon platform itself, arguing that 
there is something uniquely insidious about drones- for example, this could be its dual-





general discomfort over its “panopticon” effect- that someone is always watching. 
Groups operating from peace traditions, such as those within the US-based Interfaith 
Network on Drone Warfare or the UK-based Drone Wars, tend to be the most 
comfortable with adopting this more radical stance. As will be further explored in the 
chapter focusing on the transnational level, there is a schism within the humanitarian 
disarmament community. This division is between groups that advocate for a coalition to 
ban drones, similar to the one this community successfully led on anti-personnel 
landmines, and those who think such an approach would actually backfire in terms of 
civilian protection, given that drones are more precise and therefore less destructive than 
traditional aerial bombers.  
The “Lawful Usage” Frame focuses on how states deploy and use drones in 
combat. In this framing, the drone technology itself is not viewed as a problem per se. In 
fact, Human Rights Watch’s position on drones is that this technology, when used 
correctly, can limit civilian casualties.111 Within this frame, the primary issues are 
extralegal behavior, such as extrajudicial execution and violations of sovereignty. Groups 
that adopt this meta-frame tend to latch onto specific aspects of usage, depending on 
their organization’s professional orientation. For example, data advocacy groups like the 
Bureau of Investigative Journalism tend to be more concerned with questions of 
government transparency and accountability. These activists have focused a large amount 
of attention on simply gaining access to information on civilian casualties and 
government drone policies through actions like FOIA requests.112  
The “Neocolonialism” Frame is more complicated than the above categories, 
because it does not easily mesh with professionalized understandings of transnational 
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advocacy and it only appears in the violence-affected level of the network. Here, 
technology, policy, state control, colonial legacies, and even hierarchy in transnational 
civil society are all imbricated problems. Activists who adopt this meta-frame are more 
concerned with a broader tapestry of civilian harm in the drone-affected regions, 
including civilian casualties by drones but also internally displaced peoples, cultural 
discrimination, economic justice, and how both historical and modern colonial 
underpinnings perpetuate these problems. The “problem with drones” for these 
individuals then mostly surrounds societal harm, cultural sovereignty, and the potential 
that the Pakistani state is complicit in the US operations. 
  These three meta-frames represent fundamental differences in goals, venues for 
advocacy, and desired outcomes – they are the discordant ingredients within the armed 
drone “frame soup” that activists were unable to unify. These various groups choose 
these frames for different reasons, and the empirical chapters in this dissertation explore 
these reasons. What is key is that the frames groups choose to utilize informs how they 
vet potential partners. The first two meta-frames can be thought of as the 
“professionalized advocacy frames,” favored by large, mainstream international groups 
like Human Rights Watch. As the network diagram in the next section will show, the 
actors that adopted the Neocolonialism meta-frame are disconnected from groups that 
fall into these professionalized meta-frames.  
Methods and Analysis 
For this dissertation, I adopt a multi-methods approach to data collection and 
analysis in order to study how activists communicate and coalition-build across a specific 
transnational network.113 I take a deterritorialized approach to data collection, as such an 
approach is particularly well-suited to examining “how ideas circulate” through 
 





transnational space, because it considers “temporary sites of action” (such as 
conferences) alongside more fixed sites of power (such as the UN First Committee or 
the EU Parliament).114 This dissertation is based on three years of research (2017-2020), 
during which I conducted three distinct but interrelated methods of data collection: 1) 
creating an original text and picture dataset of advocacy organization publications, 
websites, and internal communications on drones; 2) conducting semi-structured 
interviews with key informants from various hierarchal slices of the issue network; and 3) 
field site visits to conferences and offices. 
 As an initial step, I compiled a master list of advocacy organizations working on 
the armed drone issue through web-based research. This Excel spreadsheet categorizes 
organizations based on 1) name, 2) self-identified advocacy community, 3) type of drone 
advocacy tactics, 4) location, 5) policy stance on drones [if any], 6) public partnerships 
with other drone organizations, and 7) contact information for key informants [when 
available]. This basic information allowed me to start tracing connections between 
organizations through salient information such staff overlaps between organizations, 
jointly signed documents, jointly published projects, jointly attended conferences, and co-
hosted drone events.115 In terms of sampling, I identified key actors through jointly 
signed agreements and through participant lists for anti-drone conferences and activities. 
I then contacted these organizations and used a snowball sampling method to identify 
other key actors. As will be discussed in Chapter Five, my interviews with Pakistani 
activists came from a professional connection who has an extensive network amongst 
affected actors.  
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This initial research allowed me to begin compiling an original text and picture 
dataset of drone advocacy documents. The database includes over 300 multimedia 
artifacts, such as website pages, court filings, research reports from NGOs, local news 
sources, videos/short documentaries, interactive web material, books published by the 
organizations, and protest artwork. This data was collected during fieldwork, from email 
listservs, and through website scraping. With the support of an undergraduate research 
team, these artifacts are documented in an Excel spreadsheet according to 1) title 2) 
publishing organization 3) type of artifact, 4) link to resource if available and 5) a brief 
description. 
In order to investigate the relationships between advocacy groups in different 
slices of the network, I supplement the database with 30 in-depth semi-structured 
interviews with key informants from the drone advocacy issue network. These interviews 
were gathered through a snowball sampling technique and averaged 30-90 minutes. They 
were collected between 2017-2020 in New York, NY, Hartford, CT, Washington DC, 
and Islamabad, Pakistan as well as over Skype and phone. In order to achieve a 
reasonable level of comparability between participant responses, I posed the same semi-
structured interview questions to individuals at three hierarchical levels of the issue 
networks: transnational, domestic, and violence-affected.  
Finally, I gathered data through fieldnotes taken during field visits to sites at the 
transnational, national and violence-affected levels. My first field site visit occurred in 
October 2017, at the Annual Humanitarian Disarmament Forum in New York. Along 
with participating in workshops and breakout groups during the long weekend, this 
forum granted me insights into the key actors in the elite level of the network. 
Additionally, I attended a Side Event on drones at the UN Headquarters in New York 
during the meeting of the First Committee of the General Assembly in 2017. This 





representatives on the issue of armed drones. At the more domestically-focused level, I 
attended an interfaith conference on armed drones in 2018 at the Hartford Seminary, 
along with virtually-held anti-drone peace conferences in 2020. On the violence-affected 
level, I traveled to Islamabad, Pakistan in 2018 to speak with the less traditionally legible 
drone activists. With the aid of a local informant, I visited various offices in the city, 
including both legal offices and organizational headquarters (as well as public spaces such 
as cafes and parks for security reasons) in the city and its surrounding areas.  
 I qualitatively coded my database, interview transcripts, and fieldnotes in NVivo 
12. After conducting a preliminary round of coding, I identified key themes and patterns 
in my transcripts and documentary data and created the first draft of a codebook. These 
codes included information on networking dynamics and decision making as well as 
framing. I use a ground theory approach to analysis. Grounded theory is inductive, as it 
involves approaching data with a question and allowing theories, concepts and 
hypotheses to emerge from it.116 Such a qualitative approach to studying a transnational 
network “allows collecting details on (a) the meaning individual actors attach to their 
network ties and the network as a whole, (b) data on informal … networks not available 
through quantitative analysis, and (c) an insider view on the relationship between 
informal and formal policy networks.”117 
This analysis resulted in a preliminary list of broad descriptive codes, such as 
“targeted killing,” “transparency issues,” and “morally wrong.” I then refined these broad 
codes in the second draft codebook as I started to note patterns in the text, especially 
regarding what types of groups favored which frames, and how various frames could be 
organized into larger buckets, such as “drone technology is the problem” and “policy of 
TK [targeted killing] is the problem.” The final codebook is organized into five sections: 
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“Advocacy Tactics and Strategies,” “Network and Advocacy Dynamics,” “Political 
Opportunity Structure,” “Problem with Drones,” and “Solutions.” Each of these 
sections have both self-contained codes as well as subfolders such as “Challenges with 
Advocacy” and “Partnering Dynamics.” 
In order to systematically assess connections, I keep all data sources on all levels 
of the transnational network in the same single NVivo project, separated by clearly 
labeled files. For example, any mention of specific organizations or actors by a specific 
network actor can be linked back to both that actor’s and organization’s top-level 
cases—a function in the software that allows me to keep track of who is talking about 
whom. This enables me to track ties between specific actors within the overall network 
across both interviews and documentary sources and to run analytical queries within the 
software across all data sources. Utilizing both the dataset as well as interviews allowed 
me to triangulate my findings, investigate how the public and private faces of these actors 
relate to one another, and to reach a level of consistency in responses that signaled to me 
that I achieved an acceptable level of saturation.  
 In this dissertation, I organize the overall transnational anti-drone issue network 
into three slices: activists working at the transnational level, activists working primarily at 
the domestic level, and activists working closest to a violence affected region- specifically 
in Pakistan. Groups operating at the transnational level primarily petition 
international/regional bodies such as the UN and EU; domestic groups focus on 
petitioning their own governments; and violence-affected groups work at the grassroots 
level in an affected country. Within these three slices are different types of advocacy 
organizations, such as human rights groups, humanitarian disarmament groups, data 
transparency groups, and peace groups. The following chapters are organized along these 





hierarchal groups. Figure 1 below gives a conceptual overview of the issue network’s 
levels. 
 
Figure 1.1: Conceptual Overview of Issue Network and Levels 
As can be seen in Figure 2 below, a network graphic created using the analytical 
outputs of my NVivo analysis, partnerships tend to occur between those actors that 
share common meta-frames.118 Additionally, the most common mixed-frame cooperation 
happens between actors who ascribe to one of the two professionalized meta-frames: the 
“Lawful Usage” Frame or the “Ban Drones” Frame. This has the effect of not only 
leaving the Neocolonialism frame disconnected, but also the majority of the violence-
affected actors, since they are the ones that utilize this less dominant frame. Notable here 
is that the most politically disenfranchised population in the transnational network 
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remains the most tenuously connected to the overall network, which largely 
conceptualizes itself as advocating on their behalf.  
 
 
Figure 1.2: Illustrative Diagram of Transnational Drone Advocacy Issue Network 
This dissertation is primarily interested in the stories about the role of power 
within the transnational drone network that are difficult to tell in a network visualization. 
First, as will be elucidated in Chapters 4 and 5, is the story of how groups with 
discordant meta-frames overcome these differences and collaborate on joint advocacy 
projects. For example, smaller groups within the Global North networks do not always 
merely submit to the frames of the more powerful gatekeeper organizations. Even in the 
instances where the coalition moves forward with a framing that not all member groups 
agree with, oftentimes a careful process of coalition-building ensured that all groups felt 
as though they were meaningfully included in the process. Interviews with these activists 
reveal complex processes of stakeholder buy-in from less powerful organizations. In 





counterparts but come to a collaborative result because they felt as if their differences 
were taken seriously. 
Second, lack of connection to the network is not necessarily due to 
powerlessness. In fact, as will be discussed in the violence-affected chapter focused on 
Pakistan as well as the US domestics-focused chapter, purposely deciding not to 
participate in business-as-usual in transnational civil society may be an important exercise 
of power as well. We can see this in the examples of grassroots drone activists in 
Pakistan choosing not to legitimize the transnational framing by accepting gatekeepers’ 
overtures at partnership. We can also see this in the radical anti-war American activists 
who also refused to make ties with more moderate international activist partners. The 
result of these inverse vetting processes were that more radical activists either to rebuffed 
or heavily renegotiated the networking proposals from transnational actors. Such 
decisions ultimately impact the overall cohesiveness of the armed drone network’s 
messaging, since a noncollaborative result means that individual groups continue to work 
with their own chosen framings of armed drones.  
These processes reveal important lessons about how power flows through a 
transnational network, and how actors with differing levels of geopolitical power navigate 
these obstacles.119 Specifically, inverse vetting processes show how the agency of less 
well-positioned actors also shapes the contours of transnational advocacy issue 
networks.120 In instances of mixed-frame cooperation, which occurred across group-type 
as well as positions in the network, activists stated that they felt like their understandings 
were taken seriously and meaningfully addressed in decision-making processes. However, 
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in cases where actors reported feeling high levels of dissatisfaction with feeling included 
in joint advocacy projects, actors avoid making ties and pursue solo projects.  
Dissertation Layout  
The empirical chapters of this dissertation investigate the three slices of this 
overall network described above. Each empirical chapter offers separate but interrelated 
case studies that reveal distinct coalition-building processes within the transnational 
drone issue network, while developing the inverse vetting concept and working within 
the advocacy frame typology. 
Chapter Two, “Inverse Vetting: Powerlessness and Power in Transnational Advocacy,” 
outlines the theoretical basis and contribution of this dissertation. I put three different 
bodies of academic literature into conversation with each other for the first time– 
theorizing on transnational advocacy networks, social movements, and armed drones. I 
further develop my original concept of inverse vetting and how it can act as a useful 
diagnostic of power within advocacy issue networks. 
Chapter Three, “A Very Wide Church:’ Drone Advocacy at the Transnational Level,” 
maps the elite actors in the network. In this chapter, I show how processes of inverse 
vetting led to a failure to coalesce around an overarching umbrella frame. In this way, 
fights over frames at the transnational level correlates with missed opportunities for joint 
activism with a focused and unifying message. These disagreements occur at multiple 
levels within the network. On the one hand, there is an overall difference between the 
groups ascribing the to the “Ban Drones” meta-frame and those who adopt the “Lawful 
Usage” meta-frame. However, there is also a debate internal to the groups who gravitate 
towards the “Ban Drones” meta-frame. This disagreement is largely within the 
humanitarian disarmament community, which is split amongst those who desire an 
outright ban of the technology and those who favor regulation. In situations where 





weaker actors describe a feeling of meaningful inclusion in the process, but only after 
they pressed the more powerful actors through a process of inverse vetting. This 
described “meaningful inclusion” by powerful network actors is an important condition 
for coalition-building amongst groups with differing meta-frames across all levels of the 
network. 
Chapter Four, “An Examination of Conscience:’ Domestic Peacemakers and the Drone 
Issue,” zooms in on the US-based activists who primarily petition their own governments 
over its drone policies. Where the transnational level of the network has found difficulty 
keeping interest and combatting issue-fatigue, this peace-focused domestic network has 
sustained active lobbying and grassroots protest activities for over a decade. However, 
this robust horizontal partnerships between domestic US activists does not scale up to 
vertical connections. In this case, we can see both inverse and traditional vetting 
dynamics at play. Gatekeeper organizations did not largely seek out these radical groups 
due to perceptions that their messaging was too anti-war, while at the same time, a 
number of these domestic groups did not even attempt to initiate contact with 
transnationals out of frustration with their comparatively bland framings of drones. 
Chapter Five, “Vetting the Boomerang: Advocating on the Armed Drone Issue from 
Pakistan,” examines the violence-affected segment of the network. In this chapter, I 
contextualize the transnational drone issue in terms of the domestic politics within a 
drone-targeted state: Pakistan. The case study in this chapter discusses both the domestic 
and international obstacles Pakistani actors face in seeking accountability for US strikes 
in the tribal regions. I found that the activists who held fundamental differences in how 
they frame the “problem of drones” either rebuffed or renegotiated networking 
proposals through inverse vetting processes. The empirics in this chapter demonstrate 
that the decisions of local actors matter alongside the choices of large international 





means through which groups achieve outcomes is important, even if it defies certain 
understandings of “effective” – refusing to partner is also a strategy. 
 Chapter Six concludes the dissertation by drawing the insights gained from 
studying different slices of the network together, and what they mean in terms of power. 
I argue that power is operative in this network in two primary ways. The first is in terms 
of the reproduction of geopolitics. This is evidenced in the fact that the most influential 
groups are based in the states responsible for the bombings: the US, UK and Europe. 
This is also reflected in the fact that the most dominant meta-frames, the “Lawful 
Usage” and “Ban Drones” frames, are both squarely based in an ontologically liberal 
understanding of transnational politics. The second way is in terms of responses to 
power from the bottom up. While the Neocolonialism meta-frame and its adherents are 
the least well connected to the overall network, I argue that this is a response by these 
grassroot actors to power structures they disagree with, rather than solely a result of 
powerlessness and lack of agency. In this way, actors at the other end of the boomerang 
throw, who are traditionally considered the least enfranchised members of a network, are 
capable of making their voices and interests heard. I close with a discussion of how these 
responses might impact efficacy and a consideration about what opportunities taking 














Inverse Vetting:  
Powerlessness and Power in Transnational Advocacy 
 
Introduction 
This dissertation brings together international relations literatures on the 
institutional politics of advocacy, political sociology literatures on transnational social 
movements, and a multi-disciplinary body of research on armed drones. While much has 
been written in all three of these areas, these literatures have not been brought together 
before. Specifically, the transnational advocacy literature has not engaged with the drone 
literature, and the drone literature has not engaged with the transnational advocacy 
literature. Bringing these bodies of literature into conversation with one another is of 
interest to an interdisciplinary social science audience, as such a synthesis further 
elucidates how power operates in transnational space.  
I combine and extend these literatures by introducing the dynamic of inverse 
vetting to our understanding of networked transnational advocacy. Specifically, the 
inverse vetting concept contributes to the literatures on patterns of transnational 
advocacy participation by disempowered actors by showing another process through 
which these actors participate in transnational politics.121 Specifically, the inverse vetting 
concept as defined in this dissertation deepens our understanding of the mechanisms 
through which actors in a transnational network can affect the cohesiveness of overall 
campaign messaging. It deepens our understandings of how actors who are considered 
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the least powerful in a transnational network exert influence that reverberates up to the 
transnational level. Importantly, it must be noted that the discreet actions that go into 
creating this effect are largely unintentional and are in pursuit of situational goals unique 
to these actors. The inverse vetting dynamic, an inherently relational process, also 
demonstrates another instance of how social and ideational factors can influence 
international relations.122 
Institutional Politics of Transnational Advocacy 
Much of the early scholarship on INGO-led campaigns highlights the altruistic 
motivations of activists, and the horizontality of transnational networks. Keck and 
Sikkink’s (1998) foundational study examines the ways in which individual political 
entrepreneurs can change norms within world politics through concerted transnational 
advocacy campaigns targeted at national governments. The authors posit that, when 
successful, these morally motivated political entrepreneurs can affect foreign policy 
through strategic processes of social construction.123 These processes entail reshaping 
meanings around state action by constructing a once accepted practice as inappropriate 
or shameful.124 This theorized ability to teach states how to “properly” conduct politics 
has led some scholars to call human security INGOs, NGOs and their transnational 
partners key “makers and shapers” of legitimacy and change in the international arena.125 
The efficacy of INGOs is thus theorized as being dependent in part on their acceptance 
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as a principled, legitimate authority in a given issue area,126 as well as on their ability to 
communicate this identity to relevant audiences.127 
Numerous scholars have since argued that the saliency of INGOs in global 
governance is not an unqualified normative good.128 For example, research demonstrates 
that institutional factors ranging from resource scarcity129 to internal decision-making 
structures130 shape INGO behavior and stymie their influence. For example, rather than 
attributing a numerical growth in organizations as evidence of global civil society’s 
increasing robustness,131 Cooley and Ron (2002) contend that this growth causes 
competition for funding between NGOs, undermining project collaborations.132 Given 
the intersubjectivity and hierarchy of transnational political space, this asymmetrical 
competition between organizations can ultimately influence which civil society voices get 
heard and represented in elite policymaking arenas like the UN.133 
Relatedly, recent studies consider how INGO authority – bestowed in the form 
of deference from policy-relevant audiences134 – hobbles the most powerful INGOs like 
Amnesty International from making “transformational” demands on states.135 Stroup and 
Wong (2017) argue that concerns over maintaining status as authorities lead these groups 
to adopt strategies that result in “vanilla victories,” which are tolerable to a wide range of 
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elite global audiences.136 This is, of course, at odds with smaller “direct action” 
organizations and political groups, which make comparatively radical demands and adopt 
contentious and sometimes even anti-state strategies.137  
Pursuing this organizational need for legitimacy and authority also impacts the 
representativeness of campaigns involving activists from the Global North and South. 
On the one hand, research shows that the perceived legitimacy of human security 
campaigns does in part rest on how diverse they appear from the outside, with diversity 
being measured by levels of Global South stakeholder involvement in the movement.138 
In the words of Keck and Sikkink (2018): “For northern groups, they [Global South 
partners] make credible the assertion that they are struggling with, and not only “for”, 
their southern partners.” Inclusivity and fostering grassroots “ownership” are then 
important factors for transnational advocacy campaign-building success and hence 
desirable goals on the part of INGOs. 139 However, studies also show that campaign 
diversity and effectiveness can sometimes be mutually exclusive goals.140 This is because 
activists are constantly juggling network unity with network diversity.141 Additionally, the 
need to access elite actors in transnational politics can lead INGO brokers to focus on 
cultivating contacts with other professionalized bodies (such as donors or corporations) 
while becoming less responsive to grassroots partners affected by the human security 
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issue.142 Thus, ensuring political efficacy and access on the transnational level oftentimes 
involves steamrolling the interests of their grassroots partners, an act that undermines 
their “normative legitimacy”143 by making the network less horizontal and more 
vertical.144 Furthermore, this “logics of effectiveness” approach favored by INGOs - in 
which the large INGOs pursue their goals as efficiently as possible in the transnational 
policy space - can create “divisions of labor” within the transnational advocacy network 
that fosters competition between hierarchical factions.145  In this way, Global South 
stakeholder inclusion in transnational advocacy can simultaneously appear to “empower” 
disenfranchised global populations while also exacerbating global inequalities.146 
Scholarship on the institutional politics of transnational advocacy sheds light on 
the structural constraints imposed upon nonstate global civil society actors. It is well 
established that while individuals and groups may be guided by (what they consider to 
be) “principled” motivations, INGOs and NGOs are not insulated from mundane 
bureaucratic pathologies and external pressures that impact institutional processes and 
outcomes more generally.147 That being said, much of this literature takes a traditional 
understanding of the political, in that actors’ interests are relatively fixed and rational, and 
that politics primarily happen within formal channels of organizational structures and 
through official communications. My dissertation builds on this literature’s insights, by 
asking how actors with varying levels of geopolitical power within these structures 
collaborate (or fail to collaborate) on creating a unified advocacy message. This approach 
draws on another insight of this literature: that the institutional characteristics of 
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influential organizations – such as access to policymakers and resource endowment –
heavily favor INGOs from European and American contexts.148 
Power and Positionality in Transnational Networks  
While the above scholarship offers a useful understanding of the institutional 
politics involved in transnational advocacy, a different strand of literature addresses the 
former’s tacit assumption that politics are largely limited to “formal” spheres.149 Scholars 
in this tradition consider the overarching discursive framework of “global civil society” in 
which INGOs and NGOs are embedded.150 They argue that the universalist movements 
promoted by most INGOs – such as human rights, rule of law building, and economic 
development – are themselves political projects that are deeply enmeshed with 
hegemonic state and economic power.151 They contend that these projects are meant to 
build and sustain a neoliberal “world order,” through encouraging an engaged global 
citizenship.152  
For this reason, some scholars see that relationships between activists – especially 
between groups in the Global North and South – are inevitably ones of problematic 
power relations.153 They posit that activists from less resource-rich states (or from 
organizations that make transformational demands) are in disadvantaged positions to 
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take part in a so-called global citizenry.154 For example, the traditional boomerang model 
of transnational advocacy contends that activists in the Global South reach out to 
partners in the Global North in order to circumvent local policy blockages.155 In this 
conceptualization, local groups are thought of as kicking their grievances “up” to better 
known and more resource-endowed European and/or American organizations, who 
then advocate on the behalf of their Global South stakeholders.  
More recent work focuses on the role that activists from the Global South play in 
transnational advocacy networks and challenges a perceived “Northern bias” in 
transnational advocacy theorizing. For example, Hauf (2017) argues that the early 
advocacy literature “overstates the Northern dimension” of transnational movements at 
the expense of considering how activists in the Global South also influence a given 
network. Other scholars show that sometimes Global South advocacy networks do not 
even reach out to Northern partners, but instead partner horizontally with one another in 
order to lobby regional governments, as in the case with Vietnamese activists in the 
HIV/AIDS issue area.156 Global South-based activists have also played important roles as 
stakeholders in advocacy directed at governments with emerging economies, as with 
campaigns against extractive industries in BRIC countries.157 This critical literature shows 
that activism in the Global South - both in terms of who is advocating and which 
governments they are targeting - is more vibrant and agentic than traditional international 
relations theorizing portrays.158 Indeed, marginalized populations are able to participate in 
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and impact transnational advocacy through various processes, even if they are much less 
visible than transnational groups based in the Global North and are forced to act within 
systems that are embedded in inequitable hierarchies.159 
This Southern-focused transnational advocacy literature extends to reexamining 
unidirectional processes such as the traditional boomerang model. For example, Pallas 
(2017) suggests that “inverse boomerang” throws also exist. This occurs when global 
campaigns initiated by Northern INGOs hit policy blockages and seek out stakeholders 
in the Global South to bolster their perceived legitimacy.160 The “inverse boomerang” is 
theorized as creating a paradox, in that Northern partnership with Southern NGOs may 
boost campaign legitimacy, but it simultaneously undermines meaningful stakeholder 
input.161 The initial goals and strategies of the Southern groups can be coopted by more 
powerful groups, who retranslate their frames to sit better with policy relevant 
audiences.162 Other studies show how repressive domestic environments can even make 
the traditional boomerang pattern dangerous and undesirable for local activists.163 
Other scholars argue that in addition to traditional and inverse boomerangs, 
“double boomerangs” can exist as well. 164 Through the example of women’s groups in 
the Balkans and their use of both UNSCR 1325 and local gender norms, Irvine (2012) 
shows that activists can pressure to both international and national authorities 
simultaneously to achieve their goals, while utilizing two different sets of norms. 
Almagro (2018) points of the existence of “lost boomerangs” as well. A lost boomerang 
occurs when the pattern of pitching ideas between claimants and large organizations 
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rebounds back and forth off mutually exclusive norms.165 Temper (2019) steps out of the 
boomerang model and points to the existence of “catapult” patterns of transnational 
advocacy as well. In the “catapult” model, transnational organizations send information 
and resources into local groups like “projectiles” in order to bolster their own campaigns 
– what is important here is that external support is not always asked for by local 
groups.166 
These power differentials have led to disagreements over the emancipatory 
potential of transnational activism and “global citizenship.” Many see that European- and 
American-based INGOs are in privileged position within this liberal discourse,167 since 
they oftentimes possess the technical knowledge and professionalized expertise that serve 
as barriers to entry into global governance networks.168 Some critical scholars take this 
point further, and argue that these attributes – intentionally or unintentionally – replicate 
colonial patterns of “power and powerlessness” between INGOs and their local 
partners.169 Others remain more positive, arguing that many smaller local groups across 
several different issue areas have reclaimed these universalist projects in order to pursue 
counter-hegemonic resistances to globalization and oppression.170  
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In this dissertation, I present the dynamic of inverse vetting as displaying a 
mixture of these conclusions regarding power and powerlessness in transnational politics. 
On the one hand. I am careful to never describe inverse vetting as a celebration of 
complete agency or a “reclaiming” of control by less powerful actors, especially those 
based in the Global South. This is because many of these actors’ motivating reasons for 
such vetting processes arise from interests and goals inherently shaped by historical and 
contemporary political dispossession. On the other side however, I also acknowledge the 
true influence, even if oftentimes unintentional, that these traditionally disenfranchised 
actors have on a global advocacy issue network, specifically in terms of its coherence and 
connection. At its heart, the anti-armed drone issue network story is one about discreet 
decisions driven by situational interests, mediated through relational transactions.  
Analyzing intra-network relationships’ abilities to shape and even drive 
transnational advocacy processes can tell us about participation in global governance. 
Social networks are “networks of meaning,”171 comprised of “patterns of communication 
and exchange.”172 While early research on transnational advocacy networks emphasized 
the “horizontal” and “reciprocal” nature of network ties, subsequent work shows that 
network connectivity forms over an uneven and hierarchal terrain.173  
Networks then become more than a means for amplification of voices and 
transportation of information/resources; they become key sites of power within 
advocacy communities, where certain meanings are elevated at the expense of others.174 
For example, Charli Carpenter’s (2014) work contends that while things like moral 
entrepreneurship are important, an advocacy organization’s position in the larger 
network structure – and its connection to ‘gatekeeper’ organizations like Amnesty 
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International – largely determines if a group’s chosen issue makes it onto the 
transnational advocacy agenda.  
Transnational Advocacy Processes 
 In order to understand these advocacy network processes and dynamics more 
fully, I also draw on conceptual tools and definitions from political sociology and 
comparative politics literatures on social movements. These theoretical discussions at 
times overlap with international relations work on NGOs, and studies like Jackie Smith 
et al (2021) show that this increasing synergy has the potential to contribute to our 
overall shared knowledge of transnational activism in the 21st century.  
It is first useful to distinguish between various types of transnational advocacy.175 
Khagram, Riker and Sikkink’s (2002) distinctions include: transnational advocacy 
networks, transnational coalitions/campaigns, and transnational social movements. 
Transnational advocacy networks consist of the least formal connections out of the other 
two, and are defined as international actors “who are bound together by shared values, a 
common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services.”176 Transnational 
coalitions/campaigns are more coordinated in terms of information exchange and 
strategizing, involving “concerted efforts by multiple organizations lobbying for a 
specific outcome around a certain issue.”177 A transnational social movement, as defined 
by Tilly and Tarrow, is “a sustained, organized public effort making collective claims on 
target authorities.”178 Social movement actors use a repertoire of tools, and consider 
themselves “worthy, unified, numerous, and committed.”179 Mobilization against armed 
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drones falls conceptually between the first and second categories. This mobilization is 
fractured amongst distinct, loosely connected networks of organizations with differing 
levels of influence, with some of these clusters producing more targeted coalitions and 
even calls to action. However, as this dissertation will show, the anti-drones network is 
missing “a common discourse,” leading to difficulty in making “collective claims.”180 
In order to get a better understanding of advocacy messaging in the anti-drone 
human security issue in transnational space, it is useful to consider theorizing on other 
humanitarian disarmament campaigns. Humanitarian disarmament is a broad approach 
to international security that seeks to end human suffering through developing laws on 
the use of specific weapons;181 it is distinct from the traditional disarmament movement 
due to its focus on the individual human as the referent of security rather than the 
state.182 Transnational humanitarian disarmament campaigns, which are focused on 
creating treaty law on a specific weapon, are a key way in which these activists attempt to 
impact world politics and pursue their goals.183 The aim of these individual treaties is to 
gradually expand the humanitarian obligations that states have towards individuals in 
peace and war time, with the ultimate goal of reducing unnecessary suffering caused by 
specific weapons of war.184 They do so by not only attempting to create international 
treaties, but also by pioneering “norms of acceptable state behavior”185 –  for example, 
the “taboos” around the usage of nuclear weapons and chemical weapons can in part be 
connected to transnational campaigning against these specific technologies.186 
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All of these campaigns had concise external messaging regarding what was 
“wrong” with each weapons technology. The most famous humanitarian disarmament 
campaign is the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), which resulted in a 
treaty-based ban on anti-personnel landmines and is widely considered to be the most 
successful transnational campaign.187 Anti-personnel landmines were considered uniquely 
harmful weapons due to the fact that they are victim-activated and unable to distinguish 
between combatant and civilian; they are also oftentimes left behind as remnants of war 
that accidentally get triggered by civilians.188 Humanitarian disarmament activists also 
succeeded in banning the use of chemical weapons and cluster munitions,189 both of 
which were campaigned against as being inherently indiscriminate in their effects on both 
combatants and civilians.190  
These campaigns have also been able to produce pre-emptive weapons 
technology bans, such as in the case of blinding lasers, which were presented as causing 
unnecessary lasting harm and suffering to victims.191 While it has not yet produced policy 
outcomes, the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots is a robust and active campaign trying to 
preemptively ban fully autonomous weapons.192 The campaigners have framed these 
weapons as potential science fiction nightmares ala The Terminator, due to the fact that a 
human does not maintain meaningful control over the targeting procedures and it is 
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unclear how they would be able to conform to the laws of war.193 Another contemporary 
campaign, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), captured 
headlines by winning the Nobel Prize in 2017 for its success in creating an international 
treaty ban on nuclear weapons.194 Much like with landmines, cluster munitions, and 
chemical weapons, the ICAN campaigners framed nuclear weapons as being inherently 
indiscriminate and destructive since they are unable to target only combatants and cause 
widespread environmental degradation.195 
Advocacy frames are a particularly useful modality through which to study 
relational meaning-making processes in humanitarian disarmament campaigns such as 
the ones discussed above.196 On the broadest level, sociologist Erving Goffman (1974) 
defined frames as the “principles of organization which govern events – at least social 
events – and our intersubjective involvement with them.”197 More specifically, Gamson 
and Modigliani (1987) define a frame as “a central organizing idea or story line that 
provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events, weaving a [strategic] connection among 
them.”198 The social movement literature characterizes collective action frames as 
“action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate [advocacy] 
activities,” which are created through negotiation between activists. Frames are important 
heuristic and strategic devices, because they have the ability to name key social problems 
and suggest their solutions.199  Framing is thought to impact mobilization largely through 
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variables like credibility, salience and resonance.200 For example, Jutta Joachim’s study 
shows that transnational women’s groups gained traction at the U.N. after strategically 
re-framing the violence against women issue from an “equality” frame to a 
“development” frame.201  
Advocacy frames matter in terms of understanding how activists publicly 
communicate “problems” to wider audiences. While the strategic framing literature offers 
a useful foundation, this project treats factors like culture and interpretation as 
constituting features of framing processes, rather than as objective variables subsumed 
within the larger concept.202 The epistemological value of studying processes like framing 
from within activist networks prioritizes the meanings activists articulate and avoids 
making a network seem more cohesive than it is.203 Such an approach more closely 
examines the tensions that go into creating advocacy frames, both within groups and 
between groups. The process of framing is laden with power relations, because a frame 
necessarily focuses on one narrative over another.204 It signifies what can be considered 
as properly political, and by extension who can be considered as a central issue 
stakeholder.205 Indeed, determining whose advocacy frames “count” over others is 
theorized as being integral to building the appearance of a unified transnational 
campaign.206 Studying these processes is thus a useful diagnostic for inter- and intra-
network politics.207 
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The canon transnational advocacy literature oftentimes eschews the 
understandings and framings of local actors in favor of looking at how larger 
organizations mobilize on their behalf and present the issue to wider audiences.208 This 
can be seen in the theoretical assumption that once an understanding or frame is adopted 
into a transnational advocacy campaign, it remains static and not contested.209 In reality, 
there is an ongoing process of ideational contestation within the network even after an 
“umbrella frame” emerges to “consolidate” the campaigners – and even when this frame 
finds influence in policy circles, it is not just automatically accepted by individuals at the 
grassroots level.210 For this reason, critical scholars of transnational advocacy and 
international norm diffusion recommend focusing on the “productive power and on the 
co-constitution of agents and the norms for which they advocate.”211 Going back to 
Almagro’s (2018) theoretical model of the “lost boomerang,” the process of campaign 
building is one of social construction that can lead to the “exclusion or annulment of 
certain subject positions and discourses” when the positions of actors in a network are so 
different from the mainstream that they are beyond intelligible boundaries.212 This has led 
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some scholars to call localization – the process through which local activists are thought 
to adapt transnational norms into local contexts – a “myth.”213 
This internal frame contestation matters because disagreements can impact norm 
evolution, campaign coherency and ultimately policy outcomes.214 Shareen Hertel (2007) 
shows that contentious frame negotiations can occur in two patterns: an “outside-in” 
pattern, in which campaigns are framed in the Global North and then imposed on 
activists in the Global South, and a “dual-target pattern,” in which shared interests guide 
collaborations between activists to solve problems in both the Global North and 
South.215 Especially in the case of an “outside-in” framing pattern, international NGOs 
are viewed as being detached from the frames of the affected population for which they 
advocate. This has led some scholars and practitioners to advocate for an increased role 
for “Affected Peoples’ Organizations” (APO) to frame their own human security issues 
and for international NGOs to merely act in a supporting, non-framing role.216 Thus, 
framing in transnational advocacy campaigns is always a battle over legitimacy and 
meaning that takes place at multiple levels of the network simultaneously.217 
Theorizing Armed Drones 
  Armed drones have captured the curiosity of many academics as well as public 
intellectuals, writing from a variety of disciplines both within and outside academia.218 
While expansive, the armed drone literature falls roughly into three conceptual and 
thematic buckets: security studies-focused, public opinion/discourse-focused, and 
law/ethics-focused.219 
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Studies concerned with the efficacy of drone warfare consider whether the U.S. 
policy is actually reducing national security threats or if it is causing suboptimal security 
results.220 Here, “policy success” is generally treated as reducing terrorist attacks against 
the US and its allies. 221 One of the most active debates in this area is over the issue of 
“blowback” – or whether US drone strikes foment anti-American sentiments within the 
areas being bombed.222 Another dimension of this debate is the extent to which 
individuals in the targeted states support drone strikes. Reputable polling institutes such 
as Pew have long reported that Pakistanis generally strongly disfavor drones. However, 
Aqil Shah (2018) criticizes these polls for being misleading, while Christine Fair et al 
(2016) claims NGO reporting on drones is inaccurate and biased because it relies on 
television reports from affected regions.223 Both authors claim that people living in the 
areas affected by the strikes are actually the most supportive of the policy. According to 
Shah, this is because people living in the tribal areas comprise the population who is 
most besieged by terrorism, as well as by the Pakistani army’s counterterrorism tactics. 
Others have made similar arguments,224 though it is useful here to remember that 
measuring any kind of civilian perceptions of violent action during conflict is 
methodologically challenging since these perceptions are filtered through pre-existing 
ideas of perpetrators and victims.225 Some even argue that “success” of drone strikes may 
not even be possible to measure reliably.226  
Another subset of drone literature studies US public opinion and popular 
discourse around drones. Academics disagree over how much public opinion on foreign 
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policy issues can constrain policymaking,227 and whether or not American citizens even 
care about foreign policy issues.228 Recent research argues that US citizens may in fact 
care quite deeply about whether or not their government respects international law and 
norms.229 Additionally, public opinion polls on the armed drone issue have been difficult 
barometers for Americans’ “true” sentiments on this specific foreign policy issue. This is 
because the framing of survey questions on armed drones and international law in US 
media are often misleading or erroneous,230 which leads to priming effects – and even 
socialization effects – that favor the US government’s stance.231 The perceived “apathy” 
or hawkishness on the part of the American electorate may be due to the convoluted 
cultural framing of the armed drone issue, rather than a “true measure” of their 
feelings.232  
A large chunk of the literature considers the legality of drone warfare under 
existing international law,233 as well as how drone usage may impact future laws and 
norms of war, such as preventative force.234 Relatedly, a wide interdisciplinary literature 
that spans from political science to critical geography considers the ethical implications 
of drone warfare – oftentimes focusing on themes of distance and disembodiment in 
warfare, morality, neocolonialism, or on lived civilian experiences.235  Other studies put 
 
227 Eichenberg 2005; Grieco et al. 2011; Gartner 2008 
228 Holsti, 2004; Simmons, 2009; Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000; Wallace, 2013; Sagan and 
Valentino, 2017. 
229 Horowitz, 2016; Chilton and Versteeg, 2016 
230 Kreps and Wallace, 2016 
231 Nylen and Carpenter, 2019; Carpenter, Montgomery and Nylen, 2020 
232 When offered a chance to give open-ended, non-structured qualitative answers in a 
mixed method survey on security issues, respondents typically equivocate and qualify 
their more hawkish answers in the rigid, quantitative portion of the survey (Carpenter, 
Montgomery and Nylen, 2020). 
233 Jameel, 2016 
234 Fisk and Ramos 2014; Buchannan and Keohane, 2015; Crawford, 2015; Falk, 1997; 
Ward, 2005 
235 Enemark 2017; Bashir and Crews, 2012; Shaw, Graham and Akhter, 2012; Nylen, 





forth regulatory recommendations.236 Buchannan and Keohane’s (2015) “Drone 
Accountability Regime” is one of the most well-known set of policy recommendations to 
come out of the scholarly drone literature. The authors argue that drone proliferation is 
inevitable and that powerful states like the U.S. would not sign on to any binding legal 
document dictating proper usage of drones. They identify three primary risks of drone 
usage: the violation of sovereignty inherent to the technology, over-use of military 
solutions, and difficulty in accountability for casualty counting. They conclude that any 
legal framework should be informal and nonbinding, as well as inclusive of nonstate 
actors. Their recommendations include increased transparency, enabling civil society to 
hold states accountable to any abuses, and the creation of a drones Ombudsperson who 
would have broad investigative responsibilities. Neta Crawford (2015) penned a rejoinder 
to this article, in which she dismisses Buchannan and Keohane’s assumption that terror is 
an act of war. She instead suggests a novel hybrid approach to addressing terrorism that 
uses both law enforcement and military tactics. Additionally, Crawford suggests that 
domestic regulation around drones must first be pioneered before designing an 
international regime.237 
 As mentioned at the opening of this section, the drone literature and the 
transnational advocacy literature has not yet overlapped. However, studying international 
activists’ responses to armed drones is a useful addition to this multi-disciplinary body of 
work. In terms of the more security-focused literature, studying transnational advocacy 
patterns around a specific weapon can garner information on whether the security 
measure is acceptable to different constituencies and populations. How much popular 
support a human security advocacy campaign enjoys can act as signals and almost litmus 
tests for policymakers. In part, this is why the debate detailed above over “popular 
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support” for drones is so contentious – implicit (and sometimes explicit) in these 
arguments is whether current security policies around drones should be continued as is, 
or if they are too costly. But these studies have focused on public opinion measuring, and 
not directly on transnational advocacy. Here, a more grounded study in an affected 
country like Pakistan can add value. As I will explore in Chapter V, local anger at drones 
(at least anecdotally) is largely aimed at the Pakistani government, rather than the US 
government. This has the effect of further destabilization by further fomenting distrust 
in government institutions within a nuclear armed country.  
In terms of the literature subsection focused on the legality and ethicality of 
armed drones, paying attention to how activists mobilize these concepts into political 
action offers a useful empirical grounding. Because concepts like legality and ethicality 
are socially enacted and enforced, studying one of the key processes through which these 
ideas can solidify into consolidated law and norms is important.238 Additionally, by 
turning analytical attention to the legal and ethical interpretations of traditionally 
marginalized actors in global civil society, such as the Pakistani activists in this case, we 
can also get a glimpse at which narratives and understandings of “law” are typically left 
out of international law and policy discussions.239 
Conclusion: Theorizing Power and Inverse Vetting 
Drawing on these synergistic bodies of literature, this dissertation explores the 
processes through which activists within the anti-armed drone issue network attempted 
to create a unified campaign. I study hierarchal relationships within this single-issue 
network in depth, in order to speak to larger questions about the role of social 
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connections in global governance.240 I also build on drone-specific theorizing by 
introducing a new modality – transnational activism – through which to study drones. I 
see that this unique epistemological point of departure is important, as it offers a new 
case for studying transnational advocacy processes and also maps a specific advocacy 
issue that has not yet been addressed.  
The anti-armed drone case also further illuminates the operation of power within 
transnational processes. Unlike Lukes’ first face of power, where an actor has direct or 
sovereign control over another, a Foucauldian approach sees power as dispersed, 
constantly negotiated, and in flux.241 In other words, power is not individualized, but is 
instead both produced by and productive of discourses, scientific knowledge, legal 
frameworks, administrative rules, moral propositions, and a host of other sociopolitical 
structures.242 Foucault’s unique approach to conceptualizing power allows us to 
conceptualize a transnational advocacy network as a set of co-created power relations, 
rather than a network in which some actors have more influence than others based on 
their objective position economically or geographically. In doing so, it makes it possible 
to see how smaller, non-gatekeeping actors produce their own discourses and positions 
on a human security issue – at times actively using these discourses to assess whether the 
position of larger groups fits with their own advocacy goals. 
As discussed above, much of the institutional politics of INGOs literature takes a 
traditional understanding of “power” and “the political.” This focus centers scholarly 
attention on the actions and motivations of large, traditional advocacy organizations that 
are generally headquartered in the Global North. This dissertation builds on this 
literature’s insights by examining how grassroots actors can influence the strategic 
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options available to activists working on the same issue from different transnational 
sites.243 By doing this, my inverse vetting concept builds on contemporary theorizing on 
“inverse” patterns of transnational advocacy. In order to visualize how my concept fits 
into and builds off of these “inverse” transnational processes, I have replicated Pallas’s 
(2017) original diagram with my own addition of where the inverse vetting takes place. 
First, Pallas’s (2017) inverse boomerang model is below: 
 
Figure 2.1 The Inverse Boomerang (Pallas, 2017) 
 
Below, I include Pallas’s model with my own addition of where inverse vetting fits: 
 
Figure 2.2: The inverse boomerang (Pallas, 2017) with Author’s conceptual addition 
 





One of the key additions to the inverse boomerang model that inverse vetting 
introduces is the possibility of less powerful actors to either refuse to join altogether, or 
to not join the transnationals in the manner that the transnationals desire. In both 
circumstances, the less powerful actors pursue their goals in ways that impact the 
cohesiveness of the overall campaign. 
The consequences of assuming that power is exercised only by well-resourced 
and well-connected actors misses how smaller actors present and pursue their goals; how 
they resist hegemonic power within the network; and most significantly, how their 
actions lead to political effects that exceed their intentions.244 Inverse vetting suggests 
that rather than a single actor determining how the issue should be framed based on the 
power they have, a variety of geographically and culturally dispersed actors – in resisting 
and exerting their own power – seek to determine what the issue is to begin with. This has 
an unintended outcome, as it contributes to the overall network’s inability to define the 
problem in one meta-frame. Instead, the anti-drones work almost remains three separate 
campaigns, each with their own frames, working at cross-purposes. 
Relationships between activists in the Global North and South are inherently 
characterized by hierarchical relationships.245 For example, the boomerang model of 
advocacy contends that activists in the Global South maneuver around difficult political 
opportunity structures and/or lack of resources by reaching out to groups in the Global 
North.246 This model can also be reversed when global campaigns seek out partners in 
the Global South to bolster their legitimacy.247 The “inverse boomerang” is theorized as 
creating a paradox, in that Northern partnership with Southern NGOs may boost 
 
244 Epstein 2012; Hertel 2006; Bucher 2014; Plesch 2016 
245 Duncombe and Dunne 2018: 30 
246 Keck and Sikkink 1998, 2018 





campaign legitimacy, but it simultaneously undermines meaningful stakeholder input.248 
The initial goals and strategies of the Southern groups can be coopted by more powerful 
groups, who retranslate their frames to sit better with policy relevant audiences – 
producing the type of “vanilla victories” discussed earlier.249 
All of this shows that transnational advocacy issue networks are deeply impacted 
by broader geopolitical power dynamics. 250 Inverse vetting focuses on one of the 
processes through which actors with varying levels of power navigate a civil society 
network. This novel concept builds on and extends a growing body of literature 
examining patterns of activism in the Global South, as well as the fragmenting of civil 
society more broadly.251 This work contributes to research that considers the work and 
motivations of grassroots activists at the “other end of the boomerang,” and how less 
powerful network actors more broadly might exert influence on a transnational level.252 
The preceding chapters of this dissertation explore these theoretical concepts in-depth, 
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“A Very Wide Church:”  
Drone Advocacy at the Transnational Level 
 
Introduction 
This chapter explores the framing differences and social relationships between 
the activists at the transnational level of the anti-drone network. I show that there is a 
significant amount of contestation between these actors and a subsequent failure to 
cohere around a single guiding anti-drone campaign frame. These disagreements 
primarily center around whether to adopt the “Ban Drones” Frame or the ”Lawful 
Usage” Frame. As discussed in Chapter 1, these frames are distinct and carry with them 
different policy implications, and frames are a useful modality through which we can 
understand power differentials between groups and how power flows across this specific 
issue network. This is because the smaller groups in this network cluster tend to adopt 
more radical frames considered unpalatable by larger groups. I argue that framing 
disagreements between transnational actors kicked off processes of inverse vetting, in 
which the less resource-rich actors pushed back and negotiated with their would-be 
powerful partners.  
In this chapter, I draw on a unique text and picture dataset of 300 primary 
advocacy documents, 15 in-depth semi-structured interviews with key informants from 
the transitional level of the armed drone network, and field site visits. In order to 





armed drones at the UN, and the annual Humanitarian Disarmament Forum in 2017.253 
The connections I gained granted me access to internal listservs, which include 
information on advocacy planning, processes, partnering amongst the transnational level 
actors as well as invitations to future events. This positioning at the center of the key site 
of power within the elite cluster of the drone network also allowed me to identify 
important interviewees, and to narratively map the transnational network.254  
Through iterative processes of qualitative coding in NVivo 12, I identified salient 
themes and patterns across both documentary and interview data sources. I found that 
transnational actors have fundamental disagreements with one another over identifying 
“the problem of drones.” These disagreements primarily revolve around whether drones 
are an issue because of how governments use them to kill people, or because the drone 
technology is inherently bad. Though these are fundamental disagreements over the 
problem, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2  it is common for nascent human security 
campaigns to face such challenges only to either 1) fade away or 2) coalesce under an 
umbrella frame.255 In this chapter, I argue that relational processes between actors, 
informed by their preferred frames, prevented these activists from folding their 
disagreements into one guiding advocacy message on drones.  
We can see this by more closely examining a segment of the transnational level 
that should be a most likely case for developing a strong, unifying anti-drone campaign 
frame: the European Forum on Armed Drones (EFAD. The majority of anti-drone 
organizations based in the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK) are 
 
253 The Humanitarian Disarmament Forum is an annual multiday networking event in 
which both large and small NGOs convene in New York to discuss opportunities and 
challenges facing disarmament activists 
254 The subsequent interviews were gathered using a snowball sampling technique and 
were conducted remotely via phone and videoconferencing. 
255 Bahçecik 2019; Carpenter 2007; Mekata 2000; Stroup and Wong, 2017; Eilstrup-





members of EFAD. EFAD is an active section of the transnational network, as it sends 
out monthly newsletters and routinely speaks with policymakers at the EU and the UN. 
EFAD is also diverse in its membership; it currently has 29 official members, including 
human rights, disarmament, and peace-focused organizations ranging in staff size and 
policy impact. For example, members include gatekeeper organizations like AI and Open 
Society Foundations (OSF), alongside smaller NGOs like Drone Wars UK, which has a 
staff of three individuals.256 EFAD’s member groups meet in-person yearly in order to 
share information on each organization’s activities, discuss important developments 
regarding done usage and development, and decide on the network’s action points for 
the coming year. They communicate frequently throughout the year both virtually and 
during conferences, such as Drone War UK’s 2020 ten-year anniversary webinar on the 
future of drone warfare. 
Given the density of the exchanges between members, EFAD seems like a case 
within the overall anti-drone network where the activists should have been able to from 
an umbrella anti-drones frame. Indeed, other human security issue areas that have 
demonstrated similar levels of organizational diversity and sustained communication with 
one another were able to settle on an overarching frame. For example, the Campaign to 
Stop Killer Robots also has a diverse membership, with organizations from the human 
rights, disarmament, computer science and peace groups.257 This campaign was able to 
overcome initial in-fighting over frames – with the large gatekeepers initially hesitant to 
use the science fiction terminology – and coalesce around a guiding meta-frame: the 
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technology of fully autonomous weapons is inherently dangerous for its lack of human 
control and should be banned, or: “Ban Autonomous Weapons.”258  
But, despite its level of intra-group communication, policy work and 
organizational diversity, EFAD does not have a steering committee259 and does not 
consider itself a campaign against drones like the ICBL did against landmines, ICAN 
does against nuclear arms260 or the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots does against fully 
autonomous weapons. Instead, EFAD’s members are loosely and voluntarily bound to a 
broad shared set of jointly agreed upon aspirations, codified in its “Call to Action.” This 
call is aims five requests on armed drones at the EU and UN levels: “Articulate clear 
policies,” “Prevent complicity,” “Ensure transparency,” “Establish accountability,” and 
“Control proliferation.”261 In addition to its leaders stating that EFAD is not a campaign, 
this Call to Action is different from an overarching frame because it is more aspirational 
than it is a targeted message about “what is wrong with drones” and “how this problem 
should be fixed with policy.” Again, in the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, the problem 
and solution is clearly and cogently stated: the problem is full autonomy, and the solution 
is a weapons ban.262  
Given these continuing efforts to work together on joint projects, what explains 
EFAD’s – and the overall transnational level’s – lack of an overarching frame? As I will 
explore in this chapter, this absence of an overarching frame in part grew out of diverse 
groups with diverse interests bumping up against one another to advocate for the 
regulation of armed drones. I argue that the case of EFAD illuminates a wider trend 
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within the transnational level of the network of how processes of inverse vetting resulted 
in vague Call to Actions that represent multiple perspectives on drones rather than a 
unified anti-drone frame that agrees on a problem and a policy solution. 
Importantly, as will be shown in this chapter, inverse vetting processes can end in 
multiple ways. In the case of EFAD, less powerful groups that prefer more radical 
frames on drones reported only buying in after powerful organizations had sufficiently 
and meaningfully included them in the coalition-building process. The (reported) 
perception of procedural inclusion of course does not equate with achieving desired 
outcomes or meaningful representation in advocacy products. Tracing these processes 
illuminates how power is operative between and within the “elite” level of this 
transnational issue network and illuminates how network outcomes are impacted by 
power dynamics internal to coalition-building. The more powerful actors in the EFAD 
subnetwork were reportedly able to achieve a sense of inclusion amongst the smaller and 
more radical transnational groups to gain their organizational buy-in. As will be discussed 
in Chapter 5, this same signaling towards “inclusion” and “legitimation” of differing 
advocacy frames by gatekeepers is notably lacking when it comes to grassroots actors in 
Pakistan.263 
 This chapter proceeds with a brief case background of transnational anti-drone 
mobilization. I then move into an analysis of this transnational mobilization, describing 
the competing frames that have characterized advocacy at this level, and delving deeper 
into the specific case of EFAD. I conclude by considering what this case reveals about 
power and representation in transnational advocacy. 
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Transnational Civil Society Mobilizing Against Drones 
The transnational anti-drone issue network hubs are located in the US and 
Europe. In the US, the primary hubs are located in Washington, DC and New York, with 
the human rights-focused groups mostly operating out of DC, and the disarmament-
focused groups operating out of New York. Where the human rights groups primarily 
petition the US government directly, as well as the human rights bodies within the UN, 
the disarmament-focused groups target the disarmament bodies within the UN. 
Representatives from these key gatekeeper organizations like HRW, AI and CIVIC sit 
down monthly in DC to discuss their work on drones. 
Since 2010, transnational civil society groups have advocated on the use of armed 
drones in three primary ways: data advocacy (or using computer science methods to 
tabulate civilian casualties),264 naming and shaming through writing in-depth qualitative 
reports,265 and direct lobbying of policymakers and stakeholders.266 Because advocacy is 
necessarily reactive to patterns of state use, and the US has been the overwhelming sole 
user until very recently, the US government has been the primary target. However, as 
proliferation increases, transnational activists are widening their focus.267 
 The first strategy is to seek more transparency from the U.S. government about 
its drone policy. Given the covert nature of the US program, both the public and 
activists struggled to gain even the most basic information on the strikes.268 For this 
reason, some of the earliest advocacy focused on goals of data transparency surrounding 
strike locations, numbers, and deaths. The UK-based Bureau of Investigative Journalism 
(TBIJ) is a pioneer within the network in this regard, essentially setting the standard for 
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data advocacy on drone warfare.269 This data advocacy community is diverse in terms of 
professional backgrounds, including journalists, data scientists, roboticists as well as 
whistleblowers from the military, contracting and intelligence communities.  
Second, human rights and disarmament advocacy groups have produced 
numerous reports on the use of drones since 2010. Unlike in many other transnational 
human security campaigns where elite civil society actors need to be convinced that a 
particular issue is worth their time, gatekeeper organizations were some of the earliest 
“adopters” of the armed drone issue.270 In 2012, CIVIC collaborated with the Human 
Rights Clinic at Columbia Law school to release a report on the civilian impact of armed 
drones.271 In 2013, AI and HRW coordinated a simultaneous release of two separately 
researched reports on drones, with the AI report covering US drone strikes in Pakistan 
and the HRW report covering the Yemen strikes.272 Along with the 2012 CIVIC and 
Columbia Law School brief, these reports became three of the most highly publicized 
advocacy publications on drones during the Obama years.  
The third strategy is directly lobbying of policymakers and stakeholders. This 
tactic is unique to the transnational groups within the issue network, given their levels of 
elite access. Some groups focus on addressing state actors in official forums like the UN 
and the EU, while others form professional relationships directly with stakeholders and 
policymakers. For example, Article36 and other disarmament groups speak during the 
meeting of the First Committee every year at the UN headquarters. In addition to this, 
they host side events at the UN on specialized topics such as the humanitarian impact of 
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armed drones where state representatives attend to learn about an issue more in-depth. 273 
Distinct from this are the advocacy groups that solely produce content for state actors. 
For example, the Oxford Research Group (ORG) creates specialized in-depth research 
reports for military consumption.274 While the organization’s broad mission aligns with 
other humanitarian disarmament groups, its particular tactic is to demonstrate to military 
and political figures why using drones is a tactical and strategic failure not in states’ best 
interests.  
Competing Transnational Frames 
In the words of a transparency activist from the Oxford Research Center, the 
drone network is a “very wide church” with a large amount of diversity amongst its 
actors.275 While these transnational actors have a baseline agreement that the armed 
drone issue is worthy of valuable advocacy resources and sustained attention, they 
diverge when it comes to specific organizational stances and framings of the “problem.” 
Figure 1 below reintroduces my frame typology chart from Chapter 1 to explain the 
difference between the two meta-frames, offering an overview in terms of definitions, 
examples of what activists in these categories would consider the “key issues,” as well as 








273 “The Humanitarian Impact of Drones” 2017, for example, was a report launched at 
the United Nations headquarters during the 2017 First Committee Meeting 
274 Watson and McKay 2021 











characteristics of the 



















The technology is 
not inherently 
problematic; policy 
and current state use 
are the problems 
 
 
- targeted killing 
- violation of 
sovereignty 
- lack of 
transparency 





- Export control 











society are all parts 
of the problem 
 
Note: Present only in 
Pakistani network 










power relations  
Table 3.1: Overall Frame Typology with Relevant Meta-Frames Highlighted 
As shown in Figure 2, the policy solutions for these two groups are of course 
dependent upon the framing they adopt. “Lawful Usage” activists tend towards more 
status quo stances such as requesting more transparency on state parameters of lethal 
targeting and regulation. On the other hand, “Ban Drones” activists generally call for 
more radical policies, such as a weapon ban or extreme regulations on research and 






The “Lawful Usage” frame is the preferred frame of the gatekeeper organizations 
within the transnational level. As stated earlier, this frame encompasses legalistic 
positions, exemplified in the following statement by the Deputy Washington Director of 
Human Rights Watch during our conversation: 
“I don’t have a problem with the weapon itself… The problem I have is the 
approach to killing people because they are on a list of people who should be 
killed. That has nothing to do with armed drones per se… I mean the 
problem again when talking about drones is that I don’t think that they need 
anything special. I think that states and other actors should only use weapons 
in accordance with the law.”276 
This same position, that drones are an issue of policy and not technology, is mirrored in 
an Amnesty International infographic (Figure 3) from my dataset: 
 
Figure 3.2: Example of “Lawful Usage” Frame in Amnesty International Report, 2014 
While predominate amongst the large human rights organizations, other types of 
influential network actors also adopt the “Lawful Usage” frame with different 
professional emphases. For example, CIVIC, an international humanitarian law group, 
focuses on detention and criminal prosecution of suspected terrorists as an alternative 
approach to targeted killing. Additionally, the group advocates for “ensuring drone 
strikes include precautionary measures to mitigate civilian harm” rather than an all-out 
ban of the technology.277 The Oxford Research Center focuses on remote warfare as a 
strategy of combat more broadly, with its program head stating that “the means of 
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delivery is much less important” to them than the “misguided” policy belief that targeted 
strikes work.278 There are also groups such as New America Foundation and The Bureau 
of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ) that focus solely on drone data reporting, with 
increased governmental transparency as their key goal. Below in Figure 4 is an example 
of the organizational goal of transparency, from TBIJ’s website: 
 
Figure 3.3: Example of “Lawful Usage” Frame from TBIJ’s Website 
The “Ban Drones” frame tends to be adopted by less influential – but still 
important – groups within the transnationals.  For example, the director of Drone Wars 
UK argues that “there is something specific about the technological potentials [of 
drones], which merits addressing.”279 According to this organization, these drone-specific 
potentials include risk transfer, lowering the threshold for warfare, and “PlayStation 
warfare” – a distancing function of the drone that supposedly makes lethal targeting 
decisions easier and civilian harm more likely. These groups are more likely to adopt the 
name “killer drones” within their advocacy; a framing that leads to the more radical 
proposed policy solution of “grounding” the technology. This is exemplified in the 
banner below from an anti-drone rally hosted by Drone Wars UK and their partners in 
the UK Drone Campaign Network: 
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Figure 3.4: Example of “Ban Drones” Frame from Drone Wars UK Website, 2020 
Some of these groups even go as far to describe drone technologies as inherently 
“indiscriminate” – meaning that it is uniquely destructive amongst other weapons to 
human life. This is in exact opposition to many of the international human rights groups’ 
views on drones, which sees them as potentially more humane than traditional weapons. 
This position is stated clearly by War on Want below in Figure 6, in which they equate 
drones to the destructive potential of banned technologies like anti-personnel landmines: 
 
Figure 3.5: Example of “Ban Drones” Frame on War on Want’s Website 
Practitioners are quite aware of these differences in issue frames and were eager 
to discuss how they perceived the cleavages in the movement. For example, as one 
Europe-based drone activist mapped out the key “fissure:”  
“I would say that there are kind of two broad groups. But again, they break down 
into subsets... One is [the group] who have a fundamental problem with the 
technology, who would say that it lowers the threshold and is making the world 
less safe… And then there are those who say ‘well, drones are no different from 





targeted killing, and that’s the problem- so we don’t have a problem with the 
technologies, it’s how they are being used.’” 
Framing disagreements can be viewed within groups of the same type as well. 
While human rights groups generally correlate to the “Lawful Usage” meta-frame and 
peace groups with the “Ban Drones” meta-frame, there is an internal debate within the 
humanitarian disarmament community on which framing to adopt, and how radical of a 
stance they should take. The humanitarian disarmament community largely employs the 
“Lawful Usage” frame, yet there are a significant minority that wish to pursue the more 
radical “Ban Drones” frame, as explained by an activist from Reaching Critical Will: 
“Some people within the humanitarian disarmament community find it difficult 
to know where they would sink their teeth into the drones issue. Because they 
can’t quite agree as a group. Not everyone is a pacifist, right? In fact, a lot 
of them aren’t [pacifist] in the humanitarian disarmament community… So they 
don’t see the drone itself as a problematic. Whereas humanitarian disarmament 
people have largely been about banning classes of weapons that are seen as 
inhumane. And that it’s really difficult to make the argument that drones are 
inhumane… It’s a slippery thing to argue.” 
In addition to merely being aware of these differences, there are also tensions 
between the “Ban Drones” and “Lawful Usage” groups. Each express varying levels of 
frustration that the other does not understand the true problem. As one activist stated: 
“people kind of constantly say to us, well what’s the difference between drones and an F-
16… A lot of drone campaigners are being technology blind- they focus on just the 
policy of how these things are being used.”280 A disarmament activist views the more 
moderate “Lawful Usage” framing as capitulating too much to national governments: 
“Accountability or transparency [approaches are] sort of like ‘if you are going to do this, can 
you do it a little more nicely?’ And I obviously want that as a first step, but that feels to me 
somewhat a bit like giving in a bit.”281 Another activist from a separate humanitarian 
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disarmament organization echoed this concern, stating that the “emphasis on transfer 
and proliferation” that many within the network adopt “seems like giving in too 
much.”282  
Others within the “Ban Drones” frame echoed this concern and actually accused 
the overall “meekness” of key network actors as irreparably ceding ground to state 
governments on drones, to the point of capitulation on the issue. They argue that not 
only was there not enough “early action” on the issue, but that a focus on legal 
discussions about usage by human rights gatekeepers staked out a very small bargaining 
range with governments. They argue that it is better to “better to focus on the 
technology” rather than targeted killing, because discussions about the policy merely 
turns into “discussions of law,” which in their opinion are inherently conservative 
advocacy positions.  
For their part, multiple activists from the “Lawful Usage” framing camp 
dismissed the “Ban Drones” approach as being “unrealistic” and too pie-in-the-sky to 
attain actual policy outcomes. In the words of one activist from the “Lawful Usage” side 
of the humanitarian disarmament community: “I don’t think it would be politically 
possible to ask for a ban at the moment because the technologies have become too 
normalized.”283Another individual from an activist policy thinktank stated that these 
more radical groups are ‘not part of the conversation’ within policy circles, because such 
a technology abolitionist framing is a “conversation stopper” for politicians and military 
officials. They went on to describe how the drone itself isn’t the most pressing human 
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security issue, as much as larger strategic shifts from traditional to remote warfare of 
which drones are an integral part. 284 
Complicating Cooperation  
The above interview data indicates a divide between the more “practical” 
“Lawful Usage” frame activists – who desire greater transparency, accountability, legality 
and even regulation on use and/or proliferation – and the more “idealist” “Ban Drones” 
frame activists – who desire a weapon ban on armed drones. As one humanitarian 
disarmament drone activist put it, when you try lump these different organizations into 
“one basket” in genuine attempts to work together, the result is “strained social 
relations” and stalled work on drones.285 Put another way by an Open Society 
Foundations (OSF) drone specialist that has a birds-eye view of the overall network, “the 
main issue with it [coalition-building] is the fact that most of these groups do not work 
on drones the same.”286 
 Such differences and disagreements seem to matter when “the rubber hits the 
road” and diverse groups try to work together in coalitions or on joint projects on armed 
drones. As the same individual from OSF described: “they simply don’t agree on what 
the aims of a policy paper should be.”287 A humanitarian disarmament activist elaborated 
more concretely on the import of these disagreements when it comes to the mundane 
day-to-day work of advocating:  
“There are these really small nuances which on the surface-level look like they 
mean nothing, but once you get to the little sentences that have to be in policy 
documents, you definitely notice ‘wow, we are spending a lot of time emailing 
about these little words here.’”288 
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To avoid this perceived incompatibility, like-minded advocacy groups working on 
drones tend to create silos by partnering with one another on smaller projects. While this 
likely has to do with unconscious homophily and ease of communication, some 
gatekeepers make a policy of it. An interviewee who works with Human Rights Watch’s 
counterterrorism division stated the organization’s approach plainly when asked how 
they decide to link up with drone campaign partners: “if our views are aligned and we 
generally take the same approach.”289 Similarly, an interviewee from an activism-
motivated thinktank described why they do not link up with “Ban Drones” groups: “it’s 
hard, because there are a lot of people that like work hardcore on drones, and drones 
very specifically, whereas for us, they’re just a very interesting part of a more complex 
puzzle.”290  
Activists have made attempts to overcome this frame silo-ing. A media 
communications activist described their job as to tell the transnational anti-drone 
activists that: “not only should you guys work together, but it’s better and amplifies your 
message when you guys work together on a regular basis.”291 This individual has worked in 
a similar capacity on other human security issues, such as nuclear weapons, and states 
that cooperation is uniquely difficult to attain between the anti-drone campaigners. They 
attribute this to the fact that “they are all working on different sides of this issue,” 
because where AI and HRW “can only talk about that civilian harm point” and generally 
don’t take positions on war, the pacifist “Ban Drones” groups “sit there like: ‘no war, 
ever.’”292 According to them, the result of this “nitpicking” is that only likeminded groups 
such as CIVIC, HRW and AI regularly meet during a bi-monthly meeting in DC where 
they discuss joint anti-drone advocacy opportunities. When expanded to include the 
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more pacifist “Ban Drones” groups, according to them “it takes them so long” to get out 
a joint statement that they tell them to just “release their own individual statements 
immediately.” They followed this up with the aside that they “would have a lot less work 
if that [nitpicking] stopped.”293 
The Case of EFAD 
 As stated above, EFAD is diverse in terms of its member’s views on drones, and 
intentionally so. In the words of its coordinator, “we have everything from grassroots 
activists like Drone Wars UK to established human rights organizations like Amnesty 
International.”294 This coalition-building process was not without its obstacles, though. 
According to the same coordinator, “it’s also a challenge to get local organizations to 
look up and sometimes, you know, act together with other organizations. It’s more 
difficult than I expected it to be… sometimes they simply don’t agree.”295 These 
disagreements are the same discussed above in microcosm: “there are people who are 
like against drones period, because they think it’s dehumanizing. There’s also other 
people who disagree and don’t think it’s much different from an F16, and are more like 
‘no, it’s just the targeted killings which are the problem.’” 
 As can be seen from the description above, the same “Lawful Usage” versus 
“Ban Drones” divide exists within EFAD. However, the actors were seemingly able to 
overcome it – or at least set it aside - and work together on a consistent basis even if they 
were unable to agree on an overarching advocacy message. According to what they 
reported to me, perceptions of meaningful inclusion in coalition-building processes by 
the more radical groups is an important variable. Specifically, the more powerful 
gatekeeper organizations purportedly gained buy-in amongst more radical groups 
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through fostering what these activists described to me as a sense of inclusion. They 
stated that these processes assuaged them that their concerns and positions were ‘being 
taken seriously.’ However, far from adopting their radical framing into the coalition’s 
overall Call to Action, the pacifist positions were folded into the positions of 
gatekeepers.296 In an effort to bring diverse groups on board, EFAD’s founders 
purposely did not make it a “campaign” in the vein of the International Campaign to Ban 
Landmines. This resulted in EFAD remaining a loose coalition with a relatively benign 
Call to Action. 
 EFAD’s structure is built to allow its members to air grievances and 
disagreements in constructive ways. These breakout sessions happen during annual 
meetings, where each group can share their perceptions. One actionable way that EFAD 
attempts to honor organizational differences is by allowing its members to choose which 
joint statements they sign onto and which they abstain from. As EFAD’s former 
coordinator describes: “sometimes organizations simply don’t subscribe to [EFAD’s 
joint statements] because they don’t agree. And that’s okay; that’s allowed.”297 Another 
way in which EFAD tries to keep differing organizations engaged is by structuring break-
out groups during their meetings to allow like-minded groups to partner up on smaller 
projects. An activist from PAX describes, after the group creates a list of goals and 
activities through large-group brainstorming, they “split up the work in groups of 
interested organizations who know what they want to do together.”298 Key to this 
process is that groups are free to choose topics that most align with their own 
organizational interests and viewpoints. 
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 These organizational measures do purportedly succeed in cultivating perceptions 
of meaningful inclusion amongst smaller organizations, according to what these activists 
reported to me. Amongst these smaller organizations are several that do not present their 
advocacy work in English, and sometimes rely on other EFAD members to translate 
their work for broader dissemination. It also includes Drone Wars UK, which works its 
impact by working both with grassroots peace organizations as well as alongside 
transnational organizations. The founder of this organization approaches his advocacy 
work from a “Christian pacifist perspective” and is interested in drones as they pertain to 
the “ethics around warfare.”  
While they note that they differ significantly from the larger organizations in 
terms of their position on drones – that they should be banned – Drone Wars UK 
remains a member of EFAD. According to them, this is because coalition actors like 
Amnesty International made enough effort to takes their position seriously. The founder 
describes EFAD as having “good will” towards all of its members, including the more 
radical ones like their’s. They stated that “those of us who have perhaps more 
fundamental problems with the technology didn’t feel excluded,” and that the Ban 
Drones activists have been able to “push our perspective.” They describe a sense of 
control and input in EFAD’s processes and report a satisfying ability to impact the 
coalition’s focus: 
“EFAD, I would say, has listened to our challenging them. I think at the 
beginning, there was an idea that we [EFAD] should only work on targeted 
killing; targeted killing was the problem. And I think that they have listened, 
and that other groups have listened to our arguments about lowering the 
threshold for war… They take that onboard now as well, so there is shifting 
and movement.”299 
These same organizational measures aimed at fostering inclusion of diverse 
perspectives on drones also resulted in satisficing when it came to guiding principles and 
 





demands. Perspective of inclusion aside, EFAD’s Call to Action on the side of the 
“Lawful Usage” framing. Perhaps most notably, according to the founder, EFAD 
purposely maintains its status as a coalition rather than a campaign so that they can 
sustain this diversity.300 The founder of EFAD goes on to state the key dilemma clearly: 
“The issue in the beginning was how can we find a common goal to work on 
together, where we have an advocacy goal that’s acceptable by all? Because, you 
know, Amnesty has very much a human rights focus on the issue, whereas Drone 
Wars UK is much more outspoken… So how can still find a common ground 
where we can work together?” 
Similarly, EFAD’s coordinator - the individual tasked with corralling these 29 groups into 
cooperating during meetings and virtually – stated that they “just try to get as many 
people agree on, you know, what is the middle road.” This oftentimes led to a situation 
where the more radical groups were expected to “be pragmatic and add water to the 
wine’ when it comes to working together.” As can be inferred from these statements, 
EFAD’s ability to hang together as a coalition in large part depends on the more radical 
groups’ willingness to work at the margins of smaller projects and to ultimately fold 
themselves into the more conservative demands of the umbrella organization rather than 
achieving actual representation in advocacy outputs. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Above, I show that despite sharing a general common interest in advocating on 
drones, there are significant disagreements over how to name “the problem of drones” 
that transnational activists have largely not overcome. These disagreements center 
around whether armed drones are an issue of the technology, or of how armed drones 
are currently being used by governments for targeted killings. These disagreements 
between meta-frames generally correspond to organization type, with the human rights 
and transparency-focused organizations adopting the “Lawful Usage” framing, and the 
 





anti-war groups using the “Ban Drones” framing. The humanitarian disarmament 
community is experiencing an internal disagreement over which framing to adopt. Some 
want to take the well-trodden path of squarely focusing on a specific weapon technology, 
as such a strategy has resulted in past victories (the International Campaign to Ban 
Landmines).301 Larger humanitarian disarmament organizations such as PAX view a 
drone ban more skeptically, agreeing more with the human rights focused activists that 
the drone itself could theoretically be used to reduce civilian casualties in war and is 
therefore not an inherently problematic weapon of war. However, as can be seen from 
the EFAD case, how these activists engage with one another can determine whether or 
not they partner, regardless of their frames. EFAD is a story about relational processes 
between activists, informed by their chosen frames.  
Observing how these actors relate to one another and try to come together can 
illuminate how power is operative within advocacy networks. First of all, the gatekeeper 
organizations such as HRW and AI along with other influential network brokers all 
adopt the “Lawful Usage” frame. However, smaller groups within the Global North 
networks do not always merely submit to the frames of the more powerful organizations. 
Oftentimes a careful process of coalition-building attempted to ensure that all groups felt 
as though they were meaningfully included in the process. Interviews with these activists 
reveal complex processes of stakeholder buy-in from less powerful organizations, which 
ultimately affect the network’s overall message cohesion. The desire to bring smaller 
groups along in the coalition led to a situation in which EFAD was unable to solidify 
around an umbrella frame, precisely because doing so risked alienating these more radical 
partners.  
 





It is important to note that collaboration and described perceptions of inclusion 
do not necessarily correlate to actual representation in advocacy outputs. From the 
outside, the coalition appears to buck the “Lawful Usage”-versus- “Ban Drones” conflict 
through internal procedural measures meant to foster inclusion. However, these 
inclusion measures themselves seem to exert a modifying influence over the radical 
groups. Rather than resulting in tangible representation of diverse perspectives within the 
coalition’s Call to Action, these “wins” by the radical groups remain more symbolic and 
ideational than practical and observable.  
Furthermore, as will be discussed in Chapter 5, not all transnational network 
partners are extended reconciliatory process-building measures as they are in EFAD. The 
two meta-frames discussed in this chapter can be thought of as the “professionalized 
advocacy frames,” favored by groups based in the Global North. As Chapter 5 will show, 
the grassroots actors in Pakistan that adopted the “Neocolonialism” meta-frame are 
almost entirely isolated from these professionalized networks. In this way, geopolitical 
power relations mirrored in this network, as the most powerful and well-connected 
organizations in the network are based in the countries doing the bombing. The present 
chapter demonstrates that even when transnational groups differ significantly with one 
another on how to frame drones, their liberal universalist ontology ultimately allows 
them to maintain closer connections than with actors operating outside this ontology in 
Pakistan. Due to their national headquartering and traditional approaches to advocacy, 
groups in the Global North are far more willing to work with “perpetrators” of the 











“An Examination of Conscience:” 
US Activists and the Armed Drone Issue 
 
Introduction 
On a bright October morning in 2019, around two dozen individuals fell, in 
perfect synchronism, motionless to the pavement in front of the United Nations 
Headquarters. A former United States Army member kicked off a chant by shouting: 
“double tap,” to which the group responded: “drone strike!” Dressed in all white, the 
protestors lay on the sidewalk beneath Predator drone model. The Army veteran 
remained standing, holding a highlighter-yellow sign above his head detailing the civilian 
casualties of the US drone program, along with a demand to end the manufacturing of 
unmanned aerial vehicles. Named “Blank Slate,” the coordinator of this demonstration, 
Essam Adam Attia, refers to it as a “public art intervention.”  
The timing of this protest-through-art was strategic; within the marbled-lined 
halls of the UN Headquarters, diplomats, policy experts, and transnational activists were 
convening for the opening day of the General Assembly’s First Committee.302 Through 
allotted speaking times on the assembly floor and scheduled side events, transnational 
activists belonging to organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Reaching Critical 
Will lobby policymakers from all over the world on subjects dealing with humanitarian 
disarmament, including the specific issue of armed drones. Despite purposely aligning 
the date to coincide with the first day of the First Committee meeting, the domestic 
 





activists outside of the UN building performing a drone “die-in” protest did not 
communicate nor coordinate their actions with the transnational activists inside of the 
building. Both drone-focused advocacy activities took place literally adjacent to one 
another, but completely separately and with very different advocacy messaging.  
In the previous chapter, I showed how inverse vetting patterns within the 
transnational level of the network contributed to the non-emergence of a unifying anti-
drones campaign frame. This chapter further explores the overall lack of an anti-drones 
advocacy frame by examining the social relations and framing between activists at the US 
domestic level, as well as their relations to the transnational level. Observing the case of 
US domestic anti-drone activists stands to teach us more about vetting in transnational 
issue networks. First, when taken with Chapter 3, it sheds light on how inverse vetting 
occurs within the segment of the anti-drone network located in the Global North.  Due to 
their geographical locations, the domestic and transnational activists share roughly the 
same cultural sensibilities.303 However, these actors – the domestics and the 
transnationals – do have real differences in power, influence, and resources. As I will 
show in this chapter, some US domestic groups refused to work with larger transnational 
groups based on the latter’s lack of perceived radicality. This is because they see drones 
as a particularly insidious expression of warfare and violent conflict, something that 
makes war more efficient and one-sided. The domestics defined the armed drone issue in 
their own way – through an anti-war discourse – and assessed transnational groups’ more 
moderate positions as deficient in achieving their pacifist advocacy goals. 
 The 2019 UN Headquarters vignette is analytically useful because it distills these 
two hubs – the US domestic level and the transnational level – into a microcosm. 
Theorists might expect these two groups of activists to coordinate their actions and unify 
 






their messaging, especially since both subnetworks were preexisting, robust, and all 
network actors knew of the others’ existence.304 Sell and Prakash (2004) show that 
domestic level political actors and transnational actors share similar interests. Indeed, 
partnership with a consolidated frame and policy recommendation would benefit the 
smaller organizations by elevating their voices, while also benefiting the transnationals by 
giving them broader reach in disseminating international norms to a domestic context 
and diversifying their base;305 it would benefit both in terms of policy outcomes.306 This 
engagement with a politically active national-level network is a vital part of implementing 
INGO interests, because international human rights norms are theorized as influencing 
foreign policy after they become encoded into a domestic context.307 Despite this, while 
the US domestic subnetwork’s messaging is rather cohesive and their social relations with 
one another produce consistent advocacy products (such as conferences and protests), 
the social connections between the US domestic level and the transnational level are 
weak and their framings remain entirely different.308 
Normative frames can act to bind activists and differences between stakeholders 
in an issue area – such as the US domestic and transnational anti-drone activists – 
complicate cooperation.309   While the transnational activists, as discussed in Chapter 3, 
adopt both the “Ban Drones” and “Lawful Usage” meta-frames, the US domestic 
activists fall mostly into the “Ban Drones” meta-frame, with a unique focus on the 
ethical dimensions of armed drones.  
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Indeed, the US domestic activists’ “Ban Drones” framing of the drone 
technology is very dissimilar from how the transnational activists frame it. The US 
domestic activists lean into a heavily ethical framing of the drone technology as “evil” 
than the transnational “Ban Drones” activists, who would instead focus on more 
nuanced language out of the humanitarian disarmament tradition. This ethical framing is 
also different to the more clinical language of international law we see the transnational 
organizations using in the “Lawful Usage” frame. This focus on ethics amongst many US 
anti-drone activists is in part due to the large presence of the religious community in this 
section of the network, but also the presence of secular pacifists. To distinguish it from 
other “Ban Drones” frames in this chapter, I call the US domestics’ focus on technology 
the “peace” approach, a term that activists themselves use, as it reflects their general anti-
militarism.  
Additionally, the domestics’ framing is also different from the Neocolonialism 
frame. Even though the domestics’ framing does share some similarities with the 
Neocolonialism frame, particularly in their focus on armed drones’ role in imperialism, I 
purposely keep these two distinct. This is because the US domestics’ framing of their 
anti-drone advocacy falls within the same liberal universalist ontology as the other 
organizations based in the Global North, whereas the Neocolonialism frame falls outside 
this conceptualization of world politics. For example, even the most radical groups in the 
US believe in creating change through participation in electoral politics. In doing this, 
these US activists advocate within systems of power that the Neocolonial activists wish 
to distance themselves from.  
This chapter supports but also extends the traditional elite vetting theory. It 
supports the traditional model in that the gatekeepers clearly did not want to work with 
domestic partners who were deemed as too radically anti-drone, since it would possibly 





traditional model, this chapter also extends it by suggesting that this process is not only 
unidirectional but can go in both directions simultaneously. In this case, both gatekeepers 
and domestics were hesitant to work together and subsequently vetted one another. 
These vetting processes led to an absence of compromise in terms of settling on an anti-
drone umbrella framing. This left both the US domestic and transnational activists to 
pursue their own anti-drone advocacy with their own frames; much like how the two 
groups in the opening vignette operated simultaneously but separately. 
In this chapter, I draw on a unique text and picture dataset of 300 primary 
advocacy documents, 10 in-depth semi-structured interviews with key informants from 
the US domestic level of the armed drone network, and field site visits. As part of my 
initial fieldwork for this network hub, I attended a 2018 Interfaith Network on Drone 
Warfare regional conference in Hartford, Connecticut held in the Hartford Seminary. 
The connections I cultivated at this networking event allowed me to gain access to the 
leaders of the US domestic network hub and also granted me access to internal listservs, 
which include information on advocacy planning and events. This chapter proceeds with 
a brief case background of how US activists have advocated against armed drones over 
the past two decades. I then move into an analysis of this mobilization within the US 
context. I conclude by discussing what this case can teach analysts about transformative 
politics in advocacy on human security issues. 
The Domestic Network Actors 
I conceptualize the US domestic network hub as groups and individual issue 
entrepreneurs that primarily petition their own governments without focusing on 
international policy audiences. It is important to clarify that I am not sorting these groups 
based on their nationality alone, because there are American activists and groups that fall 
into the transnational activist category, such as Human Rights Watch. What is salient in 





on US politics. I do not include the smaller European organizations from the previous 
chapter in this classification as “domestic activists,” since (despite their size) they petition 
extra-state bodies such as the EU and UN as part of their advocacy. Because the US 
groups are interested in petitioning their own government and seek partnerships with 
transnationals in as far as they can help them reach this goal, the US activists I spoke to 
did not express much interest in connecting with pacifist groups advocating in the EU 
(even if they admired their work).  
Thus, what makes US domestic actors in the issue network distinct is that unlike 
their transnational counterparts, their efforts focus solely on various elements of 
American politics. Whereas the transnational advocacy groups – even the ones based in 
New York and Washington DC – primarily engage in transnational politics and 
petitioning international/regional organizations as well as nation states, the domestic US 
activists I focus on in this chapter concern themselves only with political and economic 
actors as well as smaller constituencies within the US. These targeted actors may include 
politicians, but also direct appeals to drone pilots asking them to join in protesting as well 
as corporations that manufacture armed drone-related technology.  
Additionally, while the US-based transnational activists - such as Human Rights 
Watch and Human Rights First - are clustered in New York and Washington DC, these 
domestic-focused activists are much more geographically dispersed throughout the 
country. For example, the religiously focused group Coalition for Peace Action is based 
out of Princeton, New Jersey, while the women’s peace group CodePink is headquartered 
in Los Angeles, California, and Veterans for Peace is located in St. Louis, Missouri. The 
largest actors in this level of the network, such as Veterans for Peace, also have dozens 
of local chapters. 
There are three further dimensions which are characteristic of this subnetwork 





contains the highest numbers of anti-war pacifists. As this is also on average an older 
population (a large number are retirees), many US activists cut their advocacy teeth on 
anti-Vietnam War protests and nuclear abolitionism. They see drones as making foreign 
wars more tempting and easier for US policymakers; a problem, since they are steadfastly 
anti-war. 
Second, while this level of the network is comprised of perhaps the most 
surprising bedfellows out of any drone network cluster – including anti-war pacifists, 
religious community leaders, veterans, Silicon Valley techies, as well as ‘concerned 
citizens’ – two types are unique to the US context: the veterans and the religiously 
motivated actors. Notably, this is the only part of the transnational network that contains 
individuals who, at one point in their lives, directly supported the US’s drone war 
through their professions before becoming conscientious objectors. Specifically, this 
includes two types of individuals: 1) veterans who either served as drone pilots or bore 
direct witness to drone warfare, and 2) high-tech industry workers from companies like 
Booz Allen Hamilton or Google who worked on the research and development side. 
Both types are unique amongst other actors in the broader issue network for the 
participatory, insider role they once played in the drone program. This perspective is 
significant given the layers of confidentiality and opacity surrounding the US drone 
program, which activists at all levels of the transnational network often cite as a key 
challenge to their work. 
Finally, there is a significant segment of this subnetwork that is heavily religious 
in motivations and approaches.310 For example, the Interfaith Network on Drone 
 
310 While Pakistani activists at times use religious phrases and imagery in discussing 
drones, these activists do not cite religion or their personal (at times, very strongly held) 
beliefs in Islam as their overarching ontology for taking political action on drones. 
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Warfare is an umbrella organization that focuses on grassroots education, primarily 
aiming to teach congregations about the ethics of drone warfare in key constituencies. 
This group of actors includes politically liberal protestant Christian denominations such 
as Unitarian Universalists and Quakers, as well as Catholic and Muslim groups. While its 
founder has tried to recruit Evangelical churches to join, he reported that this has been 
extremely difficult due to the politically conservative ideology of that denomination in 
the US.311 They also at times participate in direct action tactics, such as protesting drone 
bases and contractor headquarters, sometimes even purposefully getting arrested for 
publicity. The Network also has an associated but separate policy advocacy wing called 
the Interfaith Working Group on Drone Warfare based in DC that focuses on lobbying. 
US Civil Society Mobilizing Against Drones 
These actors have taken an eclectic approach to advocating on armed drones, 
with the “how” varying widely depending on the individual’s organizational affiliation. 
The most prominent tactics include direct protests of air bases, lobbying both local and 
national political figures, corporate lobbying, art installations and performance pieces, 
grassroots education, television ads, and litigation advocacy focused on the rights of US 
citizens as they pertain to drone targeting. Again, the one common thread throughout 
these approaches is that they are solely focused on advocating in the US context without 
a significant, sustained international component.  
 The Interfaith Network primarily focuses on grassroots education and targets 
religious congregations located in key congressional districts.312 Taking a religiously 
 
religious establishments. As will be discussed in the next chapter, the grassroots activists 
I spoke to in Pakistan instead cite a decolonial ontology as informing their drone work. 
311 For a fascinating analysis of how conservative domestic interests have created 
conservative NGOs that compete with liberal groups in transnational advocacy, see 
McCrudden 2015 
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wider armed drone advocacy initiative – which also includes funding the European 





informed ethical stance against armed drones, the Interfaith Network has produced 
advocacy products such as short movies, pamphlets, and pre-formatted letters to 
congresspeople, all of which are meant to be easily distributed by church leaders to their 
parishioners. The movies include versions of the films National Bird, Drone, Unmanned: 
America’s Drone Wars – all edited down (after purchasing the rights from the creators) to 
30 minutes for ease of screening in a church setting. In addition to these edited movies, 
the Interfaith Network also produced two of its own movies, which are meant to be 
introductory films targeted toward an American religious audience:  The Religious 
Community and Drone Warfare and Moral and Safe?: War, Peace, Drone Warfare and the Religious 
Community.  
The founders of this organization – two Unitarian Universalist reverends with a 
preexisting friendly relationship – host one national conference and thirteen regional 
conferences per year on drone warfare. While the national conference in Princeton, New 
Jersey primarily focuses on recruiting religious leaders from key congressional districts to 
attend, the thirteen regional conferences invite academics, religious lay people, as well as 
community leaders to attend. The conference that I observed in Hartford, Connecticut 
hosted a panel of speakers, select screenings of the short films named above, and offered 
opportunities for individuals to get involved with artistic advocacy work such as adding 
to a drone “peace quilt.”313 Packages passed out to the attendees included instructions on 
how to introduce the issue to their own religious community, a pre-written letter to their 
congressperson urging them to not support drone warfare, and scheduled in-person 
protests. Ultimately, the goals of these smaller conferences are to convince attendees to 
return to their parishes and host screenings of the films and to write their 
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congresspeople; encouraging individuals to go out and proselytize the religious anti-
drone warfare advocacy message to their community members. 
 Directly targeting corporations for their role in supporting the US’s use of drones 
is another advocacy approach that is unique to this set of activists. These confrontations 
tend to be dramatic in terms of optics. For example, an individual issue entrepreneur 
organized a march in Greenwich, Connecticut to picket the house of ITT Inc.’s CEO in 
order to label him a ‘war profiteer.’ This is because ITT Inc. builds the bomb release 
components that allow armed drones to drop Hellfire missiles. In another instance, two 
separate activists became shareholders in Honeywell, only to attend share meetings and 
protest to the board about the company’s role in pioneering avionics and mechanical 
systems for the MQ-9 Reaper. 
 These types of direct action and protests are an important part of the domestic 
activist’s arsenal more generally. Heavily informed by the civil disobedience culture of the 
1960s and 70s, some activists who participate in these protests purposely get arrested to 
make a political statement. While these types of regularly scheduled protests occur at air 
bases all around the country – such as at Horsham, Pennsylvania and San Francisco, 
California – the most publicized one is an annual protest at Creech Air Force Base in 
Nevada. Led by CodePink and in partnership with Veterans for Peace, the annual “Shut 
Down Creech” events include the main four-day protest, but also various “peace-
bonding” activities and an desert campout at a goddess spirituality temple. These 
differently located protests draw on various types of artforms to make their point, and 
also to “go viral.” For example, there is an individual activist who considers crafting 
scaled models of drones as their primary advocacy. These models are shipped all over the 
US – including to Hawaii – to be used in marches and educational events.314 One New 
 






York-based artist and activist specializes in Banksy-style, drone-related political street art 
and graffiti. This individual was actually arrested for allegedly counterfeiting NYPD 
posters as part of his anti-drone artwork. 
Lastly, the most well-known and resourced US domestic organizations tend to 
focus on litigation advocacy on behalf of American citizens targeted by drones abroad as 
well as on Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests regarding drone policy from the 
government. The most famous case of domestic advocacy comes out of the American 
Civil Liberty Union’s (ACLU) work on the behalf of Anwar al-Awlaki – a US citizen who 
was targeted and killed by a US drone strike in Yemen for his role as an influential al-
Qaeda propagandist. This case was critical in terms of compiling the most 
comprehensive information on the processes to date. It revealed, in part, how the US 
government makes lethal targeting decisions and how it internally justifies the legality of 
such strikes. For example, the ACLU’s al-Awlaki casework revealed that in 2010 the 
White House Office of Legal Council (OLC) reinterpreted the US Supreme Court case 
Hamden v Rumsfeld to mean that the US can legally undertake military action within 
non-war zones. Until this point, even the legal reasoning of the US government on these 
policies had been classified. 
Ethical Framing of “Ban Drones”  
While the majority of these US groups subscribe to the “Ban Drones” 
metaframe, there are distinctly culturally American dynamics that flavor this variation and 
differentiate it from the transnational network’s overall framing of the armed drone 
technology as a humanitarian disarmament issue. Specifically, the US domestic activists 
primarily frame their drone work around what I suggest are inherently ethical 
frameworks. The first type of ethical framing these groups use has a distinct anti-war 
dimension and the second type has intentional religious components to it. These ethical 





overall faith-based anti-war stance, while secular anti-war groups like CodePink use 
ethical language but never religious parlance. 
Secular Ethical “Ban Drones” Frames 
Domestic US peace groups adopt the clearest anti-war stances against armed 
drones. This variety of activism tends to be pathos-laden in order to provoke a visceral 
response from its audience. Figure 1 below offers an illustrative example of this type of 
argument. 
 
Figure 4.1: Example of Ethical Argument in Anti-War Frame from Knowdrones.com
  
The particular issue entrepreneur who heads up this website further explained his 
position in a 2018 interview. He made the ethical argument – grounded in secular 
pacifism – that Americans “need to know how it looks from the other end of our 
military machine,” and lamented that US politicians were not willing to see Americans as 






“It’s all well and good to say “drones don’t have any consequences.” But if you are on the 
receiving end of a drone hellfire missile, you are experiencing consequences. And for 
people to feel that you can kill people without consequence is one of the most dangerous 
things that you can give somebody the sense of.” 
The ethical framing of drone technology can be seen particularly well in direct 
protests. CodePink has the most sustained and active anti-drone campaign in the US. 
While they also engage in speaking tours and book publications on the subject, their 
most notable and headline-grabbing anti-drone actions have been their protests at drone 
bases. The annual “Shut Down Creech!” protest event, which is put on in partnership 
with Veterans for Peace, takes place in Creech, Nevada outside the air base. The stated 
goal of this action, which has taken place every year since 2015, is to: “nonviolently 
oppose the barbaric and deadly U.S. drone assassination program at Creech AFB that 
terrorizes communities around the world.” Figure 2 illustrates protest signage at the 2020 
Creech event. 
 






Secular US peace activists directly target military members and drone pilots in 
particular through ethical arguments. Essentially, these activists are trying to persuade the 
“tip of the spear” that they are complicit in an immoral practice and to quit their jobs. 
One example of this approach is the partnered work between KnowDrones and 
Veterans for Peace Chapter 87. In 2017, these groups created short anti-drone television 
ads that aired on network news channels in two “drone base communities:” Creech, 
Nevada and Syaracuse, New York. The ads are meant to be “speaking about conscience” 
to the drone operators according to their creator, and to “bring out the underlying causes 
of these drone wars and urging drone pilots to not fly.”315 Their reasoning for targeting 
drone operators directly is because the US government has “been so completely 
supportive of drone attacks that we must appeal directly to drone operators to bring an 
end to the drone killing.”316 Figures 3 and 4 below are screen captures of the ads, which 
exemplify the morality-based appeals. Figure 3 is a broad appeal to the drone base 
community, while Figure 4 is directly targeted at the drone operators. 
 
Figure 4.3: 2017 Anti-Drone Television Ad Targeting Drone Base Communities I 
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Figure 4.4: 2017 Anti-Drone Television Ad Targeting Drone Operators II 
Evocative street and protest art is another way in which the US domestic peace 
activists advocate moral stances on armed drones. It also sets them apart from their 
transnational counterparts, as can be inferred from the vignette that opened this chapter. 
Informed by the use of puppetry and effigy during anti-Vietnam protests, anti-drone 
activists will sometimes use scaled models of drones to provoke emotional responses 
from onlookers. According to the creator, who works with a team of artisans in upstate 
New York and western Massachusetts, using the drone models in protests draw crowds 
who take photos and experience emotional reactions to seeing the imposing prop. The 
models are meant to inspire a feeling of existential terror in those who see it, and in some 
installations, the creator includes a recording camera on the drone with a video screen to 
make people feel repulsed at the surveillance element. Figure 5 below shows one of the 






Figure 4.5: Scaled 8-Foot Long Drone Model Created by Interviewee 
New York-based artist and political activist Essam Adam Attia’s anti-drone work 
exemplifies the evocative moral framing and garnered some of the most media attention 
out of all the US domestic activists. Attia is a veteran and the activist who led the 2019 
protest at the UN Headquarters discussed at the start of the chapter. In 2012, Attia 
created posters imitating NYPD posters and signs and posted them all over New York 
City. These signs were meant to impose upon the residents of Manhattan the same 
feelings of insecurity imposed upon individuals living in drone-targeted areas. As in 
Figures 6 and 7, they include pithy slogans like: “drones, protection when you least 
expect it,” and even “Wanted” posters for President Barack Obama, as seen in Figure 8. 
This drone protest work made Attia a figure in a high-profile local case, as he was 
charged with grand larceny, criminal possession of stolen property and 56 counts of 
possession of forged items. Figures 6, 7, and 8 show examples of this anti-drone street 

































At first glance, these examples may seem to fit into the same “Ban Drones” 
frame utilized by transnational advocacy groups like Drone Wars UK – i.e. that the drone 
itself is inherently problematic. But this would ignore that in targeting US policymakers 
exclusively, this brand of provocative pacifism has a distinctly American history to it, one 
that is steeped in anti-war cultural reactions going back decades. Most notable is the 
connection to anti-Vietnam messaging and the notion that the US is engaging in wars of 
imperialist, extractionist aggression. At times, this is a direct connection, as a large 
number of US anti-drone organizers are retirement age and participated directly in anti-
Vietnam protests. For example, on its website, one group cites Martin Luther King Jr.’s 
speech “Beyond Vietnam” – which discusses the role of global economic injustice and 
extractionism – as being directly relevant to the US’s contemporary drone wars. One 
activist described the Global War on Terror as “definitely [of] the same character that 
went on in Vietnam: the amount of killing that’s going on, the amount of secrecy, the 
amount of suppression, the amount of fear.”317 For these domestic activists, drones fit 
into an overall, historically grounded argument about US foreign policy: namely that the 
country’s foreign wars are imperial conflicts of extraction. This is an inherently different 
problem conceptualization from the transnational level. 
Faith-Based Ethical “Ban Drones” Frames 
 The US religious community has not been nearly as involved in advocating 
against the “Global War on Terrorism” (GWOT) as it was involved in the anti-Vietnam 
movement. However, while it doesn’t reach this threshold of anti-Vietnam mobilization, 
the armed drone issue has been a standout issue within GWOT that has animated a 
significant amount of political organizing and agitation from multiple US religious 
communities. Some of these organizations, such as the Quakers, adopt an ethical stance 
 





against war all together, folding the issue into their “swords into ploughshares” 
movement. Other religious organizations – such as the US Conference of Catholic 
Bishops – are not wholesale pacifists but do proscribe to the “Just War” (Jus Bellum 
Justum) theological doctrine, which strives to make the conduct of war morally 
justifiable. Regardless of whether the group adopting the religiously informed approach is 
pacifist or not, both frame their advocacy in terms of a religiously-grounded ethics. This 
quote from one of my interviewees drives home the central ontological importance of 
approaching their advocacy from a faith-based motivation: “There’s a place in the New 
Testament where Jesus says he wants his followers to be as wise as serpents but as gentle 
as doves. So [as activists] we’re pretty good at being as gentle as doves but we’ve also got 
to be wily like a serpent.”318 
Both types of religious activists frame drones as a particularly insidious and 
morally bankrupt instantiation of modern warfare. For example, the Interfaith Network 
on Drone Warfare issued a joint statement to the US Congress in 2019 exemplifying this 
deeply religious moral frame: 
As members of the American faith community, we believe that all people have 
human rights given to us by God, and that there must be transparency and 
accountability regarding the use of lethal force undertaken on our behalf. 
Therefore, we are writing to ask you to end the CIA’s use of armed drones to 
carry out lethal attacks.319 
From a theological and philosophical standpoint, these religious activists are concerned 
with the dehumanizing impact that they see drones as propagating. The focus then 
becomes the drone technology’s unique ability to create what one reverend activist called 
“moral disengagement” – both in the general US population through a decreased number 
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of US casualties and on the part of the drone pilot who has increased distance.320 This 
approach also appears in other religious groups’ advocacy products. On the Friends 
Committee on National Legislation’s drone website portal, they make the statement that 
“drone warfare is a moral and ethical issue as much as a legal one.” The post elaborates, 
drawing on this “moral disengagement” framing: “When drones kill for us, with little 
public awareness or scrutiny, we can more easily avoid thinking about the human life 
affected by these conflicts and the common humanity we share with those we 
are targeting.”321 The focus on the shared humanity of those killed in drone strikes, while 
it appears in secular pacifist activism as well, here draws on a deep religious tradition of 
human solidarity and dignity, which is uninfringeable due to the divine nature of a soul. 
Advocacy projects inspired by this religious ontology of human solidarity is perhaps best 
demonstrated in the Interfaith Network’s global peace quilt, made on behalf of drone 
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article on the related concept of “moral injury” on drone pilots, and Dill 2019 for an 
equally insightful discussion on the role of the moral responsibility of attackers in 
individualized warfare. 








Figure 4.9: The Interfaith Network on Drone Warfare’s traveling “peace quilt” 
This focus on the drone pilot herself, as an individual participating in warfare, is 
also unique to the US domestic context and finds particular focus in amongst the 
religious activists. As an outcome of “moral disengagement,” one Unitarian Universalist 
leader cites “moral injury” as a major problem with drone warfare, both on the part of 
drone operators and the US public. From a theological perspective, “moral injury” 
occurs when an individual damages their conscience by partaking in an act of 
transgression – with the concept of a conscience being a religious concept inextricable 
from a human’s soul. In this way, drone strikes are akin to creating a collective sin of 





The Interfaith Network makes this “moral injury” a central frame. One way they do this 
is by showing a shortened version of the film “National Bird,” which focuses on the moral 
anguish of the first drone pilot to have her mental illness diagnosed by the VA as PTSD 
caused by her service. Though put in secular clinical language in the film, the subsequent 
speakers at the conference then translate the woman’s agony to a more faith-based 
parlance. 
Hosting veteran speakers with firsthand experience of drone warfare is another 
way the Interfaith Network uses this “moral harm” frame. There is a specific veteran 
activist, a Unitarian Universalist Minister, who associated with both the Interfaith 
Network as well as Veterans for Peace. The Rev. served for five years in the US Army 
Chaplain Corps and was deployed to Kandahar Airfield in Afghanistan in 2012. During a 
2018 interview, they described their dilemma of conscience over drones during their 
deployment as follows:  
I saw drones for the first time and it was no longer on the peripheral – it was 
right there in front of me. And I was really confronted with a decision... 
Essentially in terms of what I was seeing and what I was learning about, and who 
I am in terms of what I represent. 
Faced with what he considered a moral dilemma, the Rev. addressed what they 
were perceiving about drones in a sermon in front of freely gathered servicemembers and 
contractors. They described this moral responsibility in a 2018 interview as follows: 
I was there [Afghanistan] as an Army chaplain and it was my responsibility to 
provide spiritual leadership for the institution of the military, and it was my 
responsibility to be a moral compass to the institution and to the soldiers and 
servicemembers in my care. And for me, that meant addressing the moral 
dimensions of what we were doing. 
 During our conversation, the Rev. was quick to clarify that they did not see this 
sermon as a “protest” action, but rather as bearing “prophetic witness.” According to 
them, “prophetic witness has to do with standing up for moral commitments out of a 





superiors perceived this sermon as “politically inflammatory,” and it resulted in the 
issuing of a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand and a release from active duty 
in Afghanistan.322 
While the secular peace activists in the US may hold some messaging affinities 
with the technologically-focused transnationals, it is much easier to observe the stark 
differences in messaging when observing the religious groups’ ethical frames. Again, 
these ethical frames are grounded in a focus on banning the drone technology, but with a 
uniquely American flavor that does not translate well outside of this domestic context. 
Just as defense and politics have historically been more intertwined in the American 
context than in the European context, so to has religion and politics. Returning again to 
the importance of the Vietnam War, we can observe the role of the US religious 
community in attempting to sway foreign policy through moral messaging.  Again, as 
with the secular peace activists, we can see that drones fit into a more historical advocacy 
concern that the US’s militarism is oftentimes not guided by “just” causes. 
Ethical Frames Facilitating and Complicating Partnerships 
 When looking at domestic US activists, two patterns are visible in terms of how 
productively they work with other stakeholders. First are the connections between 
activists within this subsection of the network, which are relatively robust and sustained 
overtime. Second, however, are the connections between this subnetwork and the overall 
network, which are quite detached and with fleeting partnerships.  
The first part of this chapter focused on detailing the two types of ethical framing 
of drone advocacy amongst the US domestic activists. While it would seem intuitive that 
there might be a hard wall between secular and religious activists, this is not the case in 
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terms of drone activists. For both groups, there is a baseline understanding of war as 
being morally repugnant, and of drone technologies being a particularly insidious 
expression of violent conflict. Due to this comparatively hardline stance towards war in 
general, these domestic activists are willing to adopt radical framing; namely, a “peace” 
approach that is inflected with a heavy sense of anti-militarism. 
 Tracing the drone models offers an illustrative example of how these groups 
work with one another under overlapping ethical anti-war frames as well as a baseline 
appreciation for how they relate to one another in a horizontal, non-hierarchical manner. 
As stated earlier, the issue entrepreneur who creates the scaled models distributes them 
to various groups around the US, including Code Pink and the Interfaith Network on 
Drone Warfare. The Code Pink staffer who designs the organization’s advocacy products 
identified the drone model as fitting with their approach to protest and acquired one of 
these models from its makers in 2013. The group still uses it in their Washington DC 
protests. In addition to utilizing the model, Code Pink and this specific entrepreneur 
engage in joint speaking tours on “killer drones,” in which they proselytize the need to 
ban the technology. The issue entrepreneur describes admiring Code Pink’s “insight and 
tenacity” as an anti-war group, saying it was a main reason that they “still do things in 
cooperation with them.”323 Tracing the drone model beyond Code Pink, the organizers 
of the Interfaith Network on Drone Warfare also utilize one during their regional 
conferences. The importance here is the shared understandings that these groups hold 
towards the use of the drone model. It is meant to inspire feelings of aversion in people 
who see them by bringing the “drone wars” – and violent conflict in general – closer to 
Americans, making it more visceral.  
 





 In addition to sharing resources, such as the drone model, US domestics engage 
in jointly funded protest events. This is perhaps most evident in the “flows” of 
likeminded individuals between in-person protests. The “Shut Down Creech!” annual 
event discussed above is the most obvious example of this, as it is an official partnership 
between Code Pink and Veterans for Peace. In addition to this partnership, the event 
itself draws likeminded peace activists from within the Interfaith Network on Drone 
Warfare as well as individual entrepreneurs such as the creator of KnowDrones.com. 
Even the veteran Rev. discussed earlier, who does take personal issue with the radical 
“killer drone” anti-militarism framing of the Creech Air Base protest event, opts to 
attend the related drone speaking events that occur in Las Vegas simultaneously with the 
peace campout. 
 These groups all adopt a distinct “peace” framing of the drone advocacy issue. 
There is also a significant amount of personal admiration – built upon this foundation of 
“peace”-oriented political ontology and “rebels with a cause” personas – that plays into 
the intimacy of these sustained relationships and reported satisfaction with the process of 
coalition-building. For example, when asked how they choose to form partnerships in 
their drone work, one activist stated that in addition to auditing the potential partner’s 
history, they ask themselves: “how do they view the United States and the world and the 
conduct around military?” They then described partners from within Creative Voices for 
Non-Violence who have “gotten arrested around drones” as the type of “people I really 
respect and really like to work with.”324 
However, the factors that help the US domestic network cohere with each other 
– the shared broad “peace framing” of the technology and reported perceptions of 
mutually respectful partnering procedures – seems to repel it from the transnationals. 
 





This repellence goes in both directions, with the transnationals opting not to partner with 
the domestics, and vice versa. Where processes of internally vetting fellow peace activists 
resulted in a productive partnership between US activists, vetting processes between US 
domestic activists and transnationals had the opposite effect. The one example of 
sustained cooperation within the DC-based working and policy group –– offers useful 
analytical leverage to see the conditions under which these groups with different frames 
may more readily unify and cohere. 
Transnational activists cite the general anti-militarism and radicality of the 
peace groups as being conversation-stoppers in the halls of power that the transnationals 
try to influence. As one activist from a prominent humanitarian disarmament 
organization described their perception of the domestic peace activists’ reach: “those 
groups had less purchase within the political arena than the human rights community.”325 
They continued, describing the “rituals” of transnational campaigning – such as 
compiling a well-researched reported that you can “make it thump on the table” of 
policymakers. They note that this rational approach to data collection sets aside the peace 
groups from the transnationals: “I think it’s kind of crucial that politics has these rituals 
and processes— that, I think, is common between human rights and humanitarian 
disarmament [groups].”326  
 Complicating the relationship far beyond matters of professional rituals and 
practice, many transnational human rights groups – such as Human Rights Watch and 
Amnesty International – have a foundational position that they will not take stances on 
issues of war and peace. Put plainly by a Human Rights Watch employee when asked 
about their position on the armed drone technology: “we do not oppose the use of any 
 






particular weapon, other than the ones that are illegal.”327 The logic behind this approach 
is that facilitates better access to governments in order to hold them accountable on 
human rights issues, because discussions about pacifism are “conversation-stoppers” 
with states and foreign policymakers.  
The drone issue itself is particularly complicated when it comes to maintaining 
this stance of not weighing in on matters of war and peace. This is due to the perception 
amongst policymakers and military officials that advocating against drones has become 
inextricably linked with pacifism in civil society circles. This official perception leaks 
down to some transnational groups as well, as can be seen in this transnational 
interviewee’s statement: 
“A lot of the people within the military … suspect that a lot of people that are 
advocating against armed drones are just broadly anti-war… They don’t really 
like war and therefore they definitely don’t like drones – when they’re trying to 
campaign against drones, what they really want is for the war in general to stop.” 
This link to pacifism is problematic, because according to the transnational activist: 
“what it has done to a certain extent is create kind of a bit of a myth, I would say, 
within the military that the NGO community [as a whole] doesn’t understand 
what the actual questions are in warfare—rightly or wrongly, because they [the 
military] were like: “drones are no different than any other military technology 
than we’ve ever used.”” 
This “myth” about the anti-drone-activism-equals-anti-war appears to over-
emphasize both the size and influence of the domestic peace groups within the overall 
network. This heuristic error appears to impact some transnational groups as well as state 
officials. For example, the fear of anti-drone advocacy acting as a “conversation-stopper” 
amongst the key targets of transnational advocacy has actually led some transnational 
groups to touch on the topic of drones more surreptitiously, in order to completely avoid 
the stigma of being “anti-war.” In the words of the same activist: “we’ve found actually 
 





that specifically not talking about drones has been one of the reasons why we’ve been 
able to make such good contacts and connections within the military... And we bring 
drones into that a lot as like a facilitation method.” 
This “myth” of pacifism and the desire to avoid the taint can be seen in a direct 
example from a US domestic activist’s rejected attempt to partner with Amnesty 
International. The veteran Rev. discussed above ultimately resigned from the Army 
Chaplain Corps out of protest over drones and wanted to “capitalize” on the publicity 
surrounding it. They described wanting “to see if Amnesty would kind of stand behind 
that and help publicize it and generate some kind of media around it.” Even though they 
met up with Amnesty International in DC, their attempt to connect was unsuccessful: 
“At the end of the day they couldn’t really offer much for reasons I still don’t quite 
understand…” They continue, describing their perception of why this missed connection 
was the case: 
“Amnesty was under some interesting kind of restrictions. Like they don’t – I 
don’t want to misrepresent them – but they don’t take positions on war or a 
particular conflict. So part of our messaging in the Interfaith Network on Drone 
Warfare Amnesty couldn’t stand behind because it goes beyond the scope of 
what they do. So it was complicated politics that seemed to obstruct that.”328 
All of the above being said, it is important to note that the US Domestics are not 
without connections to the transnationals. These connections have generally been 
fleeting. For example, returning again to the drone model as a way to trace connections, 
Amnesty International America contacted the maker in order to acquire and use one for 
a prop in its educational university speaking tour on drones. This 2013 national speaking 
tour was named “Game of Drones,” and was coordinated by and conducted through 
Amnesty’s National Youth Program. After the speaking tour ended – which had been 
timed to correspond with the release of their high-impact human rights report on a 
 





specific Pakistani drone strike – Amnesty International America stopped using the drone 
model and no longer kept in contact with the domestic issue entrepreneur. Figure 10 
shows its use in a campus visit. As can be seen in the banner, the messaging around the 
“Game of Drones” tour was to address the specific legal issue of extrajudicial executions, 
which is notable because the individual who created the drone model is a pacifist who 
wants to see a total ban on the weapon technology. 
 
Figure 4.10: Banner from Amnesty International 2013 “Game of Drones” Tour 
But in addition to these one-off interactions, there has also been at least one 
example of more sustained domestic-transnational cooperation. As described above, the 
Interfaith Working Group on Drone Warfare is a related but separate wing of the 
Interfaith Network on Drone Warfare – specifically, where the Network is a 501(c)(3) 
educational nonprofit based in Princeton, New Jersey, the Working Group is a dedicated 
policy lobbying group based in DC. This working group has maintained thin but 
sustained ties to the transnational drone activists’ policy group that meets monthly. This 





members from organizations like Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and 
Human Rights First..  
Observing the flows between these two DC-based groups through their monthly 
meetings offers some insight into the nature of US domestic-transnational connections. 
First of all, the ties between these two separate groups are sustained through two key 
network brokers from the faith-based US domestics’ side: an individual well-known in 
the advocacy circles for their work on the National Religious Campaign Against Torture 
(NRCAT), and another well-connected individual from the Friends Committee on 
National Legislation (FCNL). Second of all, the flow of information is unidirectional. 
This is because while the transnationals accept the ties with the nationals, the nationals 
still maintain a facilitating role, in that their role is to “report back from the policy 
meetings to the faith groups on how they can help” support the transnationals in their 
work.329 
Important to note in this example is that the most sustained contact between the 
transnationals and the US domestics hinges on the professional reputations of two 
individual faith-based activists. Put simply, this relationship is perceived to “work” 
because of the trust that these two domestic activists earned amongst transnational 
activists by participating heavily in the anti-torture campaigns of the early 2000s. Both 
individuals were heavily involved in the torture advocacy issue during the Bush 
Administration years, which was a campaign that both the religious organizations and the 
large transnational organizations easily rallied behind. For the religious organizations, 
torture was viewed as an affront to humans’ God-given dignity and was therefore an 
“obvious” issue that could sustain heavy faith mobilization.330 For the transnational 
organizations, torture was also an obvious issue, but instead due to its absolute 
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prohibition under international law.331 Put plainly, these two activists “earned” the 
reputation as “serious” issue campaigners worthy of partnering with, thus escaping the 
anti-militarism orientation to activism that can oftentimes be perceived as “unserious” – 
and by extension an organizational liability – by the large professionalized INGOs. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The previous section detailed the distinct frames adopted by two types of US 
domestic activists. Where the US domestic activists were able to bring two different types 
of groups – religious and secular peace groups – under one unifying frame of “armed 
drones are unethical,” these same groups did not come together with the transnational 
activists to create an overarching campaign frame. This was not due to a baseline desire 
from either the domestic or transnational activists not to partner with one another, 
either. Again, as in Chapter 3, we can see that relational processes between activists 
occupying different hierarchal points in the transnational network played a part in 
determining the overall cohesiveness of the anti-drone network’s messaging.  
These vetting processes went both ways. For example, the Rev.’s disappointing 
meeting with AI – when they did not follow up with him – as an example of the 
traditional elite vetting model, as a gatekeeper did not want to appear too radical.332 
However, we can also see an inverse vetting effect in play, with the US activists who 
primarily wanted to work with other activists that shared their politically radical stances 
and horizontal approach to campaign organizing – such as CodePink’s “peace bonding” 
approach that allows activists to create personal relationships with one another. .   
The differences in frames between the US Domestics and the Transnationals 
center around the radicality of language and messaging around ethics that each 
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subnetwork is comfortable adopting. This is not to claim, at all, that the work the 
transnational activists undertake is unethical, or not inspired by a deep understanding of 
ethics. This is instead referring to the willingness of groups to wear their ethical 
orientations on their sleeves, through their public advocacy messaging.333 Whether 
religious or secular, the US Domestic activists place their foundational ethics front and 
center, whereas the transnational activists place their rationality, credibility and 
methodologies at the public forefront.  
The comparison of these two subnetworks and how they relate to one another 
offers analytical insights about power. In keeping with the insights from the previous 
chapter, the groups that adopt a more radical framing on drones tend to be the ones that 
are the most marginalized from both the rest of the network and the policymakers. What 
sets the US domestic activists apart from the less-powerful activists within EFAD 
however is their enthusiastic embracing of this “rebel with a cause” identity, with the 
intentional arrests and lawbreaking as in the case of graffiti and trespassing. Indeed, this 
“rebel with a cause” identity factored into some domestic activists’ partnering decisions, 
as they preferred to work with others that they deemed as unwilling to “give in” to 
power. Again, this radical “anti-war” approach to armed drone advocacy can be couched 
in a historical tradition of leftist direct political action, and in the drones case, is directly 
linked to the anti-Vietnam movement.  
 But the discussion of power would be incomplete without acknowledging the 
relative power of the US domestic activists to the activists in Pakistan, who are the 
subject of the next chapter. Stroup reminds us that the host state can exert significant 
conditioning roles over the nature of advocacy.334 As activists based in the country whose 
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military is conducting the bombing, no matter how pacifist and grassroots these US 
domestic activists may be, they still enjoy a considerable amount of geopolitical power 
relative to Pakistani activists. And while the “myth” of the pacifism approach to armed 
drone technology may be viewed as locking the peace activists out of the halls of power 
(sometimes to the domestics’ pride, sometimes to their chagrin), the activists still have 
the ability to participate in the electoral politics of the belligerent country and formally 
present their government with grievances and requests for information on the drone 
program, by virtue and privilege of their US citizenship. Equally salient is the fact that 
many activists at the US domestic level, due to their identities as veterans, have at one 
point directly served as the “sharp end” of militarized US foreign policy—whether they 
participated in the US’s contemporary drone wars or a past conflict like Vietnam. 
Again, the US domestic activists come the closest to adopting the 
Neocolonialism Frame, specifically in the discussions of the US’s foreign wars being 
waged for imperialist, expansionist purposes. But, crucially, these contextual 
understandings are very dissimilar. When they discuss the violence-affected population in 
Pakistan, it is through a “give voices to the victims” approach that is actually a more 
populist mirror of the type of carefully gathered victims testimonies that the 
transnationals utilize in their reports. As will be discussed in the following chapter, the 
advocacy frame adopted by some Pakistani activists is much more complicated and 













Vetting the Boomerang: 
Advocating on the Armed Drone Issue from Pakistan 
 
Introduction 
In Summer of 2018, I met with Ibrahim335 in an Islamabad cafe to talk about his 
NGO’s past work on US drone strikes. Ibrahim heads up a small organization in 
Pakistan, which focuses on social, political and development issues in what was formally 
called the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA; now called Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
or KP).336 According to The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ), the most reliable 
source for drone-related casualty recording, drone strikes in this region reportedly killed 
between 2,500-4,000 people and injured around 1,100-1,700 between 2001 and 2021. 
Between 424-966 amongst those killed were civilians, and that between 170-200 of these 
were children.337 These strikes by the US were accompanied by the Pakistani state’s 
increasingly invasive counterinsurgency operations in the areas, which included activities 
such as housing demolitions and forced disappearances. Local civil society organizations 
found these conflict dynamics difficult to address in through advocacy, because at this 
time the Pakistani state also passed sweeping restrictions on NGO activities. It was in 
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broad descriptive accounts of each group, fictional names, and focus more attention on 
networking processes than exact mapping. 
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this hostile domestic environment that a well-known international NGO based in the 
Global North contacted Ibrahim and proposed that they partner together to work on a 
project related to the drone strikes. Despite this menacing domestic opportunity 
structure, and despite the fact that he wished to address the issue of drone strike victim 
compensation, Ibrahim told this powerful INGO “no.” In the face of all these domestic 
challenges towards his advocacy work, why would Ibrahim say “no” to linking up with a 
powerful partner that could have amplified his impact? 
Pakistan’s civil society is heavily monitored; issues related to national security are 
particularly controversial and prone to government interference into advocacy activities. 
This was especially true in the country’s northwestern tribal areas during the height of the 
drone strikes. Despite the presence of these factors – conditions that should presumably 
kick off a boomerang throw – overt instances of local groups and individuals reaching 
out to the international community to circumvent stagnation on drones have been 
relatively rare. Given the extreme domestic blockages Pakistani actors faced in addressing 
drones during the height of the strikes, why didn’t more issue entrepreneurs attempt to 
connect with powerful international gatekeeper organizations like Human Rights Watch 
that were already advocating on the subject in order to form a unified campaign? What 
has the drone advocacy network looked like in Pakistan? And how has it related to the 
grassroots and transnational activism in the North?  
Grassroots hesitancy to accept powerful transnational advocacy support is 
puzzling from an international relations theory standpoint. As described in Chapter 2, the 
conventional advocacy boomerang model posits that less resource-rich groups link up 
with better endowed international organizations in situations where political opportunity 
structures are inconducive to domestic advocacy.338 Local groups are thought of as 
 





kicking their grievances up to better known European and/or American organizations, 
who then popularize the given issue, and advocate on the behalf of or in partnership with 
their domestic stakeholders. Of course, not every would-be issue entrepreneur’s cause 
gains elite attention, as international gatekeeper organizations carefully “vet” the 
advocacy topics they undertake.339 As discussed in detail in Chapter 2, more recent 
scholarship deepens unidirectional models of transnational advocacy processes by 
demonstrating that “inverse boomerang” throws also exist, as well as “double 
boomerangs,” “rebounding boomerangs,” and even “catapults.”340 The inverse 
boomerang in particular occurs when the larger advocacy groups in the Global North 
face international policy blockages on their issue of choice, and then seek out partners in 
the Global South to bolster the legitimacy of their intended campaign.341 While useful, 
none of these models fully explain the dynamics of advocacy surrounding the US’s use of 
armed drones in Pakistan. In this chapter, I show how inverse vetting contributes to this 
body of theorizing on how actors in the Global South enact agency and impact in 
transnational advocacy networks.342 
In the previous two chapters, I have considered how relational processes 
between activists at the transnational level and US domestic level has affected the overall 
network’s ability to cohere around a unified anti-drone campaign frame. In this chapter, I 
turn to the grassroots political mobilization against armed drones in Pakistan. Drawing 
on a text and picture dataset of 300 advocacy documents and 13 in-person, semi-
structured interviews with key informants in Islamabad, I argue that the local activists 
who held fundamental differences in how they frame the “problem of drones” from the 
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transnational activists either rebuffed or renegotiated networking proposals through a 
process of “inverse vetting.”343 In this chapter, inverse vetting occurs when less powerful 
local actors decide for themselves whether or not to accept a partnering proposal by a 
transnational group based on the perceived merit of the organization and/or its project. 
The effect of this refusal complicates the overall campaign’s ability to unify around an 
impactful advocacy message and to demonstrate the involvement of affected populations 
– a feature IR theorists point to as bolstering campaign legitimacy.344 Taken together with 
the findings of the previous two empirical chapters, we can see that inverse vetting 
within the Pakistani anti-drone advocacy case offers yet another possibility for why the 
overall anti-drones transnational campaign did not settle on a unifying umbrella frame.  
While I have shown similar patterns of less powerful groups resisting the frames 
and partnerships of more powerful network actors in the previous two empirical 
chapters, here inverse vetting process is especially central to understanding why certain 
Pakistani activists chose not to link up to the transnational level. Again, this process is 
based on these activists’ descriptions of their goals, interests and strategies, with these 
descriptions being operationalized through frames. Crucially, this refusal to work openly 
with international partners was not unanimous. The two Pakistani groups that did form 
open partnerships with transnational organizations – the Foundational for Fundamental 
Rights (FFR) and Pakistan Body Count (PBC) – share similar framings of armed drones 
 
343 My interviewees from this chapter were sampled differently than in the previous 
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personally know through professional associations; they had a preexisting network 
amongst the individuals I needed to speak with in Pakistan. While I initially attempted to 
contact the founder of FFR as my first point of contact and snowball sample from there, 
this individual has since gained a prominent position in the Pakistani government and I 
was unable to interview them. The interviewees come from diverse occupational 
backgrounds in order to represent the loose epistemic communities that have worked on 
drones in Pakistan, including activists, attorneys, NGO personnel, journalists, and data 
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with their transnational partners. Interestingly, multiple activists who fall into the 
Neocolonialism frame viewed FFR with similar levels of skepticism as their transnational 
partners. 
The chapter proceeds with a brief case background of US drone strikes in 
Pakistan, the domestic challenges facing activists, and what mobilization around drones 
has looked like both transnationally and within Pakistan. I then move into an analysis of 
this mobilization in Pakistan, detailing how these local activists inversely vetted potential 
transnational partners. I conclude by considering what this case not only reveals about 
how actors with varying levels of geopolitical power navigate a network, but also what it 
reveals about grassroots resistance in the face of national and international state-
sponsored violence. 
Theorizing Relationships Between Global North and South Activists 
As discussed in previous chapters, much of the institutional politics of INGOs 
literature takes a traditional understanding of “the political,” in that actors’ interests are 
relatively fixed and rational and that politics primarily happen within formal channels of 
organizational structures and through official communications.345 This focus centers 
scholarly attention on the actions and motivations of large, traditional advocacy 
organizations that are generally headquartered in the Global North.346 This present 
chapter builds on this literature’s insights, by asking how the grassroots actors’ framing 
of their work influence their connections and relationships with activists working on the 
same issue from different transnational sites.347 Framings do not float free from context 
in transnational space and network positionality is integral to campaign construction and 
mobilization.348  
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Relationships between activists in the Global North and South are characterized 
by hierarchy.349 For example, the boomerang model of advocacy contends that activists 
in the Global South maneuver around difficult political opportunity structures and/or 
lack of resources by reaching out to groups in the Global North.350 This model can also 
be reversed when global campaigns seek out partners in the Global South to bolster their 
legitimacy.351 The “inverse boomerang” is theorized as creating a paradox, in that 
Northern partnership with Southern NGOs may boost campaign legitimacy, but it 
simultaneously undermines meaningful stakeholder input.352 The initial goals and 
strategies of the Southern groups can be coopted by more powerful groups, who 
retranslate their frames to sit better with policy relevant audiences – producing the type 
of “vanilla victories” discussed earlier.353 
A diverse number of actors and professional identities have mobilized around the 
issue in Pakistan over the past decade. Given this complexity, I adopt a wider 
conceptualization of who constitutes an “activist,” beyond an NGO-centric 
professionalized understanding. This approach includes individuals from loose epistemic 
communities like legal fraternities, data scientists and journalists, all of whom saw 
themselves at some point during the height of the strikes as doing political work on 
drones. According to some activists, popular perceptions in Pakistan of local NGOs as 
being corrupt, funding-driven and/or mouthpieces of powerholders means that a lot of 
political activism in Pakistan has occurred outside traditional spaces.354 
Transnational advocacy issue networks are deeply impacted by broader 
geopolitical power dynamics. This chapter focuses on one of the processes through 
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which actors with varying levels of power navigate a civil society network – through 
inversely vetting more powerful organizations. The inverse vetting concept builds on and 
extends a growing body of literature examining patterns of activism in the Global South, 
as well as the fragmenting of civil society more broadly.355 These studies consider the 
work of grassroots activists at the “other end of the boomerang,” and how less powerful 
network actors might exert influence on a transnational level.356 The inverse vetting 
process may show another path through which activists based in the Global South enact 
agency.  
Case Selection Logic   
I now turn to a case study on anti-drone mobilization in Pakistan, in which local 
activists, at least in part, determined the broader transnational issue network’s ability to 
unify around a clear advocacy message. Pakistan is just one of several countries affected 
by U.S. drone strikes. The U.S. undertakes lethal drone strikes in six other countries, all 
with varying levels of intensity, visibility and local conflict levels. Given the diversity of 
these settings, closely examining any one of these contexts would almost certainly reap 
different insights. I selected Pakistan as a single most-likely case for transnational 
advocacy networking for this chapter. This is because while Pakistan is not considered a 
fully democratic society by sources like Freedom House and the Fund for Peace, it does 
still have a vibrant – albeit heavily monitored - civil society.357 Under these domestic 
conditions, we would expect to see local advocacy efforts boomerang.358 
U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan 
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 While Chapter 1 broadly covers the transnational armed drone issue, it is useful 
here to specifically and more closely examine the US’s history of using armed drones for 
targeted killings in Pakistan. The US-Pakistani partnership in the Global War on 
Terrorism has been fraught and generally untrusting.359 On the Pakistani side, this 
distrust is in part due to the U.S. censure of its nuclear program in the 1990s, and the 
general perception that the US uses and abandons Pakistan for its own gain.360 U.S. 
frustration stems mainly from supposedly ongoing Pakistani deep state support for 
militants like the Haqqani network, despite civilian government assurances to the 
contrary.361 Coupled with the US’s perceived strategic importance of Pakistan’s tribal 
areas as an extension of the Afghan battlefield, this uneasy alliance heavily influenced the 
US’s decision to rely on targeted killing by armed drones as its key counterterrorism 
tactic in Pakistan. 
On 18 June 2004, the first recorded drone strike in Pakistan reportedly killed Nek 
Muhammed Wazir, an individual classified as a target by the US, and his 8- and 10-year-
old children, alongside 2-5 others.362 This was one of 51 strikes undertaken during 
George W. Bush’s Administration, which culminated in a final strike on 2 January 2009, 
just 18 days before President Barack Obama took office. Between 2004-2009, estimates 
from lowest to highest report that 410-595 people were killed in the Pakistan strikes 
during the Bush years, with anywhere from 167-332 of these being civilians, and 102-129 
of these numbers being children.363 An additional 175-255 people were reported injured, 
and during Bush’s tenure, the U.S. drone program was never officially acknowledged.  
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22 January 2009 - just five days after his inauguration – marked the first strikes 
under President Obama in Pakistan.364 These strikes heralded in a new phase in US drone 
warfare in general – one that was much expanded in frequency, intensity and 
deadliness.365 This new chapter was especially relevant to Pakistan in particular, as 
dramatically increasing the number of attacks in the tribal regions was a hallmark of the 
Obama Administration’s strategy – indeed, all 54 drone strikes in 2009 alone took place 
in Pakistan.366 Between January 2009 and January 2016, Pakistan’s tribal areas saw a 
minimum of 375 reported strikes, 2,095-3,415 overall reported deaths, and 990-1,474 
reported injuries.367  
The increasing number of strikes in Pakistan was matched with a greater 
institutionalization of target killing outside active battle zones into the framework of US 
foreign policy.368 This legalization – the process of bringing this new practice into 
preexisting legal frameworks through Office of Legal Council (OLC) memos – focused 
in large part on strikes outside the active zones of hostility in Iraq and Afghanistan, in 
order to encompass the Obama Administration’s pivoted focus to Pakistan, Yemen and 
Somalia.369 Alongside this institutionalization, or perhaps as part of it, the Obama 
Administration offered the first official U.S. acknowledgement of the drone program in 
 
Pakistani governments, credible local and international media and at times INGOs. Some 
contest the accuracy and reliability of NGO reporting on drone casualties (Fair 2014; Taj 
2010) 
364 Undertaken in two separate attacks, these strikes killed 14-19 people, all of whom 
were reportedly civilians. (“The Bush Years: Pakistan Strikes 2004-2009.”) 
365 Within Obama’s first two terms in office, the number of drone strikes increased six 
times over, and deaths quadrupled (Jameel 2016: 6) 
366 Purkiss and Serle 2017 
367 “Strikes in Pakistan,” n.d. 
368 Kaag and Kreps 2014; Savage 2015; Scahill 2016 





2012. The Administration was slow to reveal its legal justifications for the extra-territorial 
strikes – leading many to criticize the government’s use of “secret law.”370 
Pakistan’s Ambiguous Stance on U.S. Drones 
 The Pakistani government found itself in a delicate situation regarding its stance 
on the U.S. strikes, 371  something that deeply complicated local activists’ attempts to seek 
redress. The Pakistani government has been reluctant to take ownership – or to even 
discuss cooperation with the US – in the strikes occurring within its northwestern 
territories. Admitting complicity would open a floodgate of questions domestically, most 
controversial of which being why the government cooperated with Americans to kill 
Pakistanis in Pakistan.372 Public support and endorsement would also raise questions of 
the government’s responsibility to compensate victims for collateral damage caused by 
the attacks and could possibly serve as fodder for anti-state groups.373  
On the other hand, the government was also cautious not to disavow all 
responsibility for the bombing. One of the more pressing reasons for this is likely a 
desire to avoid framing the strikes as an unchecked foreign military incursion into 
Pakistan’s sovereign territory – something that would portray the state as weak and 
unable to govern its own territory in an area of crucial strategic interest. The 
government’s political tightrope walk resulted in what was likely an intentional public 
stance of ambiguity towards the drone strikes. As former President Pervez Musharraf 
reportedly told a CIA employee regarding plausible deniability: “in Pakistan, things fall 
out of the sky all the time.”374 Activists cite this quote as revealing the extreme challenges 
they face on the issue.375 
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Pakistani Civil Society Mobilizing Against Drones 
  Pakistani nongovernmental groups face significant challenges regardless of which 
issues they work on, and government regulations at times impedes operations. The 2011 
Save the Children controversy – in which a CIA agent used a vaccination program to 
gather intelligence on Osama bin Laden - served as the inciting incident for a broad and 
lasting crackdown on international organizations within the country.376 Subsequent 
legislation regarding INGO license registrations has made it difficult for some 
organization to continue operations and has resulted in the expulsion of at least 20 
INGOs on the basis of suspected anti-state activity.377 Working with INGOs has also 
become more difficult for domestic groups under these restrictions, as the domestic 
groups bring more government scrutiny on themselves in attempting to register 
international partners, or to receive international funding.  
Despite this difficult operational landscape, domestic mobilization against the 
drone strikes did exist in significant ways during the height of the bombings between 
2010 and 2017. Islamabad has been a key hub of Pakistani anti-drone activity. It houses 
the headquarters of organizations that have worked on drones, such as the Foundation 
for Fundamental Rights, the Conflict Monitoring Center, the Pakistan Institute for Peace 
Studies and others. It is also the location of relevant law and media offices of notable 
attorneys and journalists, who have at times acted as individual issue entrepreneurs from 
within loose epistemic communities. Since it is Pakistan’s political capital and is relatively 
close to the drone-affected tribal regions, Islamabad also served as a base for significant 
 
376 This resultant vaccine hesitancy out of feared CIA involvements continues into 2021, 
complicating COVID-19 vaccination programs in the country. Since the Osama bin 
Laden raid, childhood vaccinations have declined 23-39% in areas with high levels of 
support for religiously extreme political parties in Pakistan (Uildriks 2021). See also 
Matejova, Parker, and Dauvergne 2018 for a discussion on how domestic 
environmentalist activists with connections to the transnational level can be viewed as 
foreign agents in repressive domestic contexts 





drone protest activity, especially outside of the National Press Club. Indeed, popular 
protest was one of the three primary strategies of drone strike resistance in Pakistan, with 
the other two being litigation and data advocacy (or, the collection of statistics on 
casualties). 
Protests and public demonstrations were a key form of domestic mobilization 
against drones in Pakistan. These protests occurred both in the targeted areas of the 
tribal regions where they blocked NATO supplies from entering Afghanistan, as well as 
large cities like Peshawar and Islamabad.378 These protests typically coincided with 
specific strikes, such as the 2011 bombing that killed at least 38 people gathered for a 
tribal dispute resolution meeting.379 The most notable of these demonstrations was led by 
Pakistani politician Imran Khan in 2012, when he tried to lead a convoy of 100 vehicles 
from Islamabad to South Waziristan to bring international attention to the strikes; 
international activists from Code Pink and Reprieve UK were amongst the delegation.380 
Khan served as a prominent, key voice against drones before his election as Prime 
Minister in 2018, oftentimes condemning the policy in speeches and rallies.381  
 Litigation advocacy was also a key tactic for trying to address the damage caused 
by drone strikes in Pakistan. Indeed, a large number of individuals who worked on the 
armed drone issue were attorneys at various levels of the Pakistani courts. Litigation 
advocacy primarily focused on individual victim compensation by the Pakistani 
government, and these suits took place both on individual levels and also through 
NGOs. In one case filed on behalf of the Rehman family at the Supreme Court of 
Pakistan, advocates petitioned Pakistan’s interior ministry to provide compensation for 
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the deaths of ten kinsmen in a single drone strike.382 The most (in)famous of these cases 
– a victim compensation suit for KP resident Kareem Khan – resulted in the intentional 
outing of the CIA station chief in Islamabad, as he was named as party to the suit.383 The 
CIA employee was recalled from Pakistan, something that Shahzad Akbar – Khan’s 
attorney – attributed to a desire not to appear in court, since he might not qualify for 
diplomatic immunity.384  
These compensation cases were difficult to argue and nearly impossible to win in 
Pakistan for several reasons. First, as discussed earlier, the Pakistani government wanted 
to avoid inadvertently admitting complicity by granting victim compensation. Second, 
before 2018 the drone-affected population – all residents of the tribal regions – were 
unable to petition the Supreme Court under a law called the Frontier Crimes Regulation. 
Lastly, the ultimate responsibility of a foreign government for the killing complicated 
attempts to litigate victims’ cases domestically.385 Due to these challenges, the cases were 
elevated to the international level for publicity. In 2013, the Rehman family traveled with 
Akbar (their attorney) to Washington D.C. to testify in front of the U.S. Congress.386 This 
publicity event took the collaboration of Akbar’s Foundation for Fundamental Rights 
and the U.K.-based organization Reprieve.387 In a separate international publicity 
campaign, a Pakistani journalist brought the family’s young girl Nabila, her father, and 
Khan to Japan in order to discuss the fallout of the drone program with the Japanese 
government and media.388  
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Lastly, data advocacy was another significant way that Pakistani issue 
entrepreneurs confronted U.S. drone strikes. Since the early days of the war on terror, 
transnational data activists in large part focused on casualty counting. This tactic became 
popularized amongst activists specifically during the 2003 Iraq War, with groups like Iraq 
Body Count (IBC) creating a public database on the number of people killed during the 
conflict.389 With transparency and accountability being two primary concerns of data 
advocacy, the opaqueness of the drone war in Pakistan alarmed many national and 
international activists.390 Since the drone program is classified, official data on drone-
related deaths has been hard to come by, and White House reporting on the numbers has 
been widely criticized as being too low.391 The group Pakistan Body Count (PBC) – 
headed by data scientist Zeeshan Usmani – followed the model of IBC. PBC recorded 
deaths caused by both U.S. drone strikes as well as terrorist attacks in Pakistan. Given the 
controversial nature of measuring Pakistani attitudes on drone strikes, other data 
advocacy groups conducted public opinion research in the tribal regions. 
Negotiating the Boomerang  
 Individuals and groups that held significantly divergent understandings of the 
“drone problem” tended to avoid overt ties with transnational civil society. A closer look 
suggests that rather than just being a product of different understandings, the local actors 
who chose to rebuff or renegotiate partnering overtures with transnational groups 
reportedly did so because they did not assess them as worthy partners. These inverse 
vetting processes sometimes resulted in a refusal to work on drones with international 
partners at all, or resulted in processes of re-negotiation so that the proposed partnership 
better represented their interests.  
 
389 See Iraq Body Count’s website for information on analytics (“Iraq Body Count,” n.d.) 
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Rather than falling into the “Ban Drones” or “Lawful Usage” frames described in 
Chapter 1 and explored in Chapters 3 and 4, many of these local actors fall into the third 
frame category: the “Neocolonialism” frame. The “Neocolonialism” frame is more 
complex than the other categories, because it does not easily mesh with professionalized 
understandings of transnational advocacy. Here, technology, policy, state control, 
colonial legacies, and even hierarchy in transnational civil society are all imbricated 
problems. This differing frame, explored through interview evidence below, included a 
general distrust of INGOs as institutions and the problem conceptualization of drones as 
being merely one of many human security issues in KP. Indeed, due to a hostile political 
opportunity structure, activists described having to be extra cautious when choosing 
international partners in order to make sure the groups were trustworthy and would not 
betray their confidential assistance. In these ways, after making offers for partnership, 
gatekeeper organizations were subjected to vetting processes by these grassroots actors 
according to internal standards of ethicality and efficacy. 
All of that being said, there are prominent examples of Pakistani issue 
entrepreneurs and NGOs that did form robust and public ties with transnational civil 
society. These organizations – Foundational for Fundamental Rights and Pakistan Body 
Count – present similar problem conceptions and engage in the same advocacy 
repertoires as their transnational partners – they more easily fall into the “Lawful Usage” 
and “Ban Drones” frames. The analytical portion of the chapter is structured around 
exploring the unique dynamics present in these two clusters: groups that either avoided 
or heavily renegotiated relationships with transnationals, and groups that formed 
relationships with international partners. 
Skepticism towards INGOs and Transnational Society 
 According to several informants, the perceived untouchability of the drone issue 





methodological carelessness with confidentiality was a key reason that they cited for 
vetting transnational partners. Rather serving as a key impetus for reaching out to 
gatekeepers, the unique challenges of advocating on a national security-related issue from 
Pakistan led these actors to either renegotiate or circumnavigate the conditions of 
partnering in transnational advocacy. According to these activists, this was because the 
dangerous conditions made finding reliable partners essential. For example, this 
perception of danger for activists, at least in one important incident, led a local group to 
insist on renegotiating a collaborative proposal made by a large international 
organization. 
In addition to their career as a journalist, Ibrahim headed up a human security 
organization during the crescendo of US drone attacks. Ibrahim explained to me how in 
his opinion, the external dangers made the need for caution in conducting anti-drone 
advocacy and by extension choosing international partners very real. When I asked him 
to elaborate on these consequences for not being cautious with anti-drone advocacy in 
Pakistan, Ibrahim elaborated: 
Author: Because the government could block funding? Or block the 
project?— 
Ibrahim: They can block us (Ibrahim laughs darkly).  
Author: Yeah? The organization? 
Ibrahim: They [Pakistan’s security forces] can do whatever they wanted, you 
probably would be no more, if they don’t like you to be. To be no more … 
That’s an easy job for them. So why should we be taking on things this way?”392 
 
According to Ibrahim, the knowledge of these potential consequences factored 
into the need to vet potential international partners for reliability. It was in this 
security context that a large, well-known INGO that I will call Human Security 
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Champions (HSC)– which is primarily focused on accountability, transparency and 
human rights – first made contact with his group, according to Ibrahim. Given a 
desire to keep both his staff and organization safe, he rebuffed HSC’s initial proposal. 
Ibrahim described the outreach as such:  
“Human Security Champions worked quite closely on this very issue [armed 
drones]… and they were … asking for someone to partner with [so they] could 
get the issue published. But we were again, not willing and not able to do that 
under our name because it involves quite a bit of sensitivities, and here in 
Pakistan you know it’s impossible to talk- to get that published. So, we couldn’t 
do that … 393 
 Ibrahim rebuffed HSC’s initial proposal to partner, because they originally 
wanted to use his organization’s name for transparency purposes. He ended up 
negotiating a partnership with HSC that better suited his group’s unique position. 
They describe this negotiated compromise below: 
“We reached an understanding with [HSC] that we gather data from the people 
[in FATA]. We gathered some data about people, pictures, some evidences, 
and then we had some interviews and video evidence from the ground, um but 
again we were not able to get that published [under our name].  
That was the understanding, we had the data on the numbers, how much was 
the number of the drone attacks, where were these drone attacks … So that 
was the understanding, that we would do that [share information] but not 
under our own name. I have been providing them some input on that very 
issue, but when it would come to my name, uh, putting me- or for that matter 
doing that under my name, I would say no.”394 
This was indeed a process of negotiation between two actors with differing 
interests and vastly differing levels of power. Like other powerful INGOs, HSC puts a 
premium on accountability and transparency of information and sources, an operational 









HSC even suggested that they could work in an open partnership if he conducted the 
work under the mantel of a different domestic institution he was also affiliated with, in 
order to avoid naming his NGO. Ibrahim still “said no” to this revised proposal, and the 
partnership remained anonymous. Ibrahim’s NGO facilitated the fieldwork, while HSC 
used the information gathered to launch an influential report at the transnational level. In 
his words, Ibrahim had only agreed to partner after HSC could reliably demonstrate that 
they would take steps to protect their local partners and not merely benefit by extracting 
information and labor.396 
A healthy skepticism towards the motivations, efficacy and methods of 
transnational society. In addition to questioning the ability of INGOs to keep local 
partners safe, some respondents described to me that distance from the problem and a 
supposed lack of understanding of the tribal region’s conflict dynamics made INGOs 
poor potential partners. In light of these positions, the implementation of local actors’ 
goals and strategies resulted in a process of rigorous inverse vetting – in which external 
project proposals were measured against specific internal standards of quality and 
ethicality.  
For example, one reason that this inverse vetting process ended in rejection, 
according to what a local actor explained to me, was because they assessed a would-be 
transnational partner’s project as being poorly designed. HSC was not the only 
 
396 As an aside, Ibrahim’s intuition regarding the project’s contentiousness was borne out. 
HSC faced swift backlash from the Pakistani government upon the publication of the 
collaborative report. The document contains damning information about civilian harm 
caused by drones, evidenced in the interviews collected by Ibrahim’s organization. It also 
focuses criticism on both the US and Pakistani governments for not only failing to 
compensate drone strike victims, but also for perpetuating the poor human rights 
conditions in the tribal areas. In reaction, the Pakistani government banned the report’s 
lead author from returning to the country. The local chapter is now heavily observed; it 
requires prior approval for all its activities and had to abandon the drone issue altogether. 
In Ibrahim’s words on the backlash, “all that we were expecting, happened” Author 





international organization to reach out to Ibrahim’s group. An equally influential and 
more widely recognizable human rights gatekeeper organization that I will call 
International Human Rights Defenders (IHRD) also contacted Ibrahim as part of its 
wider drone-related advocacy. However, Ibrahim was much less enthusiastic about this 
INGO’s work, as they detail below: 
“IHRD worked a lot on the issue, and they would reach out to me from time 
to time, but that was not a properly designed study. That would be from, sort 
of project to project or say, for an article, or for that matter for the research … 
they would be just reaching out, asking for some questions, asking for some 
input I would be providing to them, and that’s not a properly designed study”397 
 Ibrahim clarified that where their confidential work with HSC was a real 
“partnership,” the type of collaboration IHRD proposed was a much less desirable 
parachuting in method. According to him, HSC’s desire to “get the story in FATA right” 
through intensive, on the ground fieldwork was a key difference between the two 
international groups’ approaches: 
“HSC did the project the way it should be. We filtered our people on the 
ground; we sent then out to FATA, South Waziristan, and everywhere we had 
these drone attacks on. They gathered the data; they collected the evidences 
[sic]; they did the whole tour on the ground; and we got that collected.”398 
The grievance that led Ibrahim to rebuff IHRD’s proposal – that internationals 
do not want to take the time to get FATA’s story correct “from the ground” – threaded 
through several interviews I conducted in Islamabad. The animating assumption of this 
grievance is that transnational civil society’s geographic and symbolic distance from 
Pakistan’s tribal regions breeds misperceptions over the human security problem in the 
area. For example, another interviewee named “Saeed” characterized INGO work on 
drones in Pakistan as primarily occurring from a “safe distance.” When asked about 
 






Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch’s work on the subject in the country, 
Saeed – an attorney based in Punjab – interrupted:  
“Where?! Drone strikes were happening in Pakistan! Alright? Maybe they were 
raising voices against… They were raising voice against [drones] at UN…” 
[They continued by clarifying why this distance is insulting, stating:] “…my point of view 
is, that even when your own government is silent, who will speak on your 
behalf? And who will speak on behalf of the people of FATA?”399  
 
In addition to appraising the methodology of a proposed project, this inverse 
vetting also extended to scrutinizing the funding agency behind INGO projects. This is 
evidenced in ‘Fahad’s’ decision to reject an offer of project partnership with a third 
INGO, which I will call Global Development Coalition (GDC) due to the fact that the 
project was funded by USAID. Fahad is the former president of a development-focused 
NGO that works in FATA, while GDC is a large international organization that focuses 
primarily on development in conflict and post-conflict zones, including projects on 
countering violent extremism. GDC contacted Fahad and proposed that their 
organizations collaborate on a rehabilitation project focused on civilians injured by the 
war on terror in what was then FATA. This project included working with victims of 
explosive remnants of war more generally, but also with civilians specifically affected by 
drone strikes. Fahad describes the project below, as well as the reason for rejecting it: 
“…that [project] was particularly for the bomb blast, you know, victims’ 
families and those who were injured in the bomb blast. It was funded by 
USAID, so we refused to partner. We received an offer from that 
organization [GDC]… [but] the funding was from USAID, so I refused. I 
said: ‘it’s just hypocrisy.’”400 
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Where Ibrahim had rejected an inverse boomerang throw for methodological 
reasons, Fahad rejected the gatekeeper’s overture for ethical reasons. The partnership 
GDC proposed would have certainly amplified the type of work Fahad’s group was 
already conducting in FATA. However, for Fahad, the proposed project’s monetary 
connection to very state perpetrating the violence was a red line he would not cross.    
Drones as Only Part of a Bigger Problem 
  Individuals that I spoke to who were from the drone-affected areas tended to 
view the security situation in the tribal regions much more broadly and historically than 
any single military tactic like drone strikes. For context, the legitimacy of the Durand 
Line – drawn up by colonial powers in 1893 to separate Afghanistan and Pakistan– has 
fomented ongoing conflict between both state and nonstate actors in the area. The 
border divides the region historically inhabited by Pashtun tribes – an ethnic group 
indigenous to the region that is now southern Afghanistan and northwestern Pakistan. 
This diaspora led to intense anti-colonial sentiments amongst the Pashtuns towards 
imperial Britain, and the continued recognition of the border motivates ongoing Pashtun 
nationalism that sees itself as oppositional to the Pakistani state. These pre-existing 
tensions came to the fore post-9/11, when the U.S. war in Afghanistan pushed militants 
deep within Pakistan, inflaming pre-existent domestic extremism issues. The post-9/11 
period has proven a bloody one for residents of the tribal areas, who are squeezed 
between terrorist attacks and extortion by extremists, and counterinsurgency operations 
by the state. 
 My interactions with “Massoud” offers an example of how some local actors 
view drone activism as fitting into this complex human security situation. Massoud is a 
Pashtun rights activist. Their work on the drone issue began early– according to them, 
they organized and led one of the first large protests against the policy in Islamabad. 





against the deaths caused by the 2011 jirga strike, that this activism was not in tandem 
with international groups’ or Imran Khan’s work on the subject, and that the extrajudicial 
killing of the targeted militants was not his concern:  
 
“When I was protesting, it [the motivation] was drone attack on civilians. The 
village council – the jirga… Many of the elders were just killed in that drone. 
That’s why I came out. Otherwise I was very loud against these armed groups. 
From the jihad and all the things. I denounce [militants] openly in my writings 
and speeches. But when that happened on jirga, I said no. That’s not the 
way.”401  
 
This qualifying language about drone protests being disconnected from support 
for militants gets to the heart of what Massoud thinks outsiders supposedly do not 
understand about FATA’s political situation. Namely, that the tribal area’s residents are 
not only killed in occasional drone strikes by the US government, but that they are also 
constantly subjected to terrorist attacks by militants and large-scale military operations by 
the Pakistani military. And, importantly, that many Pakistanis outside the tribal regions 
supposedly do not know much about the tribal regions due to its lack of coverage in the 
mainstream domestic media. Massoud continued, explaining to me his opinion that 
INGOs do not grasp this unique conflict situation: 
“Massoud: And by the way, the international organizations, the NGOs, are not 
very much aware of the dynamics. Because they are not aware about the 
relationship between the state and the tribal region. They don’t pay any 
attention to see how the state – you know what are the rules of business of the 
state in the region. 
Author: Could you go into that more? What don’t they understand? 
Massoud: Okay, uh, this region, the people of this region, they used for the 
Afghan war in the 80s. It was a very groundbreaking process for militarizing 
everything. Once they successfully militarized, then every action on them was 
justified. In Pakistan and internationally. And even the US, the Americans, 
 





considered these peoples savages. They considered the people savage, not -you 
know- human. There is no civilization, people are still living in tribal situations, 
its lawless, and no-man’s land. It’s lawless, so we have to do this [intervene 
militarily].” 
 
‘Shoaib’ (another interviewee present): Ilaqa gher means the land of others. It is 
the ilaqa gher of Pakistan. It is a state word used for the tribal area.” 
Massoud: The people within Pakistan, the policymakers and the researchers 
again they are not familiar with the dynamics in the tribal areas. How can 
international NGOs be? They are just imposing things. It is counter-productive 
… The international organization are not accurate while making opinion.”402 
 
As seen from this exchange, the perception of distance and power asymmetries 
between themselves and transnational civil society arises largely from this region’s 
difficult human security situation. This attitude was most pronounced in interviews with 
individuals from the tribal regions, like Massoud. This exchange also highlights how 
some local actors closest to the conflict think that transnational actors do not understand 
the conflict dynamics of the tribal regions enough to represent their interests. Of course, 
these are statements of opinion by specific individuals, and merely represent a perception 
and not necessarily objective reality. For example, as described earlier, the report that 
Ibrahim and HSC collaborated on did focus significant attention on the totality of the 
tribal area’s challenges. 
That being said, this “Neocolonialism” frame’s broad framing of human security 
threats is generally very different from how transnational civil society groups work, since 
professionalized organizations tend to focus on rigidly delineated issues. For example, 
both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch focus on concepts such as the 
legality of targeted killing, as well as the proportionality of civilian casualties in drone 







harm in the tribal areas, including civilian casualties by drones, but also internally 
displaced peoples, cultural discrimination, economic justice, and how both historical and 
modern colonial underpinnings perpetuate these problems. Out of this unique security 
situation arises the perception that the extrajudicial killing of terrorist suspects is not a 
problem with drones, but in fact a potential benefit. Additionally, given the general 
antagonistic attitudes towards the state within ethnic nationalist circles, concerns over 
state sovereignty are also non-issues. The “problem with drones” for these individuals 
then mostly surrounds lawful usage – civilian deaths, societal harm, cultural sovereignty, 
and the potential that the Pakistani state is complicit in the U.S. operations. 
 “Afzal,” an author who has published on these conflict dynamics in the tribal 
areas, explained his perception of these operational and ideational differences between the 
local and transnational: 
“So the international NGOs that are protesting, they are right in their own 
place because drones are used against humans. And whosoever is targeted 
by drones is killed extrajudicially. And this is wrong. That is against human 
rights, that is against fundamental rights, it is against anything that stands 
in this world. Whether it is religious or secular. So that is the major issue. 
We have another understanding… In Pakistan, Taliban are the vanguard 
of the Pakistani military establishment. So they [the Taliban] go there, and 
the military will follow. 
When they [INGOs] are speaking against the drone they … actually want 
peace. And when there is drone - the use of weaponized drone - that means 
there is no peace. It is disturbed. And so at their level they are right.  
But when it comes to the ground realities, when it comes to the common 
people, the affectees, so the people who are affected by the existence of 
these militants… If there are Taliban, and the drones are targeting, they 
will feel relieved. But the people at the international level, when they are 
campaigning against the drones at the international level, they actually want 
peace. They are against the extrajudicial killing of any individual; citizen of 
any country.  





… We do respect those [INGO] people who are against drones [targeting 
suspects]. But the people would certainly see that how drone is used … 
usually a common man, is least concerned with international politics.”403 
These differences in problem conception seemed to be a major reason activists like 
Massoud was uninterested in initiating ties with transnational groups, even when they were 
resisting drone strike casualties through protest with no response from the government. 
According to them, a focus on just one tactic like drones – rather than the entire portrait 
of dispossession, explained by Afzal above – is a simplistic understanding of the human 
security crisis the tribal areas face. For example, it was Massoud’s interpretation that many 
individuals in the tribal areas regard the militants who terrorize their villages and families 
with much more hatred than the drones. Again, in this context, drones are a problem when 
they hit and terrorize the wrong people – the legitimacy of extrajudicially killing a 
‘combatant’ is a non-issue, since these may be the same individuals perpetrating violence 
in their communities. According to Massoud as well as another interviewee named 
‘Shoaib,’ this was to the extent that some locals came to call the U.S. drones ababil – a 
reference to great Quranic birds that would drop tiny stones from the sky onto the 
approaching enemies of Mecca to kill them instantly.404 Massoud continued, elucidating 
how some individuals in FATA perceive the “biggest” threat in the wider humanitarian 
crisis to be the Pakistani state: 
“Those who are in favor of drone attacks were actually looking into it as an 
alternative to a massive military operation. Due to this massive and large-scale 
military operation, people used to force to move out of their towns, and farms. 
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This quote suggests that many closest to the ground are view acts of violence by 
both state and nonstate according to scale – and that drones are ‘the lesser evil’ in this 
calculus. A resident of KP who was present during my interview, “Javed,” was quick to 
agree with this assertion, but warned that “nobody is supporting drone without 
comparison.”406 Indicative of this complicated political context, Massoud informed me of 
another word locals used to describe drones: mangana. Mangana, they explained, captured 
the sound of the drone, but also the psychological terror that the buzz instilled in people 
at the height of the bombing. Massoud elaborated, comparing the drones to alternative 
repertoires of violence: “They are both evils, but nobody likes it. It’s [drone strike] a lesser 
evil... But it is an evil.”407 Descriptors like ababil and mangana demonstrate how activists like 
Massoud, Javed and Shoaib might perceive the focused messaging by INGOs, and even 
mid-level groups like Code Pink, as frustrating for their own political ends. This is because, 
in their opinion, the issue-based focus of transnational groups working on drones 
steamrolls the complicated local conflict dynamics within FATA. Javed’s closing statement 
eloquently presented this sentiment: 
“We are the victims. Whether the drones are ‘legal’ or ‘illegal,’ our people suffer, 
our children suffer, our schools and institutions suffer… So we are the victim. 
If someone says [under international law] it was militant who was the victim, it 
is not right. We are the victims.”408  
Making Connections 
 While all of the above suggests how differences in framing might kick off inverse 
vetting processes and ultimately hamper relationships with transnational NGOs, two 
outlying examples of close partnering between transnational and Pakistani NGOs merit 
closer examination. These Pakistani NGOs – the Foundation for Fundamental Rights 
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(FFR) and Pakistan Body Count (PBC)– collaborated with transnational activists to 
differing extents.409 The anti-drone frames that both organizations chose cohered with 
the hegemonic framing at the transnational level – the “Lawful Usage” frame. Since 
frame choice is a key factor that goes into whether or not a group engages in inverse 
vetting, these frame similarities between these two Pakistani NGOs and their 
transnational partners may have made their relationships less conflictual. In their own 
ways, both of these organizations’ presentations of the “drone problem” map onto their 
transnational counterparts’ “Lawful Usage” framings, unlike the groups discussed above 
who fall into the “Neocolonialism” frame. 
 Founded by barrister Shahzad Akbar, FFR is a Pakistani human rights NGO that 
advocates on issues such as lethal drone strikes, state torture and capital punishment. 
Attorneys affiliated with the NGO represented compensation cases for drone strike 
victims in national courts with the aim of holding responsible both the Pakistani and US 
governments. For example. FFR filed a case on behalf of families affected by the 2011 
jirga strike in which the Peshawar High Court ruled that US drone strikes were illegal, and 
that the Pakistani government must provide legal redress to the victims. Explaining the 
case, FFR argues that “the strikes constitute a serious breach of the Geneva 
Conventions,” and that “the U.S. Government is bound to compensate all the victims’ 
families and that the Pakistani Government should take steps to ensure that this 
happened immediately.”410 For an example of the “Lawful Usage” Frame on FFR’s 
website, see Figure 1: 
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Figure 5.1: “Lawful Usage” Frame on FFR’s Drone Portal 
The most (in)famous of these cases was the one filed on behalf of Kareem Khan, in an 
attempt to bring a criminal case against CIA officials in Pakistan. As mentioned earlier, 
Akbar purposely outed the identity of the CIA station chief in Islamabad by naming him 
as a party in the lawsuit, stating that the US had no “legal authority” to conduct lethal 
strikes within the country.  
Data scientist Dr. Zeeshan Usmani founded PBC in 2006 in order to create a 
dataset of terrorist bombings for his doctoral dissertation. Frustrated with the lack of 
credible casualty numbers in what was formerly called FATA, Usmani later expanded his 
initial advocacy project to include the armed drone issue to his website’s database. PBC 
collected this data from media sources and hospitals and published the numbers on their 
website in order to publicize the “intensity” of the human security situation in Pakistan. 
As an academic and data scientist, Usmani has published research on drone deaths in 
venues such as Brown University’s Cost of War project.411 While he stopped updating the 
project’s online presence in 2014, PBC offers several models of data presentation, from 
charts with granular details of individual strikes to interactive maps that allows visitors to 
see the exact location of the strikes.  
 





Unlike the individuals and group discussed in the previous subsection, FFR and 
PBC have partnered openly with multiple international groups, including both national- 
and transnational-focused groups. PBC is a member of the transnational casualty 
recorders network called Every Casualty, which also includes international NGOs like 
members of the European Forum on Armed Drones (EFAD) Article 36 and The Bureau 
of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ). In terms of nationally-focused NGOs, Akbar and 
CodePink founder Medea Benjamin share both a close professional relationship. In 2012, 
by invitation of Akbar and Imran Khan, CodePink members travelled to Islamabad in 
order to participate in a planned anti-drone protest, called The Waziristan Peace March. 
The CodePink delegation of 35 Americans met with Shahzad Akbar in Islamabad, where 
they hosted a joint news conference for their planned march. This protest was planned as 
a caravan to South Waziristan but was blocked at a checkpoint before it could enter the 
tribal areas. Both groups’ stated purpose of the march was to bring visibility to the 
civilian casualties caused by drones, and the illegal lethal targeting by the US 
government.412  
In terms of the transnational level, Akbar himself is a key network broker within 
the wider drone issue area. While running FFR, he also held a long-term visiting research 
fellowship at Reprieve – a UK organization and EFAD member. In this partnership, 
FFR has played a largely facilitating role, brokering meetings with people impacted by US 
drone strikes in Pakistan across Europe and the US. He also speaks about the human 
rights implications of drone strikes in international forums well-attended by policymaking 
audiences, such as a side event on armed drones at the UN in 2017, and an event in 
 






Islamabad where he hosted a UN Special Rapporteur.413 Figure 2 below shows a visual 
example of these transnational linkages from FFR’s website: 
 
Figure 5.2: FFR’s Anti-Drone Campaign Partner Page 
FFR also maintains an organizational presence at international advocacy summits 
like the Humanitarian Disarmament Forum, which is also attended by representatives 
from gatekeeper organizations like HRW and AI.414 Akbar also authored the chapter 
discussing drones from a human rights law perspective in the 2017 Humanitarian Impact 
of Armed Drones report, a key advocacy document from the transnational humanitarian 
disarmament community.415  
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 While several factors likely explain why FFR and PBC maintained open 
partnerships with transnational civil society when other Pakistani groups did not, these 
two groups’ preferred anti-drone frames may be an important part of the story as to why 
an inverse vetting process did not cut off these relationships.  
As a casualty counting NGO, PBC taps into a wider transnational community 
that puts a premium on transparency and accountability surrounding wartime deaths. 
These organizations, such as TBIJ, focus not only on counting the dead but also call for 
clear targeting criteria in order to assess the policy’s guidelines for using lethal force – a 
frame that falls into the “Lawful Usage” category. Usmani similarly argues that the main 
“problem of drone warfare” is the opaqueness of the policy’s targeting procedures.416 He 
counters the U.S. government’s official precision-strike narrative, arguing that “while 
drone technology may be able to reduce a building to a debris field [and] leav[e] the one 
next to it standing,” the government’s wide targeting criteria cannot reap precise 
outcomes.417 This type of argumentation is in line with many member organizations in 
the Casualty Recorders Network.418  
As a human rights advocacy group, FFR engages in the parlance of universal 
human rights law.419 FFR’s “problems with drones” are primarily legalistic, in that they 
are concerned with extrajudicial execution, rule of law and sovereignty, as exemplified in 
this official statement: “drone assassinations violate international and domestic law, 
negate due process, and violate the principle that everyone is innocent before the law 
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until proven guilty.”420 International human rights groups have consistently framed the 
problem of drones as one of policy – whether the US’s use of targeted killing is legal or 
not. Akbar’s contribution to the 2017 Humanitarian Impact of Drones report adopts this 
same legalistic language, with terms like “targeted killing,” “collateral damage.”421 This is 
echoed on the organizations’ website, which argues that contrary to the strikes killing 
mostly militants, “mostly civilians have been killed with some militant “collateral 
damage” resulting.”422 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This chapter has explored how relational processes between local grassroots 
actors and international activists influence the overall formation of cohesive transnational 
advocacy, and suggests the need for greater attention to coalition-building processes at 
the “other end” of the boomerang throw. In the anecdotes above, we can see that a 
number of local Pakistani actors engaged in inverse vetting processes to determine if 
their potential international partners perceived legitimacy of INGOs. In this analysis, 
according to my interviewees, INGO legitimacy rested on two specific criteria for local 
anti-drone activists: project methodology and ethicality. Opinions on the true human 
security issues in the drone-affected areas and a perceived misalignment of interests with 
and distrust of international NGOs reportedly factored into some local actors’ decisions 
on how they pursued relationships with transnational partners. This was contrary to the 
instances in which outlying groups formed ongoing relationships with transnational 
partners.  
This chapter also offers support for the existence of broader inverse models of 
transnational advocacy, like Pallas’s (2017) inverse boomerang. Indeed, in the anecdotes 
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shared above, it was the large gatekeeping NGO that first reached out to the local NGO 
with specific partnership proposals, rather than the other way around as existent theory 
suggests. Building from Pallas’s (2017) work that characterizes INGOs as desiring 
partnership with smaller groups for legitimacy, the above case study also suggests that 
local groups form relationships with international activists over the perceived legitimacy 
of International NGOs as well. This dissertation’s original concept of inverse vetting 
constitutes an expansion of this “inverse advocacy processes” literature, by suggesting 
that the decision of local actors to work with large gatekeepers may also shape 
transnational advocacy processes like cohesive campaign messaging formation.  
Importantly, however, this inverse vetting pattern should not be read as a 
celebration of unconstrained agency on the parts of grassroots actors. Advocacy 
dynamics take place over an uneven terrain of power, and the ability to vet actors does 
not have the same weight at both ends of the boomerang throw. Where vetting processes 
by gatekeepers have a very real impact on whose ideas get representation in global 
governance, vetting processes by less powerful actors should perhaps be thought of as 
more acts of resistance, with both symbolic and material power. The unwillingness to 
partner with a larger organization may influence the overall network’s cohesion and 
legitimacy but the gatekeeper organizations, with their hegemonic understandings and 
resources, ultimately remain the governors. In the face of this asymmetry, it is then the 
willingness to say “no” that becomes an important symbolic form of power; one which 
allows the local actor to create a momentary disruption to make their voices and interests 
heard. Here, inverse vetting process should invite scholars to think of the ways that less 
powerful actors still matter within networks and to further explore the multiplicity of 
ways that they influence global processes like transnational advocacy. 
Finally, scholars interested in norm effects – and more specifically, their 





Many see that norms surrounding civilian protection in armed conflict strengthened over 
the course of 20th century warfare, with governments increasingly facing heavier censure 
for using indiscriminate military tactics and weapons.423 This censure may extend to 
domestic constituencies as well as international ones— public opinion of foreign policy 
has proven a potentially important variable in democratic elections.424 In part due to an 
increasing sensitivity to the civilian protection norm, the ability of a weapon to deliver 
precise, sanitized warfare with minimal casualties factors into American citizens’ support 
for a specific weapon.425 Given these conditions, drone warfare might constitute a case of 
norm shadow effects, in that it could be viewed as an evolution in military strategy that is 
actually becoming more sensitive towards civilian deaths, albeit in ways many 
international activists would not approve of. Interestingly, the actors closest to the 
violence in the above case seem the most aware of this possible drone shadow effect, in 
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Implications and Conclusion 
 
Introduction 
 As part of the adjacent events for the 2017 Humanitarian Disarmament Forum, 
participants had the option to attend a gala party on a cruise ship-sized vessel, called The 
Peace Boat, docked in Manhattan. The Peace Boat is a Japanese NGO focused on 
sustainability and human rights; it holds a special consultative status with the Economic 
and Social Council of the UN. The organization uses its boat to conduct most of its 
activities, including international voyages to promote the UN sustainability goals. The 
gala itself was very formal; with tray-passed appetizers, bars, champagne and sake toasts. 
I attended this event as part of my fieldwork to watch (and participate with) the 
transnational activists I had just spoken to the previous day about their work on drones. I 
discussed the intricacies of international law and politics with a champagne flute in my 
hand, on the deck of the boat, with the late-night Manhattan skyline as a backdrop. I 
remembered these discussions especially vividly when I was in Pakistan conducting 
fieldwork for this project a year later. The sheer disconnect between the two locations 
was startlingly obvious; I felt impossibly far away, in every way, from that glitzy night in 
Manhattan meant to celebrate the accomplishments of the activists in attendance.426 
 At first glance, this stark difference between the transnational and violence-
affected levels of anti-drone activism seems to be a strong instantiation of IR theories 
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that point to the power of INGOs in determining transnational advocacy. For example, 
Carpenter’s (2011) elite gatekeeping argument discusses power within an advocacy 
network by showing how well-resourced and well-connected actors set the agenda. The 
implication here is that smaller actors are unable to affect a given advocacy issue network 
independently in a significant way. This gatekeeper vetting hypothesis seemed very much 
mirrored in the power asymmetries I witnessed during fieldwork as reflected in the 
opening vignette, because there was no mention of the less dominant anti-drone frames 
amongst transnational activists attending the gala or during the weekend-long forum. 
These gatekeeping effects are certainly sometimes operative in specific instances within 
the anti-drone network, most apparently in Chapters 3 and 4. 
The notion of elite vetting is largely based on studying organizations with varying 
levels of power that are all based in the Global North. But this focus on the Global 
North does not tell the full story. Scholars who study transnational advocacy 
participation by actors in the Global South have shown us that it is equally important to 
consider how the less powerful act in a network.427 For example, as I showed in Chapter 
5, smaller and less connected groups not only have their own ways of defining the stakes 
of a security issue, they also actively resist the frames of larger civil society groups and 
base their partnering decisions on this calculus. As I showed in Chapters 3 and 4, this 
inverse dynamic exists within the Global North as well. Taking a grounded approach, 
which is better suited to studying power “up” - rather than down or horizontally - shows 
that otherwise “less powerful” actors are politically significant within the network.428  
As argued in the theory chapter of this dissertation and demonstrated in the 
empirical chapters, assuming that power is exercised only by powerful actors risks 
overlooking or undervaluing how smaller actors present their goals, how they resist  
 






hegemonic power within the network and how their actions can have political effects 
that exceed their intentions. Specifically, as both smaller actors in the Global North and 
South use their own frames for the drone issue, refusing to work with or heavily 
renegotiating the terms of partnering with larger actors, the drone network becomes less 
cohesive and with fragmented messaging. In short, geographically and culturally 
dispersed actors resist and exert their own power by seeking to determine what the issue 
is to begin with. These diffused exercises of power produces the unintended effect of 
hampering the overall network from coming together in collaboration to create an 
overarching anti-drone umbrella frame.  
In the remainder of this conclusion, I unpack these theoretical concepts in 
greater detail, specifically through the lens of the dynamic I have called inverse vetting 
before discussing the implications of this concept for the efficacy and possible futures of 
transnational advocacy networks. 
Inverse Vetting and Power in Transnational Advocacy Networks 
The concept of inverse vetting is used throughout this dissertation as a way to 
explore how power is operative in transnational advocacy networks and its effects. In 
doing so, inverse vetting shows us how smaller, non-gatekeeping actors produce their 
own discourses and positions on a human security issue and at times actively assess 
whether the position of larger groups fits with their own advocacy goals. In the 
subsections below, I will detail how this dissertation has discussed these dynamics in 
terms of how actors with varying levels of political power have navigated the anti-armed 
drones advocacy issue network.  
Vetting Dynamics Between the Global North & South 
 In Chapter 5 I examined how drone-affected populations –people living closest 
to the violence – frame the issue as an imperialistic project. Their assessment was a 





particular geographic area (Northern Pakistan and Southern Afghanistan) had historically 
been the subject of both colonial and post-colonial pacification projects. Crucially, these 
grassroots actors saw transnational actors associated with the Global North – such as 
Human Rights Watch – as themselves being part of a larger globalist project of 
domination and cultural erasure. This globalist project includes both international states 
as well as their own national government of Pakistan. This perspective, engrained by 
these historical experiences and interpretations, gave these actors the discursive tools 
with which to justify not working with powerful organizations in the drone issue network. 
This is despite the fact that these larger actors were working to mitigate and or regulate 
the very drone violence grassroots actors were enduring.  
Vetting Dynamics within the Global North 
 Inverse vetting is not just an argument about a difference in culture and a 
corresponding disagreement on how to advocate as a result. The Global North/Global 
South divide and the historically mediated power asymmetries it entails gives grassroot 
actors significant reasons to vet the transnationals – even though traditional IR theory 
stipulates that they should want to work with powerful partners.429 But inverse vetting 
also occurs within the Global North between activists with differing power, where 
activists share the same cultural sensibilities at least on a broad level. As I demonstrated 
in Chapter 4, some US domestic groups refuse to work with larger groups based on the 
latter’s lack of perceived radicality. This is because they see drones as a particularly 
insidious expression of warfare and violent conflict, something that makes war more 
efficient and one-sided. Their opposition to drones, unlike Human Rights Watch (HRW), 
is not just a concern with legality but with war in general. As I further showed, this 
opposition to transnational framing was grounded in a perception of the US as a 
 





perpetrator of “endless wars,” including past conflicts like the Vietnam War. Again, the 
anti-war discourse made it possible for these groups to define the drone issue in their 
own way and assess the larger groups’ position as deficient in achieving their advocacy 
goals.  
However, it would be inaccurate to say that the US domestic actors – unlike the 
violence-affected actors – largely rejected working with the transnational level. Indeed, 
there were instances in which discerning actors did see partnering with large gatekeepers 
as useful. Furthermore, we can also see the traditional gatekeeper vetting model at work 
in this level, as Human Rights Watch purposely avoided partnering with groups it 
perceived as taking too strong of stances on issues of war and peace. Nevertheless, 
whether or not US domestic actors chose to work with larger groups on particular 
occasions, they continued to use their own frames and internal discourses to vet those 
opportunities. In short, in instances where partnerships seemed useful, domestic actors 
came to that decision based on their own goals and frames. 
 When we focus on the transnational level of the network itself, we can see similar 
patterns. More specifically, we can observe examples of less powerful groups not simply 
kotowing to their more powerful counterparts. In Chapter 3, I used the European Forum 
on Armed Drones (EFAD) as a case study within a case study in order to explore how 
actors at the same level of the network, but with differing levels of power from one 
another, make partnering decisions. While EFAD from the outside appears to be a 
cohesive network with a comparatively consolidated guiding frame, tracing the processes 
through which this “unity” was achieved reveals unique elements of inverse vetting. 
Specifically, it shows us some of the conditions under which actors with fundamentally 
differing frames agree to work with one another.  
The EFAD case reveals that, according to what my interviewees reported, the 





component that can determine the result of an inverse vetting process. For example, 
smaller and more radical groups initially did not want to work with the gatekeepers 
within EFAD because It was their opinion that the gatekeeper’s approach to drones was 
too bland. But through a variety of sustained, process-based consensus building activities, 
the less powerful actors described attaining a level of satisfaction with the process high 
enough to buy into the collaborative project. These lengthy deliberations and sustained 
back-and-forth’s between EFAD members created a model flexible enough to promote 
heterogenous membership. Again, key to reaching this collaboration was the idea that the 
less powerful actors’ concerns were taken seriously by the gatekeepers, even if their frames 
were not reflected in the final group advocacy project.  
We can compare this transnational-to-transnational process to the transnational-
to-violence-affected processes. Far from experiencing such a process-based collaborative 
advocacy model, the Pakistani activists described that they perceived the transnationals as 
merely “parachuting in,” an approach they said felt insulting and delegitimizing to their 
lived experiences. In the EFAD case, the sustained and at times grinding commitment to 
make all its members feel respected in their heterogeneous views on drones led the 
smaller actors to accept ties with the gatekeepers in their inverse vetting processes. 
Contrarily, this described lack of inclusion and respect on the part of transnationals led 
the violence-affected activists’ inverse vetting processes to result in refusal to partner.  
Implications of Inverse Vetting for Advocacy Networks 
 As with elite agenda vetting, the complex process of inverse vetting has potential 
consequences for transnational advocacy, both in terms of how it is conducted and who 
can participate in it. At the most basic level - at least as demonstrated in my findings 
specifically on the drone issue - inverse vetting might impact the contours of a network; 
put simply, how the overall network “looks” and the cohesiveness of its overall 





conceptualizations of political and social power within networks. Below I explore these 
two implications, which I see as the primary theoretical and empirical imports of the 
inverse vetting dynamic I have defined and described throughout this project. 
First, inverse vetting processes may lead to more disconnection within advocacy 
networks. For example, in addition to exploring the lack of an anti-drone umbrella frame, 
another animating empirical puzzle of this dissertation has been why there was so little 
connection between the violence-affected level and the transnational level; a dynamic 
that theory may have predicted as existing in a more robust manner. Finding that the elite 
agenda vetting argument was not applicable in the drone case, a ground-up approach to 
explaining this gap pointed to the internal decision-making processes of the violence-
affected actors themselves as rebuffing or heavily renegotiating ties to transnationals, 
even when powerful organizations sought ties. Just as elite vetting keeps certain human 
security issues off the agenda, inverse vetting may have a similar impact, with the key 
difference being the origin of the actors who erect barriers to partnering. Put simply, 
inverse vetting expands the number of actors who can say “yes” or “no” to partnerships 
and issue framings within a network.  
Second, inverse vetting expands our understanding of how power is operative 
within transnational advocacy networks. This expansion of agentic actors may mean that 
coalition-building in human security issues is even stickier and more conflictual than 
once thought, especially when considering the importance of discourse. The occurrence 
of inverse vetting at different levels of the transnational network means that gatekeeper 
organizations do not entirely control the contours of the network and that they do not 
entirely control the discourse on a given issue. On a basic level, these findings expand big 
theoretical questions in international relations regarding who can participate in global 
civil society, and to what effects.  More specifically, looking through the lens of inverse 





especially evident when we consider how seemingly small actions and decisions within 
the drone network – such as a comparably tiny Pakistani group’s refusal to partner with a 
gatekeeper organization over distaste of their framings – have large consequences when 
scaled up to the overall transnational network. 
These power asymmetries I observed in the network are characterized by actors’ 
context-specific and historical experiences of conflict that pre-date the use of armed 
drones. The most obvious and tangible connection here is between the Pakistani activists 
and their constant contending with legacies of colonialism and state domination. But 
grassroots actors in the US, such as the most radical anti-war demonstrators who willfully 
got arrested during Vietnam protests, also bring their experiences of conflict to armed 
drone advocacy. These histories are crucial, because they determine the prisms through 
which each actor create their framings and conceptualizations around armed drones. 
These distinct, historically informed differences – operationalized through advocacy 
frames – allows these actors to claim space in the wider drone issue network that more 
powerful actors must contend with. Here, we see that it is not just power asserted that 
matters, but also power resisted – which itself is a result of unique histories. The drones 
case invites us as scholars to perhaps rethink advocacy not by strictly delineated issues, as 
the most powerful political actors do, but rather as stretching well beyond into the realms 
of history, morality, and policy.  
These implications raise important questions, both empirically and theoretically, 
about efficacy and egalitarianism in transnational advocacy. As detailed in the 
introductory chapter, the armed drone activists were not able to create a concerted 
campaign under a guiding umbrella frame such as the one that coalesced around 
landmines and nuclear weapons. Instead, the drone network remains loosely connected 
and fractured around three different meta-frames, which themselves have disagreements 





around the concept of “resistance” to globalist projects, which is mutually exclusive to 
transnational civil society’s definition of success. Taken together, the empirical chapters 
of this dissertation show that one large campaign unified by concise messaging did not 
emerge. This is in large part because the three meta-frames actually at times act as three 
distinct anti-drones campaigns—ones that are sometimes working at cross-purposes with 
one another. While the influx of funding from Open Society Foundation on global anti-
drones work did not make these groups competitors for funding, by approaching the 
issue in contradictory ways, these actors still ended up competing for policy attention 
nonetheless. 
This dissertation also brings up the question of egalitarianism and efficacy in 
transnational advocacy networks, and where these two concepts may have an 
opportunity to overlap. From a traditional view, the agency of less powerful actors who 
might inversely vet their agendas may be frustrating, as this lack of cooperation is 
“ineffective” and “inefficient” in terms of civil society politics. Deep differences 
oftentimes exist between actors seeking to advocate on the same human security issue. 
As it stands, gatekeeper groups tend to approach this difference by either trying to iron 
them out to achieve an advocacy message digestible to state actors,430 or by bringing on a 
group from the Global South in a “token” role to boost campaign legitimacy without 
including their voices.431  
But the armed drone case shows that there is potentially another route that might 
expand participation in transnational advocacy in a meaningful and inclusive way. This 
potential is evidenced in the fact that the majority of the less powerful actors were willing 
– on their own terms – to work in coalition with other actors, but ultimately opted not to 
when the gatekeepers did not demonstrate their willingness to take their partnership 
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seriously. Put simply, the opportunity for connections were there and the armed drone 
advocacy issue was not predestined to reap suboptimal results. Distinct decisions made at 
key junctures, by a variety of actors with varying levels of power, led to the 
disconnectedness of this issue network. For example, the Pakistani activist who rebuffed 
and refused two gatekeeper organizations ultimately ended up renegotiating a partnering 
proposal by a third and joined into a meaningful and productive relationship with that 
group.  
Perhaps the prospect for more egalitarian and effective advocacy lies in 
embracing the messiness of this renegotiation through a more reflexive approach to 
advocacy – one that entails the gatekeeper organizations recognizing their own 
positionality and complicity in geopolitical power structures.432 Of course, this sort of 
deep self-reflection on the part of a large and entrenched institutional actor is daunting 
and will likely take scarce resources. But given the ultimately normative goals of these 
institutions in the area of promoting human security, such self-reflection is a necessary 
and worthwhile investment for realizing their goals. 
Looking Forward 
The current state of the drone advocacy issue does not bode well for its future. 
This is evidenced from both an empirical standpoint, looking at how many advocacy 
products are created on the topic, as well as from the perceptions of activists. Nearly 
every activist I spoke to, when asked about the current state of the anti-armed drone 
advocacy issue, described it as “dead,” “done,” or “dying,” even if they themselves still 
worked on the issue and described it as being a “very important” topic for human 
security. This is despite the fact that more countries and nonstate actors than ever before 
are researching and developing their own armed drone technologies. This pessimistic 
 






outlook is also reflected in my own observations on the issue’s evolution over three and a 
half years.  
During the latter part of my time researching for this dissertation, organizations 
are making key shifts away from the topic altogether. For example, where ReThink 
Media has been publishing a weekly bulletin of drone-specific updates for years called the 
“Drone Roundup,” at the end of 2020 the listserv title was changed to “ReThink 
Roundup,” and now focuses on an array of national security issues. EFAD itself, which I 
have described as one of the most active and well-connected hubs, are currently having 
internal end-of-life discussions for the network, which includes decisions on how to back 
away from the issue but still perhaps keep their website archived. The Interfaith Network 
on Armed Drones is also ending its national conferences within the first few months of 
2021. Perhaps most ominously, one of the largest funders for drone work, Open Society 
Foundation, is stepping away from the issue in a significant way, according to an 
employee in a management position.  
There are several reasons for this move away from the anti-drone advocacy issue. 
First, many smaller groups are either ending or slowing their anti-drone work because 
their primary source of funding – OSF – is stepping away from the issue. Second, 
activists have blamed the Trump Administration’s chaotic approach to foreign policy as 
dropping the armed drones issue far down their list of priorities. In the words of a HRW 
activist, the drones topic stood out as problematic under the Obama Administration, but 
“when so much is broken” under the Trump Administration, she said it is hard to justify 
focusing closely on one small piece of the puzzle.433 Third, at least according to the 
activists I spoke with, there is issue fatigue within the community over armed drones. 
This arises from a perception that the anti-drones activists “missed the boat” in terms of 
 





getting states to regulate drones early on, and that proliferation and use has gone too far 
to reel back in. Some activists even suggested that seeking a preemptive weapons ban on 
autonomous technology would be easier now than achieving regulation of armed drones, 
since drones have been too “normalized” now.  
This dissertation has focused on advocacy on armed drones as it has existed in 
transnational space for about two decades. As has been discussed previously, practices, 
technologies, acquisitions, and policies on armed drones have evolved relatively 
unabated, making armed drones an entrenched feature of contemporary conflict during 
this timeframe. Of course, a counterfactual here – what would have happened if the 
drone issue network cohered early on – is impossible to make confidently and perhaps 
unfair to the activists who have worked consistently on the issue from its inception, 
given the increased resources the military hegemon has poured into distanced and 
remote warfare. But just as the drone issue network wasn’t a foregone conclusion, 
neither was the trajectory or character of state use.  
Despite these disheartening developments from within the network, after twenty 
years there may finally be some movement on the part of the US government on 
rethinking the 2001 Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF). Again, the AUMF has 
been the guiding foreign policy doctrine that has served as the legal basis for some of the 
most controversial aspects of the US drone program (such as conducting strikes outside 
warzones) and counterterrorism operations more broadly. it is important to remember 
that the AUMF is much bigger than drones, as it opens questions about executive war 
powers. The significance of the fact that the Biden Administration is considering 
changing the legal framework for the war against terrorists cannot be overstated in terms 
of the effects it would have on US foreign policymaking.434 Whether this potential switch 
 





in foreign policy direction is a product of domestic war fatigue, an opportune juncture to 
rethink big policy questions opened by the COVID-19 pandemic and the one term 
presidency of Donald Trump, the result of decades-long work from activists and critics, 
or hard-headed Executive Office realism to pass the buck to Congress on foreign wars435 
are all empirical questions ripe for future research. It is very likely a mixture of all these 
factors. 
Returning to this dissertation’s implications in this changing security 
environment, the drone advocacy issue network case stands to teach transnational 
activists important lessons that they can take forward to future human security 
campaigns. Regardless of external policy developments on the advocacy issues, inverse 
vetting exists and should be taken seriously. Because as we can see from the drone case, a 
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